
Class iJ :' '\ 



Book_^ 



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COPYRIGOT DEPOSIT 






G 7 



OUR 110 DAYS* FIGHTING 



OUR 
110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

BY 
ARTHUR W. PAGE 




With Many Maps in Text 

{And Two Large Maps at the Back) 



Garden City New York 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 

1920 



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V 



COPYRIGHT, I919, 1920, BY 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF 

TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, 

INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN 



MAR 18 1920 



iGl,A565239_ 



TO 
MY FATHER 

WHO SACRIFICED HIS LIFE TO THE END 
THAT AMERICA SHOULD DO ITS PART 
IN THE DEFENSE OF CIVILIZATION 



FOREWORD 

THE Americaa people realize in a general way 
what wonderful work was done by the Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces in the great war. They 
scarcely realize, however, to any extent, that this 
work was done in the face of difficulties all but in- 
surmountable, or that General Pershing and those 
under him accomplished miracles in overcoming 
adverse conditions that sprang from many causes, 
most of them going back to our lack of preparation 
for war, some of them inseparable from war, and, 
therefore, unavoidable. 

The country may well be proud of the fact, in 
spite of our general lack of preparation for war, that 
in the great Meuse-Argonne battle — which proved 
the decisive battle of 191 8, and which lasted from 
September 26th to November nth — the quality of 
our leadership and plans were such that our par- 
tially trained troops were able to drive back the 
picked troops of the German Army from Verdun 
to Sedan. 

In the course of these operations, three strongly 
prepared defensive lines, in a terrain which in itself 
afforded great natural obstacles, were captured from 
the enemy, in spite of the effort of the enemy to 
hold these lines at all cost to prevent the ruin of his 
armies on the Western Front. 



viii FOREWORD 

They can further be proud of the fact that our 
leadership, plans, and the devotion of our men were 
such that this great victory was won with a total 
loss on our side of approximately 9,000 less than 
that inflicted on the enemy. 

What the American Expeditionary Forces accom- 
plished in France forms a grand picture that com- 
pels the admiration of the patriotic American. The 
small-souled critic may pick up a magnifying glass 
and apply it to the picture in an endeavour to bring 
out prominently small flaws that, in the distorted 
view of the glass, may appear great, but when seen 
in correct perspective and relation to the remainder 
of the picture, do not affect in any way its 
grandeur. 

Those of us who were called upon to hold more 
or less responsible positions in the American Expe- 
ditionary Forces in France, and who are, therefore, 
acquainted with the facts, feel that Mr. Page in 
his book, "Our no Days' Fighting," has rendered 
a distinct public service in giving a splendid vista 
of the organization of the American Armies in 
France, and of the period of fighting that began 
with Cantigny and ended with Sedan. 

Apart from the official reports, which are to come 
out later, nothing can appear that will have greater 
immediate interest than Mr. Page's book. It 
forms a brief, readable, and concise account of the 
part the American troops played in Europe. In 
this necessarily brief record we get only a glimpse 
of the principal difficulties that confronted General 



FOREWORD ix 

Pershing and his staff in France. It would take 
hundreds of volumes to recite them all, little and 
great, and in the detail necessary to a clear under- 
standing of their importance to all our operations. 

The soldiers, whose devotion to duty has set a 
new standard in our army, and their leaders from 
General Pershing down, including the staffs who 
directed operations in the American Expeditionary 
Forces; who spent days and nights of heart-breaking 
anxiety and labour in struggling with untoward con- 
ditions; whose motto was, "GET RESULTS," 
under any and all circumstances, and who finally 
presented to their country a victorious army — are 
satisfied to rest their case with the Nation, feeling 
sure of a just verdict. 

J. W. McAndrew, 

Major General U. S. Army. 

Chief of Staff, A. E. F., 

May 6, 191 8, to May 26, 1919. 



CONTENTS 
Foreword by Major General McAndrew 



PAGB 



I. Our Training and Our Plan of Campaign 3 

II. A Little Battle That Proved a Great 

Point and Made 100,000 Men ... 20 

III. Our Sixty Days Under the French . . 31 

IV. The Triumph and Humour of St. Mihiei 62 
V. The Campaign of the Argonne-Meuse . 83 

VI. With the AUies 142 

Statistics of the First Army .... 267 



LIST OF MAPS 



PAGE 



The American Army's Supply System ... 7 ^ 

Seicheprey and the Fixed Trench System . . 12 *^ 

Artillery Plan for the Cantigny Attack . . 22 " 

The Plan of the First American Attack . . 23 '^ 

Cantigny and the Trenches of the War of Move- 
ment 27 

Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood ... 35 -^ 

Ludendorff's First Effort to Widen the Marne 

Salient 39 

Ludendorff's Second Effort to Widen the Marne 

Salient 41 

Where the Tide of War Changed .... 48 

America's Part in Clearing the Marne Salient 55 

The Topography of the St. Mihiel Salient . 63 

The Official Plan of the St. Mihiel Attack . . 67 

The Lane of the 42nd's Advance at St. Mihiel 69 

The Allied Advance . 77 

The Woods of the Argonne-Meuse Battlefield 92 

The Roads of the Argonne-Meuse .... 95 

The Official Plan of the Argonne-Meuse Attack 98 



Xlll 



xiv LIST OF MAPS 

PAGE 

Looking from the American Positions, Septem- 
ber 26th 106 

Relief Map of Montfaucon Area .... 107 

The German Defence Lines . . . . . . 115 

The Verdun Hills and the Woevre Plain . . 134 

The Last Battle 136 

Where We Cut the German Communications . 137 

Two Detail Maps of the Argonne-Meuse. Supplement 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



Our 110 Days' Fighting 

CHAPTER I 

OUR TRAINING AND OUR PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 

THE first independent offensive action by the 
American Army in Europe, the taking of Can- 
tigny, took place only five and a half months before 
the war ended. 

The first American division to take over an active 
sector of line did so only in April, six months before 
the war ended. 

And the American First Army, formed on the 20th 
of July, had its first action at St. Mihiel, September 
1 2th, just two months before the war came to an end. 

The active fighting of any large bodies of American 
troops was confined to two main periods — from 
Chateau-Thierry to the Vesle, some sixty days, in 
which eight of our divisions took part; and the 
Argonne-Meuse battle, forty-seven days, in which 
twenty-two divisions took part. There were two 
or three days' fighting at St. Mihiel in between these 
two times. There were also several other notable 
actions, as those of the 27th and 30th divisions with 
the British, but none involving more than two 
divisions. 



4 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

In other words, our army just barely got in at 
the finish, and to do that it had to fight before either 
its training or equipment was ready. But if it had 
not gone in, ready or unready, and had not paid the 
price when it did, the war would not have ended on 
November nth. The war ended then because the 
Germans were beaten — defeated in the military sense. 
Let there be no mistake about that. And the Ameri- 
can Army in its hundred-odd days of fighting pro- 
vided one of the vital elements of this defeat. 

If the Marines of the 2nd Division at Belleau 
Wood, and the 3rd Division machine gunners at 
Chateau-Thierry, provided a dramatic entrance of 
our army into the main struggle, the moral decisions 
that placed them there were no less dramatic. If 
the six green divisions that went over the top in the 
Argonne-Meuse battle on September 26th performed 
heroic deeds, the moral courage to set them at such a 
task was no less remarkable, and far back of that, the 
moral courage to train them for open warfare was 
worth a great victory in Itself. Most battles are lost 
or won before the first shot is fired. With this in 
mind it is worth stud5dng the American Army's 
action In France, for It is full of brave, human en- 
deavour, of moral and physical courage at many times 
and places that are still little known. 

The short period In which our forces were actually 
engaged has tended to obscure somewhat the fact 
that when the war ended General Pershing com- 
manded the largest force in American history, which 
had fought and won one of the great battles of all 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 5 

times — the Argonne-Meuse battle, which lasted forty- 
seven days and used more American troops than 
there ever were in an American army before. This 
extraordinary result came suddenly. The work, how- 
ever, that produced it was slow. 

When General Pershing first landed in France, 
he determined to create a purely American force 
of quality and size large enough to bring victory 
to the Allied armies, for even before the German 
offensive of the spring of 191 8 it was clear that 
the maximum British and French forces were not 
sufficient to defeat the Germans, then reinforced 
by their troops from Russia. General Pershing's 
intention was to train divisions until there were 
enough for an army corps, and occupy a sepa- 
rate American sector with that. As more divisions 
were trained and as the number of corps increased 
he planned to form an American army, and as the 
troops further increased more armies, until there 
were American groups such as existed in the armies 
of the French, British, and Germans. This was to be 
strictly an American organization, just as the British 
Army was entirely British, and the French all French. 
It would, of course, be under the supreme Com- 
mander-in-Chief, as all others were; even before he 
reached France, General Pershing was a believer in a 
unified command. 

The divisions which were to make up this American 
force were to be trained principally for open warfare, 
a war of movement, with less attention paid to trench 
warfare, although they were to spend a certain time 



6 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

in quiet sectors of the front-line trenches as part of 
their training. 

It is worth while for every American who takes 
pride in what the army accomplished to contem- 
plate carefully this conception of training — two 
thirds for open warfare, one third for trench warfare. 
This conception was decided upon in the summer of 
1 91 7, when there had been no war of movement 
on the Western Front for nearly three years. As 
prosaic as it looks on paper, this decision was more 
important than most battles, for it made our part 
in the final battle possible. It had this significance : 
Continued trench fighting almost inevitably meant a 
stalemate. A war of movement meant a decision 
one way or the other. The American Army was built 
for offensive, for victory. It is probably fair to say 
that the bulk of military opinion on the Allied side 
did not agree with General Pershing, and his decision 
was, therefore, a very bold one. But seldom has 
sound thinking and courage been better rewarded. 
A good many thousand American soldiers are alive 
now who would have died had his decision been 
the reverse. He expected to vindicate his belief in 
open warfare in the spring of 19 19. It was vindi- 
cated, most opportunely, six months earlier. 

The position on the front, ultimately to be taken 
by the group of American armies being planned, was 
practically fixed by the only possible remaining line 
of supply. The British had all the northern ports, 
and their lines covered everything from the battle 
area to the sea, as far south as Havre. The French 




THE AMERICAN ARMY's SUPPLY SYSTEM 

This map shows in general the area occupied by British and French supply 
systems into which we could not go without confusion, and the lines of the 
supply we organized for our army. This only available line of supply chiefly 
dictated our position on the front. 



8 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

supply lines took in all the Paris area and a broad 
belt running eastward from the capital. A supply 
system south of the French belt, from the sea to the 
battle line, between Verdun and Belfort, was about 
all that was left. Therefore Chaumont became head- 
quarters, and the neighbourhood of Neufchateau and 
Saint-Dizier became our main advanced base. 

The first place selected by the American staff for 
attack was the St. Mihiel salient, and the staff was 
working on this project many months before there 
was any American force ready even for a minor 
engagement, not to mention the taking of this 
position. To make a purely American army, trained 
for open warfare, with the first attack to be made at 
St. Mihiel — such were the plans. 

By March, 19 17, there were four American divi- 
sions which had finished their training and were 
theoretically ready for battle. Still, they had never 
been seriously engaged and no one knew how they 
would compare with first-class veteran troops in the 
ordeal of battle. 

The first division which arrived after General 
Pershing in the spring of 19 17 went into the trenches 
for training for the first time in October of that year. 
Three other divisions had followed it, the 2nd made 
up of two regiments of regulars (mostly recruits), 
the 9th and 23rd, and two regiments of Marines; the 
26th Division, made up of the New England Na- 
tional Guard; and the 42nd, the Rainbow Division, 
made up of guard units from many states. But none 
of these divisions had yet been tested under fire. They 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 9 

had had trench practice in quiet sectors, some patrol 
work, and had been subjected to a few German 
raids. Until March, 191 8, no American unit had 
ever made a raid itself. The first one planned was to 
take place at one o'clock on the morning of March 
4th. It was to be carried out by a detachment of 
150 men from the ist Division then in line on the 
southern side of the St. Mihiel sector. There was 
a good deal of suppressed excitement over this first 
offensive action, even if it was a small one. The 
whole division would have volunteered for the duty. 
The Commander-in-Chief himself was present. 
Nearly everyone stayed up, so as not to miss any- 
thing. 

The plan was for the engineers to crawl out over 
No Man's Land, and put Bengalore torpedoes under 
the German wire, so arranged that they could be set 
off from a safe distance. At the appointed time the 
wire was to be blown up, the box barrage was to sur- 
round entirely the point to be attacked, and the 
raiders were to rush across, capture as many of the 
enemy as possible, and come back before the Ger- 
mans could retaliate. The infantry, artillery, and 
engineer watches had been exactly synchronized, so 
that everything should work in harmony. To the 
second, on the appointed time, a wonderfully precise 
and accurate barrage surrounded the point of attack. 
The hundred and fifty raiders hurried out of their 
trenches. But the German wire remained intact. 
The attacking party was ordered back again. And 
then, about this time, the missing engineers turned 



10 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

up. They had not been out preparing to blow up 
the German wire. They had been lost! 

The miscarriage of this plan killed no one on this 
occasion, as such miscarriages often do. To train 
an army, especially a very new one, so that every- 
thing Wxli happen correctly, and on time, is a task 
which is very difficult, and hard even to conceive 
in its true proportions. And if any one is disposed 
to laugh at the engineers for getting lost, let him take 
a map and go forth in the trenches in that sector in 
broad daylight, with no enemy to bother him, and 
see how rapidly he can get to any given point. 
Trenches are very crooked, puzzling, and slow and 
slippery lanes of travel. 

The largest action in which American troops ap- 
peared before Cantigny was the so-called "battle of 
Seicheprey." It, too, occurred on the southern side 
of the St. Mihiel salient, and it, too, was unfortunate, 
if judged by immediate results. 

This "battle" of Seicheprey was in reality a large 
raid. The Germans intended to cross the two 
American trenches between their lines and the village, 
clean it up, and then withdraw to the Sibille trench 
immediately north of the town. If they were not too 
heavily attacked, they meant to hold this position. 
And, in a general way, they carried out this mission 
successfully. 

In the early morning of April 20th there were no 
Americans in the foremost trench. The second, 
the Sibille trench, was occupied by three companies 
of the 102nd Infantry, each minus one platoon. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 11 

They had orders to hold this trench if attacked. 
They also had been instructed by the French to have 
no outposts more than ten meters in front of the 
trench. Behind these trenches in the village was one 
platoon and the battalion headquarters. 

About four o'clock in the morning of the 20th 
the German artillery became active. Later it quieted 
down, and then again, at about a quarter past five, 
it fell heavily on the village of Seicheprey and on 
parts of the Sibille trench in front. The American 
major in command, in the village, asked for a return 
artillery fire, which was given; but he got no word 
of any kind from his troops in the trenches, until 
about six o'clock a few of them retreated into the 
town with the Germans close behind them. With 
these men and the platoon that made up the town's 
garrison the major retreated to the southern edge 
of the village. The Germans cleaned up most of the 
town, destroyed the dugouts, kitchen, and first-aid 
station, captured the battalion headquarters and all 
its papers, and on an appointed signal withdrew to 
the cemetery that they held as a kind of advanced 
post in front of the Sibille trench, which they now 
organized for defence. It was discovered later 
that the Germans had come in three parties from 
the northeast, north, and northwest of Seicheprey, 
all arriving at the town at about the same time, 
and all having overcome the resistance of the Ameri- 
cans in the trenches. Most of our 400 or 500 losses 
in killed, missing, wounded, and prisoners occurred 
in the fighting in the Sibille trench. But the Ger- 




SEICHEPREY AND THE FIXED TRENCH SYSTEM 

The heavier black lines show the Franco-American trenches. The lighter 
black lines the German trenches. The lines of xxxx indicate wire. The 
Germans who attacked Seicheprey came from the direction of Richecourt, from 
Lahayville, and through the Bois de Remieres. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 13 

mans did not escape easily, for we buried forty-one 
of their men, and they left other indications of having 
met a very stiff resistance. Our men probably had 
little real chance to make a successful defence, be- 
cause of having no patrols to warn them and not 
being able to see on account of a heavy fog. The 
Germans, following their barrage very closely, were 
on them before they were aware. 

The Germans held the Sibille trench all day, with 
the small American force lying in front of them in the 
village, while back on the next hill preparations for 
a counter attack were in progress. But the day 
passed with no reaction on our part, except artillery 
fire, and a little before the counter attack was ordered 
an American patrol discovered that the Germans had 
abandoned the Sibille trench and returned to their 
own lines. 

Seicheprey was a very successful performance for 
the Germans, who endeavoured to use it to dampen 
our morale, sending out reports by their wireless and 
printing in their paper, the Gazette des Ardennes^ a 
list of the prisoners, with the comment that, as 
General Pershing was very new at the game, he 
might like to know what had become of his men. 
But while such misadventures were annoying, they 
were part of the process of education. And this proc- 
ess was not an orderly procession of perfect achieve- 
ments. No one can appreciate the real accom- 
plishments of the army who does not realize how 
unskilled it was to begin with, and how dangerous 
it was to be unskilled in the presence of a keen and 



14 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

practised enemy. Even our successes In the train- 
ing period were sometimes rather high priced. A 
part of the 5th Division in August, 19 18, under French 
orders attacked and captured the town of Frapelle in 
the Vosges near St. Die. The account of this in one 
of the New York papers was as follows : 

The brilliant work of the American troops on Saturday in 
low ground bordering the little River Fave, east of St. Die, In 
the Vosges, has scarcely, perhaps, received the attention it 
deserves. It may be taken for granted that the affair must 
have been pretty serious for the enemy, otherwise Ludendorff 
would not have allowed himself in an official report to state that 
the Germans advanced posts had "yielded to an enemy local 
thrust." 

What Ludendorff omitted to add was that very few of the 
defenders of these advanced posts succeeded in falling back, 
as nearly the whole lot were killed or made prisoner. The 
American attack, according to accounts which reached here to- 
day, was carried out with extraordinary dash. Charging with 
the bayonet on the village of Frapelle from two sides, the 
Americans carried the machine gun nests with a single rush, 
cleaning out the trenches and shelters with grenades as they 
went. The German garrison was practically wiped out. 

There is nothing so far to indicate whether Saturday's affair 
may be regarded as the precursor of other operations on that 
part of the front, which has been for many months regarded 
by both sides as exceptionally quiet. Frapelle, however, is the 
first stage on the very important road from St. Die to Strass- 
burg, via the Col de Saales. It lies in a river bottom, between 
five and six miles from the Col de Saales, from the crest of which 
the run down into Alsace is rapid and easy. 

This was all true. But it was also true that the 
garrison consisted of four men, one an idiot, and that, 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 15 

while it cost us nothing to take the town, the German 
artillery caused us a good many casualties before we 
withdrew from the village again. 

Seicheprey and Frapelle and various other raids 
and minor activities taught us much. After Sei- 
cheprey battalion headquarters were not again put 
where the Germans were likely to get the papers. 
The men at Frapelle learned the cost of holding bad 
positions. Our artillery became surer of itself. 
We were not so likely to carry on a night battle be- 
tween two parts of our own trenches if they happened 
to be very crooked. We were getting on in our train- 
ing. And in recounting these instances, it is not 
intended to imply that we were not getting on very 
well. We were. But merely to give the bright side 
of the picture, which was all that came to the papers 
at the time, does not give a fair estimate of the 
situation. Without the less victorious side the 
record takes on an air of precision and assurance 
which the actual progress of events often lacked. 

Suddenly, in March, our army was forced to give 
up its orderly plan of training and growth. In a 
sense. General Pershing was a sufferer from his own 
principal theory. The German General Staff also 
believed that the only way to win the war was to get 
out of the trenches and start a war of movement. 
The Germans had evolved a theory for accomplish- 
ing this end, and General Von Hutier practised it on 
the Russians near Riga. From this it became known 
as the Riga attack, or the Von Hutier method. In- 
stead of concentrating troops on a front some days 



16 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

before an attack, which usually resulted in detection 
by the enemy, they brought them up from many 
directions and had them arrive practically at the 
time of offence. The numbers and effect of surprise 
due to this system enabled them to break through the 
trench lines. They provided their infantry with 
light artillery, which it could take along in the ad- 
vance, and which gave the troops power to keep up 
their progress even after they had left behind their 
field guns and heavy artillery, whose range had 
hitherto set the limit for any continuing attack. 

Using this system, the Germans broke through the 
British Fifth Army, and in five days had gone twenty- 
five miles to within artillery range of Amiens and 
the main lateral railway behind the British lines. 
In the face of this crisis. General Pershing imme- 
diately gave up (for the time) the plans on which he 
had been working so hard for a separate American 
force. 

The Secretary of War was in France. At a con- 
ference in Paris, General Pershing and Mr. Baker 
decided that we should turn over our forces to 
General Foch. The President approved by cable. On 
the 28th of March, General Pershing attended a 
meeting of the Allied commanders. As he came into 
the room he walked straight up to General Foch and 
said in French: 

" I have come to tell you that the American people 
would consider it a great honour for our troops to be 
engaged in the present battle; I ask you for this in 
their name and my own. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 17 

"Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have, is 
yours; use it as you wish. More will come, in num- 
bers equal to requirements. 

" I have come especially to tell you that the Ameri- 
can people will be proud to take part in the greatest 
and finest battle of history." 

At that time there were four trained American 
divisions in France — a few more than 100,000 com- 
batant troops, enough to make the first corps the 
first step in General Pershing's original hopes. 
General Foch accepted the offer. The ist Division 
was sent to the line opposite Montdidier — a still 
active sector. The 26th went in the line at St. 
Mihiel. We had entered the war on the firing line. 
The four divisions which were to have constituted 
the first American corps to take over the first Amer- 
ican sector were scattered across France. The 
American plan had been surrendered in the face of 
the Allied crisis. 

In the meanwhile, aff^airs had proceeded from bad 
to worse. On the 9th of April, the Germans broke 
through the Portuguese at Armentieres, and pushed 
their advantage until another great wedge was 
driven into the British line and the channel ports 
were threatened. The difficulties of transporta- 
tion, caused by the Amiens line being under fire, 
made it very hard to get French reinforcements 
as far north as the fighting at Kemmel Hill in time 
to be of assistance. On April 12th Sir Douglas 
Haig had issued his famous communique in which 
he said: 



18 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Every position must be held to the last man. There must be 
no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the 
justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The 
safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike 
upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment. 

With the help of French reinforcements the front 
held. The Belgian army repulsed a German drive 
north of Ypres — an important contribution to the 
whole situation of which little has been said. By the 
middle of May, the lines were again stabilized. When 
the storm had broken on the Allied lines in March, 
the High Commissioners of Great Britain and France 
had gone to the American Government in Washing- 
ton and asked that we send every available man to 
France, no matter how much training he had or how 
much he lacked. 

The British cut down communications with their 
colonies and again cut down the imports into England, 
combed their merchant marine for ships, and gave us 
the tonnage to bring our men in a hurry. Ten of 
our divisions were to go into their area to be ready to 
help stem another German attack there. The others 
were to go into various French armies to build up 
their reserves. In actuality, there had not been much 
to Foch's famous strategic reserve army, and what 
there had been was exhausted. Nor, as history will 
show, did the Generalissimo have the power with 
which the public was wont to credit him. He was 
faced with a somewhat desperate situation. On May 
1st the Germans could count on 1,600,000 rifles 
on the Western Front against the 1,343,000 rifles 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 19 

of the Allies. If America was coming at all, it was 
time to start. In April and May the men began 
to pour into France. American divisions were ar- 
riving back of the British lines, some via England 
and some via the French ports, and other American 
divisions were coming into a training area behind 
the French armies. In the ten months prior to 
April we had sent 283,511 men to France. In April, 
117,212 troops of all kinds embarked. In May, 
the numbers rose to 244,345. The papers were full 
of the great troop movements, but, although we had 
been at war for more than a year, and our ist 
Division had been in France for most of that year, 
American troops had engaged in no real fighting. 
Yet American help was the main feature of any pro- 
gramme of bettering the Allied fortunes. By the 
middle of May there was no fear that great num- 
bers would not arrive, but how would they fight.? 
They were brave enough, admittedly, but 28,000 
brave men might be a mob and not a division of 
fighting troops. The officers were of good character 
and intelligence, but these qualities do not necessarily 
imply military knowledge and leadership. The divi- 
sions manoeuvred well in training, but what would 
they do in battle? That was a vital question to 
America, to the Allies, and to Germany, in May, 
1918. 

The German press belittled the possibility of our 
fighting well. Our press and the Allied press took 
success for granted. Neither side was quite sure. 
The stage was set for the trial. 



CHAPTER II 

CANTIGNY A LITTLE BATTLE THAT PROVED A GREAT 
POINT AND MADE 100,000 MEN 

THE trial was at Cantigny. It was, naturally, 
planned some time in advance, but in the march 
of events a thing happened the day before the Can- 
tigny attack which more than ever made the demon- 
stration of American fighting ability necessary. 
Our attack was to begin on the morning of May 28th. 
On the morning of May 27th, a great mass of Ger- 
man troops suddenly pushed across the Ailette, up 
over the strong position of the Chemin des Dames, 
and before the day was over the French lines were 
completely broken, and the Germans had crossed the 
Vesle on their way south to the Marne. The com- 
muniques that reached Paris on the night of the 28th 
told of the rapid and continuous German progress. 
But there came also that night another piece of 
news. The American Army had at last actively 
entered the war. The ist Division shed a bright 
little ray of light on the otherwise dismal picture. 
And this ray of light was of great significance, for if 
the Americans could successfully meet the Germans, 
the Allies were assured an eff^ective force big enough 
to win the war — the Americans were then arriving at 
the rate of 250,000 a month. If the Americans could 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 21 

not successfully meet the Germans, then, well, the 
situation was very bad indeed. 

To the Allied High Command Cantigny had an 
importance much beyond its intrinsic value as an 
action. In General Pershing's report to the Secre- 
tary of War the following occurs : 

On April 26th, a month before, the ist Division had gone into 
line in the Montdidier salient on the Picardy battle front. 
Tactics had been suddenly revolutionized to those of open 
warfare, and our men, confident of the results of their training, 
were eager for the test. 

The first time one of our divisions went into line 
as a unit it met just the conditions for which it had 
been trained, and from that time to the end of 
the war the American troops were engaged in open 
warfare. 

The town of Cantigny was the centre of a little 
salient projecting into the Allied line west of Mont- 
didier. It was a very active part of the line, and 
the German artillery continually took a toll of forty 
or fifty casualties a day. The men were particu- 
larly eager, therefore, to get revenge. The task set 
the 28th Infantry, a part of the ist Division, was 
to take the village of Cantigny and to straighten the 
line. The attack was to be made on a front of two 
kilometers (1.2 miles). The line having been here 
for some time, the industrious Germans had made 
for themselves some trenches and a good system of 
strong points, although there were no trench systems 
like those on the old fronts. The village itself was 



ROLLING BARRAGE 

end its immediate protection 




ARTILLERY PLAN FOR THE CANTIGNY ATTACK 

The lines marked H-5 to H, etc., show the position of the barrage from five 
minutes before the H hour, the moment of attack, until 42 minutes after the H 
hour. This movement of the barrage was calculated to synchronize with the 
speed of the attack. 



PLAN OF OPERATION AGAINST CANTIGNY 



legend 
2ones of action • Objectives 
Olijective 

line on wtiicli Bn. C *ill establish itself after cleaning up Hie tiead 
of tlie hollow (19.25) (if the 9 th A.C. does not attacli on our left.) 
line of change of rate of advance o1 Barrage, 
limit behneen 6ns. 
limit between Companies 



x» 




THE PLAN OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ATTACK 

The first positions of the companies of the three battalions of the 28th Regi- 
ment (ist Division) are shown by squares marked A^ A^, A^, A* for the com- 
panies of one battalion and so forth. Their advance is shown by dotted lines. 
The advance was actually made exactly "according to plan." 

23 



24 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

particularly well defended by machine guns. Back 
of it, in various woods, were the German reserves and 
artillery. The American infantry, which was to take 
the town, was to be supported by three French tank 
battalions containing ten tanks. There were also 
a French platoon of flame throwers and 150 men of 
the 1st Engineers. 

A day or two before the ist Division prepared 
two trenches in front of its position, which would 
appear on any airplane photograph as a strong de- 
fensive system. One of these trenches was a fake. 
The other was to act as a jumping-off place for our 
attack. 

After an hour*s artillery preparation, the infantry 
started at 6:45 a.m. The barrage started at five 
minutes to the zero hour of 6:45, and from the zero 
hour moved forward 100 meters every two minutes 
for the first 300 meters (327.9 yards). Then it held 
its fire for four minutes to give the infantry time to 
get up, if it had fallen behind, and then it rolled for- 
ward again; then another stop occurred, and so on, 
until it finally covered its allotted task. The bar- 
rage covered two kilometers in forty-two minutes. 
The infantry reached its destination right behind it — 
forty minutes after the zero hour, so the report of 
the battle stated. This meant that they passed all 
obstacles, overcame the German defences, captured 
or killed the defenders, and proceeded 2,000 meters 
(2,186 yards) at about the rate a person would stroll 
over the ground now with nothing to bother him. 
But as the troops went forward on May 28th, the 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 25 

French tanks lumbered alongside, the bursting shells 
of the barrage fell in front of them, beyond which 
the heavy artillery concentration burst on the woods, 
where otherwise assistance might come to the help 
of the town's defenders. 

The commander of the French tanks, in reporting 
his own operations, gives a picture of the soldiers of 
the 28th in action which is good evidence that all 
doubts of the skill and courage of the American 
Army to meet successfully the Germans could be 
safely discarded. 

One paragraph of his report read: 

Aside from the evidence of spirit and courage which aroused 
admiration on the part of all members of Tank Battalion No. 5 
the American infantry showed a remarkable knowledge of how 
to use tank assistance, following them closely without allowing 
themselves to be held up by them, and sticking close to their 
barrage. 

The tanks destroyed, or helped to destroy, fifteen 
or twenty machine guns in the village, and north and 
east of it. With their help and the barrage, the town 
was taken without a great deal of loss, and, at the 
end of forty minutes, the troops had reached their 
objectives and were even pressing on. Two hun- 
dred and fifty prisoners also had been picked up. 

Five minutes later came the first German reaction. 
A small counter attack was launched against Fon- 
taine Wood, south of where the 28th had advanced. 
It failed. Following this came intermittent heavy 
artillery fire on this part of the line. Toward noon. 



26 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

enemy planes came over, and, very shortly after, 
Cantigny and the lines that our men had established 
in front of it were violently shelled. At about this 
time the French corps artillery, which was to do 
the counter battery work on the German guns, was 
taken out and sent south to the Marne battle. This 
left the German artillery with a free hand. 

At ten minutes past five a heavy counter attack 
came against the western edge of Framecourt Woods. 
This was broken up by American artillery. At 6:45 
another attack in waves came from due east toward 
Cantigny. Rifle and machine gun fire broke up the 
first wave, and the artillery attended to the rest. 
All the next day the Germans kept up their attempts to 
regain the town, but, as they lost many men and got 
nothing, at the end of the second night they ceased. 

The American casualties were 350 men and twenty- 
five ofllicers of the 28th Regiment, and twenty-five 
men of the ist Engineers. Including the loss from 
artillery and the counter attacks on the second day, 
the losses were probably 600. The French tank 
battalion lost two officers and one man. The German 
casualties in the actual taking of the position were 
estimated at 350 men besides the 250 prisoners. In 
their counter attack they suffered many more. 

1. The American soldiers had shown bravery 
and energy — that had been pretty well taken for 
granted. 

2. They showed trained intelligence in using the 
help of the tanks in following the barrage, and in 
establishing defensive positions after their attack 




CANTIGNY AND THE TRENCHES OF THE WAR OF MOVEMENT 

The American (regular line with points) and the German (irregular line) 
trenches after our taking of Cantigny, a great contrast to the foui^year-old 
systems around Seicheprey. These two maps are copies of the G. 2 maps made 
from airplane photographs and all other sources of information and keot up to 
date by frequent new editions. 

27 



28 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

had succeeded — this was the real test of their train- 
ing. They were not only brave men but brave and 
intelligent soldiers. This information was worth much 
to the Allied command. 

Our soldiers were, however, not skilled veterans. 
They showed this in an unnecessary and somewhat 
costly contempt for danger. After taking Cantigny, 
some of them walked round in the streets, as if they 
were invisible and invulnerable, although they were 
neither. This caused General Bullard, then in 
command of the division, to say in his telegraphic 
report: "The losses sustained, caused in part by 
lack of experience, will be a lesson which only per- 
sonal experience could have given.'* 

General Debeny, commanding the French First 
Army, reported that the operation was well prepared 
and vigorously executed, "which will serve to give the 
Americans, and others, a realization of the offensive 
valour of our Allies." 

A realization of the offensive valour of the American 
troops amounted to adding four large divisions to 
the Allied forces. The ist, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd 
had finished their training and were ready for battle, 
and, as the ist Division had just shown, when ready 
for battle on paper they were also prepared in fact. 
The 32nd, 3rd, and 5th were also on hand, but not 
so far advanced. Behind the British front, training 
under British tutelage, were ten newly arrived di- 
visions, the 35th, 82nd, 33rd, 27th, 4th, 28th, 80th, 
30th, 77th, and 78th. In the supply area was the 
41st, already being broken up for replacements. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 29 

When General Pershing arrived, followed by the 
1st Division, in 1917, the French staff knew that the 
American Army, even after it reached Europe, would 
have to be trained. The French public, however, 
did not realize this so well. Month after month had 
elapsed, and, although the American help was much 
talked of — for it was the Allies' trump card — the 
American soldier did not appear in the fighting. 
Then came the terrible blows against the British. 
Still the Americans were not in the line. Then, on 
May 27th, the Germans succeeded in the unbeliev- 
able project of taking the Chemin des Dames, and 
seemingly doing it with ease. If the Americans were 
going to appear at all, it was time. Whatever had 
been the plans, whether their training was com- 
pleted or not, the current of events called for them 
in the fighting. Everyone in France, England, and 
America wanted to look at the trump card that had 
been talked of so long. 

Cantigny showed it just a little, and it looked very 
good. American stock rose immediately. It was 
a small fight of great importance. As General Per- 
shing said, in his report of November 20th, "Al- 
though local, this brilliant action had an electrical 
effect, as it demonstrated our fighting qualities under 
extreme battle conditions." As the report of the 
fight reached French officers, it was easy to see the 
great importance they attached to it. 

Within a week afterward two American divi- 
sions were defending the road to Paris and the cross- 
ing of the Marne. Perhaps necessity would have 



30 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

driven the French to call on them if Cantigny had 
not occurred. But without Cantigny, they could 
not have called on them with the same confidence. 
It is fair to say that Cantigny added 100,000 men, 
or about the equivalent of eight French divisions, 
at one of the most critical moments of the war. 



CHAPTER III 

OUR SIXTY DAYS UNDER THE FRENCH 

THE actual fighting of the American Army in 
France can be divided into two main periods: 

The first period included chiefly the battle of 
Cantigny, the fighting in the Chateau-Thierry area 
and on the Marne, and the Marne-Vesle campaign — 
some sixty days' fighting under French command. 
During this period we had nine divisions engaged. 
This does not include the operations of the 27th 
and 30th divisions which performed all their very 
remarkable service with the British Army. This first 
period is the period of French command. 

The second period, under American command, 
includes the battle of St. Mihiel beginning on Sep- 
tember 1 2th, and the forty-seven days of the Argonne- 
Meuse battle, from September 26th to November nth 
— about fifty days' fighting in which all of our com- 
bat troops were engaged. The 2nd, 36th, 27th, 30th, 
37th, and 91st served either all or part of this period 
with either the French, British, or Belgians. But the 
second period is essentially the period of American 
command. 

To get a fair picture of what happened during 
the first period one must turn his mind back to the 
conditions at the end of May, 1918. The Germans 

31 



32 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

had just broken the French Hne on the Chemin des 
Dames, as they had previously broken the British 
Hues at St. Quentin. They were rapidly advancing 
toward the Marne. In all men's minds were two 
questions: Can this advance be stopped now? 
And if it is, is there any way to stop the Germans 
from succeeding in a third drive as they have already 
in two? There was no army of manoeuvre and not 
enough for either French or British reserves. Such 
was the situation on May 29th. There were, how- 
ever, considerable reserves of Americans in various 
stages of training, and two days previously one regi- 
ment of the American ist Division had demon- 
strated its skill and ability in taking the town of 
Cantigny. 

On the morning of May 29th, the Chief-of-StaflF, 
Major-General McAndrew, had a visit from General 
Ragueneau, then chief of the French mission to our 
headquarters at Chaumont. He told General Mc- 
Andrew of the desperate condition of the French 
forces north of the Marne, and the possibility of 
German cavalry getting through and raiding south 
of the river. General Pershing was at Cantigny 
and in his absence General McAndrew promised 
that the 3rd Division would be ready to move by 
6 o'clock that evening. 

In consequence General Dickman, then command- 
ing the 3rd Division, received a sudden change in 
orders. He was on a tour, inspecting a quiet sector 
of the line to which he was to take his division for 
Its first trench training. He was overtaken by orders 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 33 

to hurry back to his command and put them in mo- 
tion with all speed for Chateau-Thierry. The 
2nd Division had a similar experience. French 
officers are among the least excitable people in the 
world, and having been in the war a long time 
they did not allow it to disturb their comforts any 
more than was absolutely necessary. Consequently 
the arrival of a French officer at five in the morning 
(May 30th) at the headquarters of the American 2nd 
Division was a sure proof that something unusual 
was afoot. The 2nd Division was then under orders 
to move up to the Beauvais district for further train- 
ing. The orders which this early-morning caller from 
French Headquarters gave to General Bundy were 
to put his whole division on trucks and move with 
all speed to Meaux. This meant that the training 
period was over and that the 2nd was going into battle ! 
These orders to the 3rd and 2nd divisions marked 
a vital decision in the conduct of the war. From 
five o'clock in the morning of May 30th to the end of 
the war American troops were always headed toward 
the fighting front. The little battle of Cantigny had 
proved that the Americans could be used without 
further test, and the German successes made it clear 
that they would have to be used without further de- 
lay. So the 3rd and 2nd received their historic orders 
and started for the battle. 

The first American unit to meet the German offen- 
sive was the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 
3rd Division. It was a motorized unit and rolled 
off to Conde-en-Brie to join the French, and then 



34 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

on to Chateau-Thierry. The men rode up prac- 
tically to the battle line and immediately went into 
action. After being more than twenty-four hours on 
the road, two companies reached Chateau-Thierry 
on the afternoon of May 31st. They helped the 
French Colonials, who were there to stop a fierce 
effort of the Germans to cross the river, and from that 
time until the Germans retreated, more than a month 
later, there were machine gunners of the 3rd Division 
holding the crossing at Chateau-Thierry. 

The rest of the division came up little by little. 
Its transportation had been disarranged in the con- 
fusion caused by the German advance, and part 
of the troops had to march the thirty-five miles from 
Provins to the Marne. As they came in they were 
scattered amongst the French troops on the south 
side of the river. The conduct of this division is 
particularly interesting because it had not had its 
trench training, had never been under any kind of fire, 
and had not even been together as a unit since it left 
America until some days after it went into action, 
when its artillery came up. Its first troops went into 
action on May 31st. It was relieved on the Ourcq 
on July 29th. 

The 2nd Division came into the battle area in 
somewhat the same hurried way but it had time 
to get together before it was actually engaged. 
Motor transport to Meaux and an all-night march 
brought its leading troops, early on the ist of June, 
into a support position covering the Paris road at Le 
Thiolet. By that night the whole division was in 




35 



36 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

position behind the French troops on a twelve-mile 
front. 

The confidence born of the appearance of this 
help stiffened the resistance of the French troops 
holding this part of the line and they maintained 
themselves with the help of small American rein- 
forcements until the night of the 3rd of June. Dur- 
ing this night the 2nd Division relieved them, and 
on the morning of the 4th the 2nd Division was face 
to face with the Germans on a twelve-mile front. 
The Germans opposite them held a position includ- 
ing Belleau Wood and Boureseches village, which 
gave them protection and cover either for defence 
or concentration for another attack. The Ameri- 
cans set to work to push them out of the woods. 

The tactical and strategic reasons for advancing our 
line there at that time were of little consequence in 
comparison with the moral reason. Cantigny had, 
after all, been but a small experiment. A bigger dem- 
onstration was needed to establish the proper con- 
fidence in our army and in the minds of our Allies, 
and to explode the myth which the German com- 
manders circulated among their troops that even if 
Americans got to France they would not be trained 
enough to fight. The Germans sent two picked 
divisions for the particular purpose of inflicting a 
defeat on our troops that would seriously discount 
the effect of all American military aid. As American 
military aid was the greatest hope of the Allies and 
the greatest fear of the Germans, its test was a matter 
of supreme significance to each side. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 37 

The battle of Belleau Wood, which followed, has 
probably been described more than almost any other 
American engagement. It was a splendid test of 
American against German in open warfare with 
machine guns, rifles, and artillery, and with all the 
advantage of position with the enemy. The Ger- 
man defence consisted of hidden machine guns so 
placed as to cover all approaches, and with other 
machine guns covering these, so that taking one nest 
would not break their line. Theoretically, it was im- 
passable. Practically, it was impassable also for any 
troops that at all hesitated in their attacks. 

Our men produced a heavy and accurate rifle 
fire — a special part of their training — against these 
nests, and when they rushed them they shed all im- 
pediments, and went in at a terrible speed and regard- 
less of loss. The combination was just good enough. 
It was the vigour of our attack there that prompted 
the German intelligence officer*s comment, captured 
later by the French, which said : 

The American 2nd Division may be considered a very good 
division, perhaps even an assault division. The various at- 
tacks of the two regiments upon Belleau Wood were executed 
with dash and intrepidity. The moral effect of our fire was not 
able seriously to check the advance of the infantry. The nerves 
of the Americans are not yet worn out. 

This is an extraordinary tribute to a division in its 
first battle. This German practically says that to 
stop the Americans they had to be hit. The last 
line of his comment is also a grim comment on the 



38 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

slowing down which long service causes in the best 
troops, and the great value of the freshness of our 
forces. 

From the 4th of June until the end of the month, 
the Marine brigade, with minor reliefs, worked its 
way through the woods. At the end it held Belleau 
(now Marine) Wood and the other brigade (regulars) 
of the division, which had been doing its part also, 
topped off the proceedings on July ist by brilliantly 
taking the village of Vaux with 500 prisoners. 

This action also marked the first appearance of the 
American Air Service in an active sector. The ist 
Observation and ist Pursuit Groups had been trans- 
ferred to this area on June 28th and the Pursuit 
Groups' task on July ist was to keep enemy air- 
planes from crossing the lines between daylight and 
eight P.M., which was successfully accomplished. 

The fighting of the 2nd Division and the scattered 
units of the 3rd Division on the south bank of the 
Marne confirmed the Cantigny verdict that there 
was no discount on our troops. On the Allied side 
the question ceased to be how much more training 
they needed, but how fast they could be moved into 
the line. With the Germans the question was: What 
could be accomplished before large numbers of 
Americans got into action? 

The necessity for a quick decision more than ever 
pressed upon the German High Command, and with 
amazing rapidity and persistence they continued their 
attacks. When they finally decided that the road to 
Paris via Chateau-Thierry was barred, they planned 




39 



40 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

a great offensive to widen their Marne salient on the 
western side. This offensive is best explained by the 
accompanying map. Its ultimate object was to 
join the Montdidier and Marne salients thereby not 
only threatening Paris, but the communications be- 
tween the British and French armies as well. On 
the 9th of June the attack began. It made some 
progress, and heavy fighting continued for several 
weeks. But strategically it was a failure. When it 
was over the Marne salient was still dangerously nar- 
row between Soissons and Rheims, and the Germans 
had derived no advantage from their operations. 

Having failed on this side of the salient, they deter- 
mined upon a similar operation on the other side. 
This, as planned, would cut the lines at Chalons and 
Epernay and threaten the French communications. 
The main second attack was to be against General 
Gouraud's army in the Champagne. But the cen- 
tral idea behind both these attacks was the destruc- 
tion of the French army. By various means. Gen- 
eral Gouraud discovered not only that this second 
attack was to be launched against him, but exactly 
the day, hour, and minute on which it would start, 
and he made his plans accordingly. 

The Germans counted upon massing both men and 
artillery in secret, and launching their infantry at- 
tack where they would have a great preponderance 
of both. These advantages, coupled with the effect 
of surprise, were to give them a third such victory 
as those of March 2ist and May 27th. But Gou- 
raud, knowing their plans, prepared his men and his 





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41 



42 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

artillery likewise, and as he knew what they were 
going to do and they did not know what he was going 
to do, the effect of surprise was all against the Ger- 
mans. The German artillery barrage was ruined by 
the French, and the Germans, massed for the attack, 
were subject to bombardment. The attacking waves, 
poorly protected by their own artillery, were ter- 
ribly lacerated by the French. Besides the ordinary 
kinds of shelling they were even subjected- to the 
point-blank fire from batteries of 75 's especially 
arranged to meet their attack. These guns were 
with the French infantry, which had been with- 
drawn from the front lines so that the Germans 
would have to pass a wide and withering zone of fire 
before reaching any one to fight. When they did 
reach the French lines they were met first with all 
the kinds of small arms fire and then with the bayo- 
net. July 15, 191 8, was probably the worst single 
day the Germans ever had. This last desperate 
attack in the Champagne was a terrible catastrophe 
for them. It took their last "offensive" reserve. 
They never attacked again. 

The 42nd, the Rainbow Division, had the honour 
of holding a small part of Gouraud's front line on 
that momentous day. Two battalions of the 165th 
Infantry (the old 'Tighting" 69th, New York) 
were in the line near Somme-Py, and the rest of the 
division was disposed in the rear to handle any Ger- 
mans that might break through. There was no break 
through, but the two battalions in the line handled 
themselves in a way to receive the praise and con-^ 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 43 

gratulations of General Gouraud. In France this is 
taken to mean that the reward was fully merited. 

While this was going on, the Germans started their 
corollary attack across the Marne intending to 
push south and east. South of Dormans the attack 
caught some companies of the 28th Division — the 
Pennsylvania Guard. They were not enough to hold, 
and had their nerves been worn out, or perhaps, if 
their experience had been longer, they would have 
retired to the main force. As it was, they stopped 
the advance until most of them were killed or woun- 
ded. A few only trickled back. 

A little farther west, the German attack ran into 
the same spirit, backed by somewhat larger numbers. 
The 3rd Division held the south bank of the Marne 
from Chateau-Thierry, where their machine guns had 
come on May 31st, to Mezy, five miles (eight kilo- 
meters) eastward. East of Mezy the Germans were 
across the river, so that the right flank of the 3rd Divi- 
sion, the 38th Regiment, was already under fire when 
the battle commenced. The German artillery turned 
a stream of shells on, Mezy to drive the 38th into its 
dugouts, and then, under cover of a smoke screen, 
the German troops started to cross the river in 
boats. It is a little stream, and if the German fire 
had kept the Americans underground, the passage 
would have been quickly achieved. The 38th real- 
ized this as well as the Germans, and taking the 
barrage as it came, they remained in the open, and 
with rifle fire and machine guns fired through the 
smoke screen at the German boats. Our artillery 



44 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

also, although this was its first action, got the range 
of the Germans waiting to cross and those crossing. 
In a few minutes broken boats and dead Germans 
were floating down the river. One boat got across, 
but there was a sergeant hiding in the bushes waiting 
for it. As it touched the shore he told the Germans 
with the particular vigour and implications of army 
language that they were the people he had been 
waiting for and simultaneously threw a hand gren- 
ade in the boat. There was no landing there. But 
east of the village, where a point of land jutted out, 
the German cross fire kept the defenders from pre- 
venting a landing. However, after they had crossed 
the river the Germans were little better off. They 
were met by the same machine gun and rifle fire — 
and General Pershing had made a specialty of 
marksmanship in the A.E.F. As they pressed on, 
they came into contact with bombs and bayonets. 
In the defence one platoon of the 38th Infantry was 
annihilated. A second was nearly so, but the third 
came in and continued the fight. As the fourth 
finally came into action, the Germans surrendered. 
With veritable devils in front of them, and the river 
behind, 400 men of the 6th Grenadiers gave them- 
selves up to about half their number. And while all 
this was going on the 38th had been subjected to 
fire from every possible direction, for they were sur- 
rounded on three sides. 

This is why General Pershing called this action 
*'one of the most brilliant pages in our military 
annals." By this time the 2nd, 3rd, and parts of 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 45 

the 42nd and 28th divisions had met the enemy 
and verified the verdict of the ist at Cantigny. 

General Pershing was one of those who, imme- 
diately after the Germans reached the Marne, coun- 
selled attacking them at the base of their salient. 
Strategically, it was the normal thing to do if there 
was an available force to do it. On June 22nd, when 
Marshal Foch and Premier Clemenceau visited 
American Headquarters, General Pershing urged it 
again, saying that the American Army could furnish 
several first-class divisions, and several others which, 
if then not fully trained, would certainly fight. And 
the less advanced American divisions could relieve 
first-class French divisions and permit them to be 
used for attack. 

But the German preparations kept the initiative 
in their hands a little longer. On the 15th of July 
the French were still fighting where and when the 
Germans chose; three days later the exact reverse 
was the case. 

The terrible defeat Gouraud inflicted on the Ger- 
mans in the Champagne ended the German offensive. 
The plan to hit back by an attack on the base of the 
Marne salient had been made some time previous. 
The psychological moment was to strike when the 
German Army was in the confusion and discourage- 
ment of its great defeat, and before it could reor- 
ganize itself and initiate anything more. But the 
decision to put the Allied attack into effect neces- 
sarily rested on the availability of men to do the 
attacking. The French were terribly used up, as 



46 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

well as the Germans. The available American troops 
were also in need of rest. There was a great danger 
that temporary stalemate might give the Germans 
time to recover. Instead, Foch had the moral 
courage to call on his tired forces, French and Ameri- 
can, to renew the struggle; and Americans can take 
pride in the fact that Pershing urged it, insisting that 
the Americans, tired and depleted as they were, could 
and should be used. There is a line in the "Battle 
Hymn of the Republic" that carries the spirit of the 
Franco- American attack of July i8th, for certainly on 
that day ''Hhere sounded forth the trumpet that never 
called retreat." The year 1918 had seen no Allied ad- 
vance of any size before July i8th. From that time 
to the end of the war there were nothing but Allied 
advances. 

The orders to start for this historic battle caught 
the 1st Division on the road to its rest area. They 
caught the 2nd Division resting after its month's 
fighting at Vaux and Belleau Wood. Both were 
ordered to make all speed, for once the decision had 
been made, no time was to be lost, lest the psycho- 
logical moment should slip away. 

Accordingly, the ist Division received orders to 
join the French XX Corps, Tenth Army — General 
Mangin — southwest of Soissons. The infantry, en- 
gineers, and even the field artillery of the ist Division 
were taken by truck to their area, and by the night of 
the 17th, by hard marching and long hours, the ist was 
in position for attack the next morning, although the 
artillery had to spend all night getting up ammunition. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 47 

The 2nd Division likewise had a difficult time. The 
plan of its attack was made on the night of the i6th. 
By superhuman efforts the infantry of the division 
was gotten to the line in time to make the attack al- 
though part of the 23rd Infantry and the 5th Marines 
had to double-time to get there. The machine guns, 
however, did not get into the fight until about 10 
o'clock, some five hours after the battle opened. 

The object of the attack was to push forward due 
east and capture the heights south of Soissons, and 
cut the road from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry 
which was one of the vital supply lines to the Ger- 
mans in the Marne salient. From north to south 
the attack was to be delivered by the French 153rd 
Infantry Division, the ist American, the ist Mo- 
roccan, and the 2nd American. 

At 4:35 on the i8th the battle opened. There 
was no previous artillery preparation to warn the 
enemy. The infantry started with the first roll of 
the barrage. Except for the fact that the men were 
very tired from hard travel, and that the French 
tanks moving into action had cut all the ground 
telephone wires to division headquarters, the ist 
went into the fight in shape. The 2nd, likewise tired, 
was without its machine guns. But even if the at- 
tack occurred before some of our units were ready, 
the situation was even worse for the Germans. It 
caught them by surprise. One German officer was 
caught still in his pajamas. Their artillery was ac- 
cordingly weak at first. By six o'clock prisoners were 
coming in, and all reports from the front were good. 




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OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 49 

The whole line moved the one and a quarter miles 
(two kilometers) past the first objective in good order. 
Before reaching the second objective the French 
on the left of the ist Division were held up and the 
left flank of the ist, slowing down to keep in touch, 
finally stopped about its second objective in front of 
the Missy Ravine which was stoutly held by German 
machine guns. The right of the division reached 
the third objective in liaison with the neighbouring 
Moroccans. On the other side of the Moroccans 
the 2nd Division had also reached its third objective. 

At four the next morning the attack was resumed. 
The 2nd Division, which had reached the outskirts 
of Vierzy the night before, cleared this place and by 
the night of the 19th, when it was relieved, had 
reached a position that commanded the Soissons- 
Chateau-Thierry road. The losses had been very 
heavy and the gains very important. 

The 23rd Regiment began the battle with 3,40x5 
men and ninety-nine officers. It came out with 
1,429 men and thirty-seven officers. It had gone 
five miles (eight kilometers) in the first day, and 
captured 2,100 men and seventy-five officers. 

The 1st Division, meanwhile, pressed on. Ahead 
of it a tank attack almost reached Ploisy, but this 
was about the end of the tanks' assistance for they 
were pretty well destroyed. In the afternoon, at 
5:30, the left wing again attacked and this time did 
reach Ploisy, evening up both flanks and presenting 
a straight front. 

This day cost the division about 3,000 casualties, 



50 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

making a total of 4,500 for the two days' fighting. 
The prisoners amounted to about 2,000 on the first 
day and 1,000 on the second, when the resistance 
stiffened. 

The French command then honoured the division 
by assigning it part of the I53rd's objective — the _ 
village of Berzy-le-Sec — for the next day. Hard f| 
fighting all that day, however, did not capture the 
village, although south of it an advance was made. 
But another toll of a thousand casualties came. 
After this third day the 153rd on the left of the 
1st was reinforced, the Moroccan Division on the 
right was relieved. The previous night the 2nd had 
been relieved. Of the original attacking force only 
the 1st Division remained as it entered the fight. 

In company, then, with fresh troops on either side, 
the 1st attacked again at four o'clock on the morning 
of the fourth day, July 21st. The casualties were 
again heavy, especially on account of the fire from 
the north, but Berzy and the heights beyond were 
reached and the whole division front was in line. 
While this fighting was going on. General Summerall 
was notified that the relief promised for that night 
would not reach the line. The relief was the Scot- 
tish 15th Division which had been previously loaned 
to Foch by Haig. So the ist was scheduled to have 
another day of it. The meagre resources with which 
Foch was attacking is significantly shown in the 
length of time the ist Division kept up its attack and 
the distance from which its relief came. 

When the division finally came out of the line 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 51 

it had lost more than 7,200 men, mostly in the in- 
fantry. The full complement of infantry in a divi- 
sion is 16,644. Five days* constant and successful 
attack after a long march; an advance of more than 
six and a quarter miles (ten kilometers); losses of 
nearly 50 per cent, of the infantry engaged; keeping 
pace with the famous Moroccan division and stay- 
ing longer in the fight — all this had demonstrated 
that the ist Division could stand in any company. 

Moreover, the last days had been the hardest. The 
element of surprise had disappeared and the Ger- 
mans were stiffening their line, for it meant a catas- 
trophe for them if this attack continued to gain. 
As it was, the success of the whole operation ne- 
cessitated the beginning of a German retreat that 
ended in the armistice. 

The records of some of the units of the ist Division 
give a good indication of the severity of the fighting. 
The 1 6th and i8th Infantry each lost all officers 
above the rank of captain except the commanding 
officers, while the 26th lost them all and came out 
commanded by a captain of less than two years' 
experience. About 60 per cent, of all infantry officers 
were hit. 

This battle south of Soissons is a fair sample of 
open warfare as compared with the previous trench 
fighting. The front had not been stabilized long 
enough at that point for much if any trench construc- 
tion. But this does not mean that troops remained 
in the open as in the Civil War. Modern artillery 
necessitates the use of dugouts, caves, cellars, or 



52 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

burrowing of some kind. In the Civil War it would 
not have been normal to catch 600 men in a cave, as 
the Americans did near Soissons. In this war catching 
men underground was not unusual. These particu- 
lar Germans had been kept in the cave by artillery 
fire and their escape had been prevented by the rapid 
approach of the infantry. Nevertheless, they re- 
fused to surrender and kept up a fire out of the cave's 
mouth. The Americans called for the help of a tank, 
which waddled up and turned its one-pounder into 
the cave's mouth. But the German garrison still 
resisted, and the German artillery, spotting the tank, 
drove it away. About this time someone discovered 
a vent from the cave and had the happy idea of 
dropping a gas bomb down it. As there were none on 
hand, messengers were sent to the Moroccans to 
borrow some. The first bomb produced the desired 
result. After it had been dropped into the cave, the 
Germans surrendered and to the great surprise of the 
little deaning-up party of Americans, instead of a 
squad or two, there were 600 of them who came 
marching out. 

At another place an American sergeant led an 
attack against a dugout. It was beaten off and he 
was wounded and captured. The Germans dressed 
his wounds. While this was going on, he convinced 
them that the Americans would treat them well and 
that they had better surrender. They let him go to 
arrange the matter, and he found a lieutenant who 
paused to receive the surrender before he went on 
with the fight. The wounded sergeant brought the 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 53 

Germans back to division headquarters. To sur- 
render this way to small numbers does not sound very 
heroic, but it is a part of modern war, and men in a 
cave or dugout have practically no other alternative, 
because one machine gun or a couple of men with 
hand grenades can absolutely command an exit. 

The tanks also add two new features to modern 
warfare — one physical and the other moral. Physi- 
cally they break up machine gun nests, which were 
the main German system of defence. And morally, 
they are of almost as much value. Officers who have 
been with them in action are almost unanimous in 
saying that they increased the morale of the infantry 
tremendously. "The men will go an)rwhere with 
the tanks.'* Even an attack that has about played 
out can be reinvigorated by the presence of a tank 
or two. 

The cutting of the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry 
road by this operation was the most decisive part 
of the general attack which Foch had started on 
both sides of the Marne salient — an attack in which 
French, Americans, British, and Italians took part. 
It made it necessary for the Germans to get out of 
the Marne salient. More war of movement was im- 
perative, this time a backward movement. That 
similarly meant movement for the French and 
Americans. All three were weary and used up. 
Around the base of the salient, in line to follow and 
push the Germans in retreat, was the 26th Division, 
the New England Guard, which had taken over the 
Belleau Wood sector. And troops of the 3rd, 28th, 



54 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

and 4th divisions in smaller units brigaded with the 
French were in the line chiefly along the south side 
of the salient. 

The 26th pushed forward its left a little on the i8th 
to keep in touch with the fighting farther north. 
On the 20th, the attack in which the ist and 2nd 
divisions were engaged south of Soissons having pro- 
gressed far enough, the whole line from there to 
Chateau-Thierry advanced. 

The Germans now steadied the sides of the salient 
and retreated north out of it. They had recrossed 
the Marne on the i8th, with elements of the 3rd, 4th, 
and 28th among the troops in pursuit. The 4th 
Infantry of the 3rd Division were the first troops 
over the river. The enemy fought only a rear-guard 
action on the 21st, but on the next two days they 
tried hard to hold the ridges around Epieds. They 
needed this time to get their material out behind 
them. Once the Allied attack started, everyone with a 
map looked eagerly at the pocket in which the Ger- 
mans were trapped, and scanned the headlines for the 
news that would foretell their cutting off and capture. 
To look at the map such a result looked possible. 
But the map did not show the lack of reserves. Even 
with the terrain in our favour, men were needed, and 
they were still scarce. The relief for the 26th Divi- 
sion, on July 25th, for example, was obtained by 
pulling the 42nd Division out of its position with 
Gouraud and sending it all the way around to the 
other side of the Marne salient. 

As they neared the line of the Ourcq River, the 






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56 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Germans were being pushed faster than they could 
withdraw their suppHes and decided to make a firm 
stand to gain time. The front having now become 
narrower, the American 3rd Division had been re- 
Heved, some French divisions had fallen out of line, 
and two American divisions, the 42nd and 28th 
(by July 27th this division was all together), were side 
by side. 

A report of the ist Army Corps, covering the oper- 
ation of the 42nd division, gives this picture of the 
situation: "To halt our too-rapid advance, fresh 
(German) divisions were thrown into line, and it was 
along the Ourcq that the most stubborn fighting 
along our corps' front, during the entire operation, 
occurred. On the yellow wheat fields that gradually 
slope eastward from Meurcy Farm; on the heights 
of Hill No. 184, which dominated Fere-en-Tardenois, 
remained innumerable evidences of the stubbornness 
of the fighting. The bodies of our men often lay in 
rows not twenty yards from the German fox holes; 
the opposing lines were often within a stone's throw 
of each other, and the bodies of the German and 
American dead in the same machine gun nests were 
a further testimony of the mutual stubbornness of the 
conflicts." On the right of the 42nd, under a French 
corps, the 32nd, which was for the first time in com- 
bat, was having similar hard fighting in front of 
Cierges. 

When the Germans gave up the Ourcq line, they 
retreated to the Vesle. On August 3rd the 4th 
Division, which in small units had been doing good 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 57 

fighting with the French, making its first appearance 
as a division, reHeved the 42nd. With Httle opposition 
it reached the Vesle the next day. Two days later 
it crossed the river and reached Bazoches. On the 
1 2th, after this campaign had really come to a stand- 
still, still another new division came into line, the 
77th relieving the 4th. The 4th, 26th, 42nd, and 
32nd had all seen hard fighting during the forty 
days from June 20th to August ist. 

The Americans had broken the German line at the 
Ourcq. Yet the enemy had conducted a skilful and 
successful retreat, losing comparatively few men and 
guns. The Allies — French, American, British, and 
Italians — had not been able to force their retreat into 
disorder. 

But a great change had come over the war and it was 
due in large part to General Pershing and his army. For 
he had produced the men to change the scale against 
the Germans. The odds were now with the Allies. 

On May 27th there had been only one American 
division, the ist, that had ever even held an active 
sector of line. By the middle of August there were 
nine divisions with battle experiences : 

1st Division, Cantigny — Soissons 

2nd Division, Belleau Wood — Vaux — Soissons 

3rcl Division, Chateau-Thierry — Mezy — Crossing of Marne 

4th Division, Crossing of Vesle 

26th Division, Belleau Wood — Hill 204 

28th Division, Dormans — Passing of Ourcq 

32nd Division, Passing of the Ourcq 

42nd Division, Champagne — Passing of the Ourcq 

77th Division, Bazoches Sector 



58 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

These divisions had met the Germans in attack, in 
defence, in bitterly contested actions, and in rear- 
guard fighting. They had met Prussian Guard and 
Landwehr divisions, all kinds of Germans in all con- 
ditions of warfare, and all were keen to meet the Ger- 
man again. They had finished "second best*' in 
none of the encounters. Their confidence in them- 
selves was high. Their Commander-in-Chief be- 
lieved in them even more than before. Their Allies 
accepted them completely. And last, but not least, 
the Germans had acquired a genuine respect for 
them. About a month after the Vesle was crossed, 
the German Intelligence wrote from this Marne cam- 
paign experience that the ist, 2nd, and 3rd were 
first-class attacking divisions and that the 42nd and 
26th were good fighting divisions. This report 
did not cover the other divisions engaged in the 
Marne, but this is enough to show that enemy 
opinion of us — the safest judgment to follow — ^was 
rising rapidly. 

The time had now come to go back to General 
Pershing's fundamental purpose and create a great 
American army to fight under its own leaders, sub- 
ject only to the Allied High Command. With the 
end of the Marne- Vesle campaign ended also the 
period of French command. In that campaign the 
American I Corps, under General Hunter Liggett, had 
functioned as a part of the French. Sixth Army. 
But most of the time it directed only one American 
division. This was the first time that we had had 
a corps organization in tactical command of troops 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 59 

either in practice or in action since the Civil War. 
With the exception of this corps all higher staffs were 
French. 

The creation and moulding of corps and army 
staffs that are as highly trained as they should be is 
properly a twenty-year task. There was, therefore, 
much more doubt about our ability to make working 
staff organizations in two years than of our ability 
to create fighting divisions in that time. Neverthe- 
less, doubt or no doubt, it was necessary to do it 
both because it would have been ridiculous for a 
nation like the United States to put two or three 
million men in the field under foreign generals, and 
also because our men wanted to fight under American 
leadership and would fight better that way. An 
apprenticeship they gladly and thankfully served, 
but we could not naturally accept permanent tute- 
lage. The fact that we did succeed in organizing 
effective staffs is due chiefly to the teaching of the 
Fort Leavenworth schools from 190 1 on and the per- 
meation of that teaching through the army. 

By the end of July, then, the time had come to 
organize the American First Army. There was no 
pressing emergency calling our troops to the front for 
a little while. The Germans had not recovered from 
their reverses at Soissons, the Champagne, and the 
Marne, and the British had launched an offensive 
against the Amiens salient on the north, seconded by a 
French attack on the south. The British and French 
then were giving the enemy no rest. The task for 
us was to organize our army and get into action 



60 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

again as soon as possible. We practically withdrew 
from active fighting for thirty days. 

On the 27th of July the American First Army 
was organized. General Pershing became Com- 
mander of the First Army acting under himself as 
Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. Orders would 
go from General Headquarters at Chaumont signed 
"by command of General J. J. Pershing, Commander- 
in-Chief, James W. McAndrew, Chief-of-Staff," to 
General J. J. Pershing, Commanding the First Army, 
who, it is recorded, was duly obedient to his superior. 

Our General Staff then began to direct the active 
operations of our troops, which, except in the training 
areas, had been done by the French. The First 
Army staff and the corps staffs began to function. A 
typical case will show what the organizing of higher 
commands meant in responsibility to American offi- 
cers. 

Joseph T. Dickman was a Lieutenant-Colonel in 
191 5, that is, second in command of a regiment which 
then consisted of 800 men. He went to France as a 
Major-General in command of a division of 27,000 
men, and in quick succession rose to be a corps com- 
mander with responsibility for some 81,000 men, 
and then to the command of an army which means 
any number from 180,000 to 250,000. From the 
peace-time care of 800 men to the war-time direction 
of 250,000 is a big increase in responsibility in three 
years. 

During August we collected our scattered divisions 
from the French and brought down to our own area 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 61 

all but two (the 27th and 30th) of the ten divisions 
which the March crises had necessitated sending into 
the British area, where they had been trained under 
British instruction. Around Chaumont and Toul the 
country was filled with American troops. 

General Pershing went back immediately to his 
original plan — to attack the St. Mihiel salient. The 
French High Command approved the project, but 
with the stipulation that when the salient was flat- 
tened out the operation should be concluded. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE TRIUMPH AND HUMOUR OF ST. MIHIEL 

WHEN the Germans took the St. Mihiel salient 
In 19 14 they established their line with an eye 
for advantageous positions which must evoke admi- 
ration from any one who sees them. In the point 
of the salient they held all the high ground and the 
French lines opposite were all below them. The 
Germans could see practically every time a French 
soldier moved, and their artillery could fire from 
direct observation. Almost the only low ground the 
Germans themselves had at the point of the salient 
was the town of St. Mihiel, and they kept part of the 
civil population in St. Mihiel so that the French 
would not disturb the troops there by shelling. The 
side of the salient running north from St. Mihiel 
crosses a range of hills where it joins the main battle 
line. On these hills the Germans were in a strong 
position, but as the French were also on the hills 
the German advantage here was not so marked. The 
German line on the side of the salient east from St. 
Mihiel ran along a completely commanding line of 
hills terminating in the isolated peak of Mont Sec. 
From there they crossed an open valley and then 
ran into the hills again near Font-a-Mousson. The 
French positions in the valley would not have been so 

62 




63 



64 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

bad if it had not been for Mont Sec. Ask any- 
American who was there, and he will tell you that 
you could not wink your eye without the German 
observers on that cursed mountain seeing you. 
Every American who ever served on that part of 
the line has a clear picture of Mont Sec In his mind. 

A report of the Intelligence Section (G-2) of the 
1st Corps gives a vivid picture of the St. Mihiel 
salient: 

The strength of the enemy positions had for four years seemed 
impregnable, and had withstood in 1914 and 1915 the bloody 
attacks of the French at Les fiparges, Apremont, and the Bois 
le Pretre. Such names in the early part of the war had vied 
in notoriety with Mons, Ypres, Louvain, Tahur, Vauquois, 
and Verdun. They were symbolic of the days of trench war- 
fare, in which opposing trenches were often no farther apart 
than ten meters; and In which mining and underground warfare 
played a principal part. They typified campaigns In which 
icx),ooo lives were sacrificed to push back a trench line a few 
hundred meters. 

But by the fall of 19 18 conditions at St. Mihiel 
had changed. It was a quiet sector. The salient 
was held by nine German divisions, perhaps 90,000 
men. Six out of the nine divisions were second 
or third-class troops, made up of reserve, Landwehr, 
or Austro-Hungarian regiments. Nevertheless, un- 
der the new system of elastic defence the line was 
supposed to be so strong that these troops could hold 
it against attack, certainly until reinforcements 
should reach them from Metz. Gouraud's defence 
in the Champagne on July 15th had been a good dem- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 65 

onstration of what a well-organized, elastic defence 
could do, and Gouraud had no such advantages of 
position as the Germans had at St. Mihiel. Ma- 
chine guns, trenches, and lines of wire — the whole 
system several meters deep, supported by artillery, 
was considered as strong as the trenches filled with 
infantry used to be, and much more sparing of men. 

From August 21st to September 12th American 
preparations for attack were ordered to be made in all 
secrecy. The troops were moved in at night and 
hidden in the woods. Traffic on the roads was ordered 
limited to the normal amount. The artillery and the 
air service were forbidden to show any unusual ac- 
tivity. The heavy artillery that was brought up 
was not even allowed to fire any registration shots. 

However, it seems certain that the front-line troops 
of the Germans and their lower staffs expected an at- 
tack, but that the higher staffs, particularly the army 
staff, did not beheve an attack was impending until 
too late to serve a useful purpose. That they did not 
know the date set for the attack is shown by the fact 
that on September nth, less than twenty-four hours 
before our attack was launched, the army command 
issued the order for the evacuation of the salient, an 
operation which would require at best several days. 
Considering the dominating observation points in 
the hands of the enemy it was practically impossible 
for our own army to make preparations unnoticed. 
The Germans were, however, a good deal puzzled 
by the whole business. An officer on the staff of the 
German General told an American officer after the 



66 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

armistice that our preparations had been so easily 
detected that the German Staff had decided that 
they were a feint until almost the time of the battle. 
They then ordered the troops to hold the lines if at- 
tacked, but they seemed to have made little prep- 
aration for this, and as they began removing their 
heavy artillery they undoubtedly weakened the 
morale of their troops. They seemed to have ex- 
pected a smaller and lighter attack that they could 
hold off while they evacuated the salient, which they 
then planned to do. In the meanwhile, they were 
busily engaged finishing a main defence line in the 
rear. 

The American plan of battle was to send the main 
attack north into the only part of the German line 
not on dominating hills. This was the valley of the 
Rupt de Mad. However, this valley is not wide 
enough for the planned attack, so that the troops on 
the right and left of the main attack would have to 
cover harder country. But it was not necessary for 
them to go so far as the divisions in the centre. 

The map will make plain the fact that, if the first 
and second days' fighting in the Rupt de Mad valley 
went as planned, the Germans would have to give 
up the whole salient, although this attack covered 
less than half of the salient itself. A smaller offen- 
sive on the other side of the salient was to be made to 
narrow even further the German outlet from St. 
Mihiel, and the two forces were to join at the town 
of Vigneulles. 

The main attack was to be made by the IV Corps^ 




67 



68 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

The I Corps, on its right, was to advance enough to 
keep in touch and maintain enough activity to keep 
the Germans opposite them busy. On the other 
side of the IV Corps, the French Colonial II Corps 
was to do likewise. This corps was acting as part 
of our First Army, just as our I Corps had served 
as part of the French Sixth Army between Chateau- 
Thierry and the Vesle. 

This French corps held a long sector around both 
sides of the salient, but its main duty was to follow 
the Germans when their retreat began. On each end 
of the sector, however, they were to join somewhat 
in the advance. The American V Corps was to 
make an offensive in the hilly country opposite its 
lines. If everything went as planned the Germans 
between the V and IV Corps, attacked on both sides, 
would have to retreat, and those in the nose of the 
salient would be caught. 

Unless it was General AUenby's capture of the 
Turkish Army in Palestine, no large operation in the 
war worked out in practice so exactly "according to 
plan." It rained hard on the night of the nth of 
September. It had been raining hard for a day or 
two. Slimy mud was everywhere. At one in the 
morning the Germans were awakened by a terrible 
crash of artillery. For four hours the shells dropped 
on their trenches and dugouts, on their roads and 
battery positions, and, for that matter, everywhere 
else. Particular attention was paid to Mont Sec. 
It was deluged with smoke shells so that its observers 
could not see what was going on. Then at five 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



69 



THE LANE 0FTHE42ND'S 
ADVANCE AT ST. MIHIEL 

Showing at the bottom of 
the map the American trench 
system from which our at- 
tack started, the German 
lines of wire xxxxx, the 
German trench systems and 
wire systems and railroads 
continuing back for miles, 
making up a system of de- 
fence in depth. 



o'clock came the 
barrage and the in- 
fantry attack on 
the southern sec- 
tor. Much of the 
German wire was 
old and a good 
deal of it was very- 
low. Some the 
Americans cut, 
some they just 
walked over. Ac- 
cording to the hab- 
it which both sides 
had acquired, the 
forward trenches 
were occupied 
only by patrols. 
There was practi- 
cally no resistance 
there. At the next 
line of trenches. 







^ 


^K 


^ 


'M 


^^ 


^"^ 


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y-y ' 


te 


f& 


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^ 


^^\^\ 


St. BcuM^SS^S^ 


fe 


iTN^^^^ \V^^3l 




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• TtT.,/ 


i4. 





70 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

where resistance should have developed, the artillery- 
had done so well that, in most places, there was not 
much there, either. Many Germans came out of- 
their dugouts merely in time to surrender. 

For example, on the front of the 42nd Division, 
which was a typical one, the first German trench 
system consisted of two trenches with various con- 
nections, on the average about 200 yards apart with 
wire in front of both. About half a mile behind the 
second trench was a third also protected by wire, 
and a mile back of that a fourth and more wire. To 
the unpractised eye it looked as if there were lines 
of wire wandering aimlessly all over these different 
positions. It was very heavy in the front of our main 
attack, and had given our staffs many anxious mo- 
ments. Between the third and fourth trenches were 
most of the German light batteries. Holding these 
defences was the German loth Division, recently 
brought down from Flanders. Contained in it was 
the 6th Grenadier Regiment, which had tried to 
cross the river at Mezy against the 3rd Division in 
July. This German loth Division was one of the 
best in the salient and yet the general commanding 
the 42nd reported after the battle : 

The operation was unusual in its nature because of the small 
amount of resistance encountered, and it is not felt that its ex- 
perience should be made the basis of general deductions for use 
in other operations. 

The 42nd was in the van of our attack against one 
of the few good German divisions in the salient, and 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 71 

its losses in the whole operation were 702. Com- 
paring this with 4,500, two days' losses for the ist 
Division at Soissons, shows very plainly that the 
St. Mihiel defence was not made of very stern stuff. 

However, even with the dash of our main attack 
and the paralysis of the German defence, it is doubt- 
ful if we should have made the big haul of prisoners 
if it had not been for one of the most extraordinary 
movements in the whole war, which occurred at the 
point of our secondary attack on the other side of the 
salient. The French 15th Division and our 26th, 
the New England Guard Division, were to attack 
there. In front of the French in their first day's 
objective were three hills, Les Eparges, famous in 
1915, being the first. As they advanced, their left 
flank was exposed, which made progress somewhat 
difl^cult. However, they pushed steadily forward 
in their cautious, skilful manner, not going very fast 
but making their gains with little loss. 

To their right the 26th Division also was retarded 
by machine gun fire in the woods and hills south 
of St. Remy. When nightfall came they were still 
deployed in the woods about halfway to their first 
day's objective with the German machine guns in 
front of them. Now, according to the usual practice, 
fighting stops at dark except for artillery. But some- 
one in or over the 102nd Regiment of infantry had a 
diff^erent idea. Some time after dark that regiment 
was collected from its lines in the woods, assembled 
in column on the high road named La Grand Tran- 
chee de Calonne, leading straight into the German 



72 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

lines. This solid formation marched boldly down the 
main highway six miles through the German lines to 
Vigneulles, arriving there at 3:25 in the morning 
and absolutely closing the retreat of any Germans 
in the nose of the salient. Although there were still 
some Germans in the woods as the 102nd passed 
through, the march of the adventurous regiment was 
unopposed. 

To a methodical and scientific minded fighting 
man like the German this proceeding must have 
seemed as outrageous a breach of the rules of war 
as any of his atrocities have appeared to us. Some 
time later in the morning the leading troops of the 
1st Division came into Vigneulles from the south, 
also somewhat ahead of their schedule, but having 
achieved their advance in a more normal manner, 
and greatly to their surprise found the town full of 
Americans. But even despite the phenomenal speed 
of our troops in reaching Vigneulles the Germans had 
moved so promptly that much of their artillery es- 
caped. 

St. Mihiel introduced four new divisions to active 
warfare. The 82nd Division, draft men from Georgia 
under Major-General George P. Duncan, was on the 
extreme right of the line. It had no advance to 
make but carried out what is called a holding attack, 
designed to keep the enemy opposite from sending 
help elsewhere. Next to the 82nd was another new 
division, the 90th from Texas and Oklahoma, under 
Major-General Henry T. Allen. It did participate 
in the attack, and accomplished in good style the small 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 73 

mission it was given by four in the afternoon of the 
first day. The 5th, a new regular division, did its 
somewhat larger task in similar manner. 

These three new divisions were all together on the 
right of the line. Nearly in the middle of the 
attack was the Missouri and Kansas draft divisions, 
trained by General Wood at Camp Funston. It kept 
abreast of the fast company on either side of it — the 
42nd (the Rainbow) under Major-General Menoher, 
and the 2nd, the regular and Marine divisions of 
Chateau-Thierry and Soissons fame. It was the reg- 
ular infantry brigade of the 2nd that did the attack- 
ing at St. Mihiel. Its task was to cover almost six 
miles to the hills beyond Thiaucourt on the first 
day — a much longer advance than that of the 5th 
Division on its right. It was not so far as the 89th 
advance on the other side, but it was the only long 
advance required of any division over hilly and dif- 
ficult country. The other long advances had the 
advantage of the Rupt de Mad valley. The bri- 
gade of the 2nd went its six miles in eight and one half 
hours, collected more than 3,000 prisoners and much 
material, including five railroad trains. The com- 
mander of the brigade reported that had the advance 
been two hours slower, half these results would not 
have been achieved. This was evidently true all 
along the line. The speed of the American attack 
caught material and men which the German com- 
mand had every reason to expect would escape, con- 
sidering the promptness with which their retreat 
commenced. 



74 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

The 1st Division did its part as usual. It per- 
formed in such manner that for the second time its 
commanding general left it to become a corps com- 
mander. It had given General Bullard to the III 
Corps after Cantigny, and General Charles P. Sum- 
merall to the V Corps during the Meuse-Argonne 
battle. 

From the morning of the second day the salient 
was blotted out. From then on the French 26th 
Division bagged the prisoners who were trapped 
and our lines were pushed forward after the retreat- 
ing Germans until we were ordered to halt in front 
of the solidly held, previously fortified line which the 
Germans had made behind the salient. 

This was the first battle under American com- 
mand — certainly a most auspicious beginning. Our 
total casualties (including the French troops in- 
volved) were about 7,000. The German prisoners 
numbered 14,439, with 443 guns. The extraordinary 
success of both new and old divisions and the fulfil- 
ment of the staff plans did not mean that we had 
made a perfectly working army. In the first place, 
to stage the artillery fire on the scale planned we had 
to borrow a lot of French guns. 

Likewise the rather unusual concentration of air- 
craft made under the command of Brigadier-General 
William Mitchell was possible only by the use of 
French planes by Americans as well as by the loan of 
French squadrons complete. 

At St. Mihiel there was a total of 46 squadrons 
and 20 balloon companies divided as follows : 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 75 





' French 


American 


Observation 


II 


lO 


Pursuit 


4 


12 


Bombing 


S 


3 


Night Reconnaissance 




I 




20 


26 


Balloons 


6 


14 



Moreover, there were many indications that we 
had still much to learn of the refinements of modern 
war. In the line of supply back of the 26th Division, 
for instance, on the morning of the attack a road in 
plain view of German observation and within easy 
artillery range was filled with every known military 
vehicle all blissfully rolling along toward the front. 
For a seemingly incredible while the Germans let 
this go on. But finally they registered on a piece of 
the road and began shelling. The procession stopped 
behind the spot. But every once in a while a motor- 
cyclist would get through the stalled transport to 
the edge of the shelled area, wave his hat at the wait- 
ing audience, turn on full speed, and run for it. 
Mounted men would do the same and go galloping 
through the shelled area. Even a Ford or two tried it. 
Running the gauntlet became a regular game. There 
is something fascinatingly American about this per- 
formance, but it cannot be classed as scientific war. 

At St.Mihiel the infantry, especially in the main 
attack, were equipped with coloured panels with 
which to signal to the airplanes overhead who they 
were, so that the airplanes could report it back quickly. 
They failed to do it. The plans for the artillery and 



76 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

transport to follow the advance were not particularly 
well handled by the military police, and traffic jams 
occurred. The power behind this young and fresh 
army was so great that, despite the rough edges of its 
performance, it succeeded in an extraordinary way. 
But the seeming brilliance of the performance did 
not blind the divisional and corps commanders to the 
lack of technique in the fine points of modern war. 
Their reports of the engagement are made up almost 
entirely of analyses of defects in their organizations, 
and suggested remedies. 

In contrast to these inside judgments is a very 
interesting description of the American performance 
as seen from the outside. On September 25th the 
Intelligence Officer of the High Military Command 
of the German Army, reporting on St. Mihiel, wrote: 

The artillery preparation prior to the attack was well carried 
out. Their objectives were bombarded with good effect and 
they were able to switch from one target to another in the 
minimum time and with remarkable accuracy. The coordi- 
nation between the infantry and the artillery was faultless. 
If the infantry ran up against a machine gun nest they would 
immediately fall back, and very soon new artillery prepara- 
tion would be directed on that point. A great many tanks 
were in readiness for the attack, but they were only used in 
very small numbers, as the masses of infantry accomplished 
the victory. 

The word victory is interestmg in comparison with 
some of the German High Command's descriptions 
of retiring from St. Mihiel "according to plan." 
The amusement which the Germans had at our ex- 






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78 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

pense about Seicheprey, one little spot in the salient, 
we could now enjoy at their expense concerning the 
whole salient. And it no doubt particularly pleased 
the 26th Division to have participated. 

Just as the German offensive had called the 2nd 
and 3rd divisions to Chateau-Thierry and a stra- 
tegical opportunity had called seven other divisions, 
most of them with training unfinished, into the 
Marne-Vesle campaign, so now grand strategy called 
loudly for the American Army to hit with all its 
strength. The active battle line from the sea to St. 
Mihiel was shaped very much like that famous salient. 
General Foch's strategy was much the same as Gen- 
eral Pershing's plan at St. Mihiel. The British were 
to push a point in on one side and the Americans and 
French on the other. They were to get as near to 
meeting as possible, and the French, in the nose of the 
salient, were to keep the Germans opposite them busy 
and not let them get away while the pincers were 
closing in on them. 

On the 8th of August, after a surprising recovery 
from their spring disasters, the British had begun 
their end of the pinching process. On the 21st of 
August they struck again. From August 8th on, 
as a matter of fact, they kept up one continual and 
terrible push against the German lines. On the 22nd 
of September they broke the Queant-Drocourt line, 
the outer line of defence of the Germans. By the 
26th of September they were solid in front of the 
main Hindenburg Line at Le Catelet, ready to strike 
the main defence on which the Germans relied. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 79 

This being the case on the northern end of the 
salient, it was time also for us to see if we could go 
through the Hindenburg Line on the south side of the 
salient, and, between the two attacks, catch the Ger- 
man armies so that they could not escape. Whether 
we were ready for our part of the task or not we had 
to try it. The French had not sufficient reserves 
available for this and the war would not wait. Such 
an opportunity, once lost, was hardly likely to come 
again. 

The problem facing the Commander-in-Chief and 
our General Staff was altogether different from St. 
Mihiel. That was a flank attack of limited duration — 
an isolated operation. The new problem was a 
frontal attack on a series of prepared positions that 
were vital to the Germans, and the operation had to 
be continuous. Its future could only be limited by 
exhaustion or the end of the war. 

To prepare this General Pershing had a general 
staff that had the experience of one operation — St. 
Mihiel, an army staff with the same experience, corps 
staffs few of which had had more, and divisional staffs 
whose experience ranged from four months to noth- 
ing of active fighting. By their own previous sched- 
ule, the American Army should have been ready 
to undertake such a battle In the late spring of 1919. 
The new British armies had gone into their first 
major offensive, the Somme, twenty-three months 
after England entered the war, somewhat hurried 
by the pressure on the French at Verdun. Oppor- 
tunity called loudly for us to make our first major 



80 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

offensive eighteen months after we declared war — 
a great deal hurried by the course of events. 

It was not to be reasonably expected that our 
newly created staff could function (to use a pet staff 
word) like the long-practised French ones. It was 
not unreasonable to fear some blunder that would pre- 
cipitate a tragedy like Gallipoli or Loos, especially 
with such impetuous and reckless fighters as our men 
had shown themselves to be. With this situation 
ahead of them, " G. H. Q." did not waste much time 
celebrating St. Mihiel. The greatest" strength of the 
American soldier, and of his regimental and platoon 
commanders, next to their own character, was the 
sound nature of their training. In most cases there 
was not enough of it, but what there was fitted them 
for the kind of warfare they had to meet. 

The same was true of the staffs. They did not 
have time to be thoroughly trained nor to sift thor- 
oughly their personnel. But the organization of the 
command of the A. E. F. was sound. For the first 
time in the history of the country, the American 
Army had a real general staff with the power and 
authority to ^'function." It was copied in large 
measure from the French. It worked in this fashion : 
The Commander-in-Chief is in complete and in- 
dividual authority. If he decides upon an oper- 
ation he gives his Chief-of-Staff — ^then Major-Gen- 
eral James W. McAndrew — the general idea and 
object of the action. Under the Chief-of-Staff are 
five Assistant Chiefs-of-Staff, known as G-i, G-2, G-3, 
G-4, and G-5. (G, meaning General Staff Section 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 81 

I, etc.) G-i, General Andrews, was in charge of the 
administration of the army. G-2, General Dennis 
E. Nolan, was in charge of army intelligence. G-3, 
General Fox Conner, was in charge of operations. 
G-4, General Mosely, had supply, construction, 
transport, etc., and G-5, General Fiske, looked after 
the training of the troops. The French have no G-5, 
this work being done under operations, but as train- 
ing in our army assumed such colossal proportions 
it was given a separate head. 

Under the Chief-of-Staff's instructions these or- 
ganizations get the necessary information about 
the enemy, including maps of his defences, G-2, 
prepare the plans for the attack, G-3, and get up 
the war material necessary, G-4. In the carrying 
out of the general policies of the army aside from 
combat operations, G-i and G-5 are continuously 
active, so that men and material may be ready when 
battle is decided on. Compared to a business organ- 
ization, the Government at Washington is the Board 
of Directors, the Commander-in-Chief is President 
of the company, the Chief-of- Staff is operating Vice- 
President, and the various "G's" are department 
heads. 

It all sounds simple and obvious. Nevertheless, 
the creation of the General Staff of the A.E.F. on 
these lines is a landmark in American military history, 
for until the war we never had a general staff that 
could carry out any policy, because the Chief of Ord- 
nance, the Quartermaster-General, and the various 
bureau heads, always dominated the army — each 



82 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

working for his own bureau, and all against an army 
under unified control. If such a deplorable system had 
been followed in France, the Chief of Artillery would 
have told General Pershing how many guns he could 
have for an action; the Chief of the Medical Corps 
would have arranged as many hospitals as he saw 
fit; and the Chief of the Air Service would have de- 
cided what he would do. A battle under these con- 
ditions would have been murder with no extenuat- 
ing circumstances. 

The army, corps, and divisional staffs were exact 
copies of the organization of the General Staff, except 
that the army staffs and corps staffs have no G-5 
and the division staffs have neither G-4 nor G-5. 
The staffs thus organized, on a firm foundation but 
with little practice in directing battle operations, were 
to meet their first major test in the biggest battle ever 
fought by American troops. 

By the second day of the St. Mihiel battle, before 
the operation was really over, long before the papers 
began to ask why the American Army did not ex- 
ploit its success and follow it up toward Metz, 
the reserves had started toward Verdun and the 
Argonne for the last great battle of the war. 



CHAPTER V 

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARGONNE-MEUSE 

THE Argonne-Meuse battle, fought by our First 
Army, was the largest battle in American his- 
tory. General Pershing's forces engaged were 
1,034,300 men — 896,000 Americans and 138,300 
French. It was a vital element in the conquest of the 
German forces, and our main contribution to the war's 
decision. The first great battle of the new British 
armies — the Somme — occurred twenty-three months 
after Great Britain entered the war. Our army went 
into its first great struggle eighteen months after 
our declaration. Half of the troops and divisional 
staffs were green, and our corps and army staffs had 
had but the very scanty battle experience acquired in 
the Marne-Vesle campaign under the French and our 
own operation at St. Mihiel. The place to be at- 
tacked was extremely difficult, and General von der 
Marwitz and his troops were seasoned and formid- 
able opponents. Under the circumstances it was 
just as reasonable to look for a terrible catastrophe 
such as befell the British at Gallipoli, the French in 
the Champagne in 1917, or the Germans in the 
Champagne in July, 19 18, as to look for a decisive 
victory — perhaps more so. 

The state of our army would naturally have sug- 

83 



84 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

gested spending five or six months more in prepara- 
tion for such a task. The state of the war incon- 
tinently demanded that we tackle the problem im- 
mediately in whatever shape we were to handle it. 

On the morning of the 26th of September the 
Allied line from the sea to Switzerland was in contact 
with the main first lines of the Hindenburg system. 
The Germans held these lines intact everywhere except 
in the old St. Mihiel salient. The German troops 
had the greatest confidence in the strength of these 
lines and their ability to hold them, and it was en- 
tirely reasonable for them to feel that their defeats 
in preceding months in a war of movement were no 
criterion by which to judge what they could do 
behind their famous defensive system. 

Marshal Foch's plan was for the British army to 
break through these lines in the neighbourhood of 
Cambrai, and push eastward, and for the French 
Fourth Army and the American First Army to drive 
northward on either side of the Argonne Forest. 
This would crowd the bulk of the German forces 
back on the Ardennes Forest where their transpor- 
tation facilities were the poorest. If this plan could 
be carried out rapidly enough to throw the German 
retreat into confusion a large part of the German 
army would be forced to surrender in the same gen- 
eral locality as the French surrendered at Sedan in 
1870. And this is exactly what occurred. Foch, 
Pershing, Haig, Ludendorff, and Hindenburg are all 
agreed that the German army was beaten and the 
armistice (which was a surrender) was signed to 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 85 

avoid a complete debacle. In General Pershing's 
words: ^* Nothing but surrender or an armistice 
could save his army from complete disaster." 

September 4th was the first day on which any of 
the plans for the Argonne-Meuse concentration 
could be begun to be put into effect. Between that 
time and the battle on September 26th, the French 
and Italian troops in this area had to be moved out 
and the Americans moved in. Of the French and 
Italians there were two corps headquarters, eleven 
divisions, and several other units — altogether about 
220,000 men and all their impedimenta. The Ameri- 
cans who took their places consisted of three corps 
headquarters and troops, fifteen divisions, and several 
thousand army and corps troops — some 600,000 
men and the vast supplies of a major attack. One 
item of these supplies will give an indication of their 
magnitude. There were 240 trainloads of ammuni- 
tion put into the artillery dumps in this area between 
September 6th and September 26th. This was added 
to the ammunition in that area and to what the on- 
coming artillery brought with it. And these 240 
trainloads were just one item of the supplies. No 
other staff on the Western Front carried out so large a 
concentration in so short a time. And this concentra- 
tion was accomplished secretly. Everything was 
ready on the appointed hour and the enemy was 
surprised. 

Not only does the staff deserve great credit for the 
planning of this concentration but the troops showed 
remarkable discipline in concealing themselves in the 



86 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

daytime and going without fires at night. The wet 
weather made these precautions very uncomfortable. 
The troops went by rail, motor, and on foot. A divi- 
sion moving by motor bus will fill about fourteen miles 
of road. Fifteen divisions, the corps and army troops, 
and all the vast stores they need aggregate a terrible 
lot of humanity and material to put down in front of 
a watchful enemy in twenty-one nights without his 
knowing about it. 

There is neither the heroism nor the drama about 
moving troops that there is about the actual fight- 
ing, but it is one of the most difficult and important 
parts of the conduct of war, and this troop movement 
brought our army more praise in Allied military 
circles than many a spectacular combat. 

To move an army the staffs have to calculate the 
amount of traffic each road can carry and give each 
unit in the whole army an exact schedule of the time 
it can be on each road. Military police with full 
instructions must be at every cross-road, for many 
miles of the roads are literally as full of traffic as 
Fifth Avenue, New York, on a winter's afternoon. 
Road discipline becomes as important as battle dis- 
cipline, and it seems about as hard to teach people. 
In an army the army, corps, and division staffs are 
like the various grades of managers and superin- 
tendents of an industrial establishment. A manu- 
facturer can get some idea of what it is to move an 
army, either before or during a battle, if he will 
imagine himself conducting his business with his 
machinery and workmen and raw material moving 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 87 

all over the country and he and his office staff and 
the records following along from town to town, all 
the while keeping in touch with his organization and 
directing operations. Now if the manufacturer 
will imagine most of his office staff and personnel 
to be fairly green when he started such a conduct 
of his business, he can picture for himself some of 
the difficulties which the management of a battle 
like the Argonne-Meuse entails, and this conception 
will help make clear why war isn't usually conducted 
economically, and also why all people who have even 
looked at such a problem are so deadly in earnest that 
we have a trained organization if ever we have to try 
this kind of thing again. When it is done without 
training, the price of ignorance is blood. 

But to go back to the Argonne-Meuse battle. 

Some of the divisions took over the line on the 20th 
of September. But a thin screen of French troops 
was left in front so that enemy raids would get no 
American prisoners from which to identify the forces 
against them. 

A large operation such as the Argonne-Meuse 
battle is very seldom a complete surprise to the 
enemy, but the element of surprise may still remain 
in a very useful degree if the enemy cannot find out 
when the attack will begin, where its main effort will 
be, and what kind of troops will conduct it. 

The Germans knew that the American Army was 
going to make an offensive in the Verdun district. 
It might, however, start from east of the Meuse River 
and go toward the iron district of Briey — toward 



88 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Longuyon and Thionville. Or it might go, as it 
did, north between the Meuse and the Argonne, 
From prisoners* statements and captured documents 
it is certain that the Germans thought that there 
would be an attack by the French in the Champagne, 
that there was to be a demonstration or an attack 
between the Argonne and the Meuse, and they were 
also fearful of an attack east of the Meuse, as shown 
by General von der Marwitz's order dated October ist, 
which is later quoted in full. Their information on 
the time of the battle was good. They knew its 
main purpose. But just how that purpose was to be 
achieved, where our main effort was to be, and how 
many and what troops were to make it — on these 
things their information was not very good. 

For instance, as late as September 22nd a German 
non-commissioned officer told a raiding party that 
they must get prisoners because an attack was 
feared and they did not know whether it was to be 
made by French, British, Italians, or Americans. 

A German brigade order of the ist Guard Division 
dated September 24th (later captured) stated that 
"we must count on a big attack to-morrow in Cham- 
pagne (the French attacked there on September 26th) 
and against Metz (there was no attack there). The 
width of this attack on our front (they were between 
the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River) is not yet 
known." 

This report expected our main attack to be 
toward Metz on the other side of the Meuse from 
where it occurred, but they also expected some 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 89 

activity on the front where our main attack was plan- 
ned. The idea that we would attack toward Metz 
had been in the German mind for some time. 

An order of General von der Marwitz, commanding 
the German Fifth Army, issued on October ist^ shows 
that as late as that date an attack east of the Meuse 
was expected. This very important order, captured 
during the course of our operations, is quoted in full : 

Vth Army Staff Army Hq., October i, 191 8. 

la. No. 10619 SECRET 

According to information in our possession, the enemy is about 
to attack the Vth Army east of the Meuse and try to push to- 
ward Longuyon. The object of this attack is to cut the 
Longu yon-Sedan line, the most important artery of the Army of 
the West. Moreover, the enemy's intention is to render it im- 
possible for us to exploit the Briey basin, on which depends in a 
large part our steel production. Thus the heaviest part of the 
task will once more fall on the Vth Army in the course of the 
combats in the coming weeks, and the safety of the Fatherland 
will be in its hands. It is on the unconquerable resistance of the 
Verdun front that depends the fate of a great part of the west 
front, perhaps even of our nation. The Fatherland must rest 
assured that every commander and every man realizes the great- 
ness of his duty to the very end. If we do this, the enemy's attack 
will as heretofore break against our firm will to hold. 

The Commander-in-Chief 
VON DER Marwitz 
General of Cavalry 

and 
Adjutant General 

It is certain that even as late as October ist, when 
this order was issued, the German High Command 
had not clearly realized that our main attack would 



90 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

be toward Sedan instead of east of the Meuse. This 
failure on the part of the High Command to appreciate 
correctly the direction of the main attack is in itself 
a tribute to the way in which the concentration of the 
troops for the great attack was accomplished. 

It seems clear, therefore, that the Germans did not 
expect our main attack where it came. This sup- 
position is further confirmed by the fact that a line 
from the Argonne to the Meuse was held by only five 
(5) German divisions — only one of them being first 
class — the divisions in line being the 9th Landwehr, 
2nd Landwehr, ist Guard Division, 117th Division, 
7th Reserve Division, the 9th Landwehr being partly 
in the Argonne in front of our army and partly in 
front of the French Fourth Army on the left. In the 
Argonne Forest itself was the 2nd Landwehr Division 
made up of men of more than thirty-five years of age. 
It had held this quiet sector for more than a year. 
Next on its right was the ist Guard Division, one of the 
best in the German Army, but it had suffered severely 
in the Chemins des Dames and Marne battles, and 
was sent to this sector to rest and recuperate. 

The 7th Reserve was similarly resting in this sector 
after having been heavily engaged in the battles of 
the spring and summer. The remaining division, 
the 117th Reserve, was composed largely of Poles 
and Alsatians and on that account was not expected 
to be of high morale. These divisions were between 
the Argonne and the Meuse. 

Between the Meuse and the Moselle, also on the 
front of our First Army, were fifteen German divisions 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 91 

in line and available for the battle between the Meuse 
and the Argonne, and in reserve were a total of eight 
divisions. 

On September 25 th, it was estimated that the availa- 
ble reserves would permit the enemy to reenforce the 
Meuse-Argonne front as follows : 

First day of the attack, 4 divisions 

Second day of the attack, 2 divisions 

Third day of the attack, 9 divisions 

On the fourth and subsequent days of the attack it 
was estimated that ten divisions could come from the 
west and seven from the east. The availability of 
these divisions from the fourth day on depended on 
other attacks. 

In other words, the comparatively weak forces in 
line could be reenforced on the first two days by six 
additional divisions and on the third day by an addi- 
tion of nine divisions, and that from the third day on 
the battle would reach its greatest intensity and the 
gain of ground would necessarily be very slow. Had 
the German commander diagnosed our plan, however, 
and prepared for our attack on the first tremendously 
strong lines the result would have been very different. 

Physically and artificially the 40-kilometer front 
which the American Army was to attack was about 
the most difficult point on the Western Front. The 
Argonne Forest had been considered impregnable 
for four years. We accepted this verdict, also, for 
the plan of battle was for the French to go up on the 
west of it while our army went up east of it, and by 
outflanking it render it untenable. The plan was 




THE WOODS OF THE ARGONNE-MEUSE BATTLEFIELD 

The Argonne Forest gave the Germans a strong protection for one flank and 
the Meuse River similarly protected the other. The numerous smaller woods 
gave fine protection for defensive measures between as did the hills both at 
Montfaucon and farther back along the hne Romagne, Landres St. George, 
Grand Pre. / 

.92 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 93 

not to take It by direct assault. It is a thick growth 
very much resembling the Wilderness in Virginia, 
only the Wilderness is fairly level while the Argonne 
is full of steep hills and ravines. The growth is like 
the Wilderness, the lack of roads Is the same, and 
the character of the few roads that exist Is not very 
different. A fair picture of the Argonne does not 
include "the beautiful roads of France." 

Across the valley of the Aire from the Argonne 
is another woods boasting half a dozen names but 
no roads running north in the direction we wanted 
to go. These woods were also a considerable im- 
mediate obstacle. From these woods to the Meuse 
the German lines were in the open but were strongly 
placed on the hills. Our positions on le Mort Hom- 
me, of Verdun fame, overlooked the German front 
near the Meuse River, but just behind the enemy's 
first positions was the Forges Wood which the Ger- 
mans considered impregnable. 

In addition to the lack of sufficient roads, the usual 
difficulty of building roads across "No Man's Land" 
connecting up the roads existing on your side with 
the roads existing on the enemy's side — the artillery 
having, in four years of warfare, destroyed all vestige 
of roads across "No Man's Land" — ^great difficulty 
was encountered, as was to be expected — five or six 
days being required to make the more Important re- 
pairs to roads in "No Man's Land." However, lack 
of experience in traffic control and regulation by su- 
bordinates, coupled with a laudable desire of heavy 
artillery to push forward, caused several temporary 



94 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

blocks and congestions. Rain and mud did not 
help matters on the only roads available for heavy 
traffic. Also, there was a serious lack of engineer 
tools and road construction material which the First 
Army in the limited time available for the purpose of 
the attack was unable to secure. Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, sufficient supplies and ammunition 
reached the troops and no serious shortage occurred. 
On the whole 40-kilometer (25 mile) front there 
was only one main north and south road — the one 
up the Aire valley. The road from Esnes to Mont- 
faucon was very poor, and the one along the Meuse 
was poor and under fire from the other bank of the 
river. Besides these three roads, one subject to 
shellfire, there was one from Bethincourt to Mont- 
faucon, but as it went diagonally across the direction 
of our attack, it crossed the spheres of three different 
divisions which made its use somewhat complicated. 
On the map also there are such roads as the one from 
Avocourt to Very, but they were too poor to be of 
much help. According to theory each division in 
combat needs a good road to itself. We had nine 
divisions in line. Our communications, therefore, 
should have had nine good roads parallel to our 
advance. We had only one. The constant discus- 
sion of the difficulty of advancing without roads gives 
many people the same impatient feeling that the talk 
of low visibility in the North Sea gave them. It is true, 
of course, that the attacking troops go across country. 
It is likewise true that their ammunition, food, rolU 
ing kitchens, artillery, engineers, supplies, without 



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95 



96 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

which things they can't fight, must go by road, and if 
there are no roads the infantry will soon get out of 
range of their artillery in its original positions. 
Attacks with an objective limited to the range of 
the artillery belong to the period of the old "fixed 
position'* warfare. They do not belong to the war 
of movement, and they would have been fatal to the 
whole conception of the Argonne-Meuse battle. 
The lack of roads, the woods, and the hills were the 
chief physical difficulties to our advance. 

The artificial difficulties — the defensive lines of 
the Germans — ^were even more formidable. The 
German defence systems between Verdun and the 
Argonne were close together. Immediately in our 
front were three, and in places four, well-prepared 
defensive lines. The Hagen Stellung and the Volker 
Stellung made up the principal parts of what is 
generally known as the Hindenburg Line, although 
this term was somewhat indefinite. Behind these 
was the very strong Kriemhilde Stellung, and back 
of that the surveyed but not finished Freya Stellung. 
The easiest way to picture the German defences is 
to think of three lines of one or more trenches in each 
line, the first two close together — the third some dis- 
tance back. The third, the Kriemhilde line, was 
the basis of the thirty days of German defence in the 
Meuse-Argonne. These various lines consisted of 
trenches, permanent works, reenforced at places with 
concrete. At advantageous positions were concrete 
pill boxes. The German artillery was practically all 
fed by light railways. The dugouts were of per- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 97 

manent construction. Against the same skill that 
Gouraud held his less-advantageous lines in the 
Champagne in July our attack might have cost us 
200,000 men in two days and ended in failure as the 
German attack there did. But even knowing that 
the German first defence was lightly manned by a 
somewhat mediocre force, one cannot help admiring 
the confidence and imagination that wrote into the 
plan of our first day's attack an advance of nearly eight 
and a half miles (army objective) and the piercing of 
the three main fortified German positions. If this had 
been done and the transport and artillery had kept up, 
it is almost certain that the war would have ended at 
least thirty days earlier than it did. If our army had 
been able to rush the Kriemhilde as well as the other 
two lines we should have appeared in the rear of the 
German forces in the Champagne about the first of 
October. But as the rush was checked we had to 
follow the original plan, but at slow time for a while. 
When we finally did get through it at the end of 
October, our troops started full speed ahead again. 

The action of our First Army was to synchronize 
with the attack by the French Fourth Army under 
General Gouraud. The Argonne Forest ran north 
about six miles between the two armies. The plan 
was for the French to advance up the west side of it 
while the Americans advanced up the east side of it. 
When that was done the Germans would have to 
get out to keep from being surrounded. The French 
and Americans would join up then and repeat the 
process on the wooded hills north of the Argonne. 




98 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 99 

The two armies side by side would thus press north 
toward Givet while the British pushed east toward 
Givet, and the main German forces would be crowded 
in between with their backs to the Ardennes Forest. 

With these major purposes in view our General 
Staff plan was as follows: 

The V Corps was to drive straight up the middle 
of the country lying between the Argonne and the 
Meuse. It was to be the point of the attack. The 
I Corps on its left was to keep the Germans busy in 
the Argonne and to advance up the Aire valley to 
keep in touch with the main attack. The III Corps, 
on the other side, was to cover the territory between 
the main attack and the Meuse. (See map page 98.) 

The First Army, which had taken the St. Mihiel 
salient, was to make the Argonne-Meuse attack, 
but it will be noticed that Its composition was not 
the same. This army now had in it the I, III, and 
V Corps instead of the I, IV, and V Corps as at 
St. Mihiel. In the French Army a division belongs 
normally to a certain corps, and the corps belongs to a 
certain army. With us this was not true. The corps 
and divisions were used as interchangeable parts and 
moved from army to army and corps to corps as 
occasion required. What remains permanent are 
the army and corps staff. But as it turned out 
during the Argonne-Meuse battle the army com- 
mander and every corps commander was changed — 
another evidence of the Immaturity of our organiza- 
tion. 

On September 26th General Pershing was still 



100 ' OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

commander of the First Army as well as being Com- 
mander-in-Chief. Major-General Hunter Liggett 
was in command of the I Corps. Major-General 
Robert L. BuUard commanded the III Corps, and 
Major-General George H. Cameron the V. During 
the battle the Commander-in-Chief, assuming the 
direction of both the First and Second armies, gave 
up the command of the First Army to General Lig- 
gett of the I Corps. The latter*s place was taken by 
Major-General Joseph P. Dickman from the 3rd 
Division. General Cameron was succeeded in com- 
mand of the V Corps by Major-General Charles P. 
Summerall from the ist Division. When General 
Bullard gave up the III Corps to take command of 
the Second Army he was succeeded by Major-General 
John L. Hines of the 4th Division. 

When the attack started, the I Corps opposite 
the Argonne Forest and the Aire valley had in line 
two divisions with experience, the 77th and 28th, 
and one green division, the 35th. The V Corps in 
the centre had three green divisions in line, the 91st, 
the 37th, and the 79th. The III Corps on the right 
had one untried division, the 80th, which had never 
been engaged, the 33 rd Division part of which had had 
experience with the British, and the 4th which had 
fought on the Vesle. 

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 26th, 32nd, 42nd, the most tried 
divisions, were, with the exception of the 32nd, in- 
volved in the St. Mihiel attack, and could not be 
brought up in time for the attack, on September 26th, 
of the First Army. The 32nd, while not in St. Mihiel, 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 101 

had been fighting for about a month, and needed rest 
and replacements. 

Six out of the nine initial attacking divisions had 
never been in a real battle before. The experience 
of the corps staffs was very limited. The army was 
somewhat lacking in training and experience. It 
was also lacking in the appliances of war. Happily 
this did not apply to guns. Our army had plenty 
of guns for the initial bombardment and after that 
more than could be got through the country. With 
a very few exceptions all our guns came from the 
French. Up to the time the war ended practically 
no guns of American make had reached the front. 

Quite a large proportion of the artillery, princi- 
pally heavy artillery, came from the French army. 
There were 35 French artillery regiments besides 
the railroad artillery units. There were not always 
plenty of guns at every point of the line during the 
battle on account of the difficulties of transportation, 
but we did not lack in total numbers. Between those 
bought from the French and served by our artillery- 
men, and those borrowed from the French, guns, 
transport, and gunners by regiments, there were 
enough. 

On transport our army was short. The lack of 
horses came about because we stopped horse ship- 
ments in the spring in order to send men, and the 
French were unable to find as many horses, or as 
good ones, to supply us with as they had expected. 
Added to this, our army had not had time to learn 
how to care for animals, and the wearing-out proc- 



102 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

ess went on at a terrible rate. We had, of Ameri- 
can make, about 40 per cent, of the motor trans- 
port needed. The rest came from the French or 
British. With the exception of one or two divisions 
which had the Hght Browning, our men were using 
the Chauchat automatic rifle which they did not 
like and quite often threw away. Of minor but 
useful appliances, such as smoke bombs for be- 
clouding the vision, we had only small supplies. 

We had acquired from the French a sufficient 
number of tanks. One hundred and forty-two of 
these were operated by our own tank corps. The re- 
mainder, 73, belonged to the French and were manned 
by them. The French could not again lend us the help 
in the air to the extent they did at St. Mihiel because 
they had an attack going on at the same time. 

We consequently had to fight a much larger battle 
without the corresponding increase in the air forces. 
On the first day of the battle the records showed 193 
pursuit planes, 58 bombardment planes, and 333 ob- 
servation planes available. On the day of the armis- 
tice the corresponding figures were 188 pursuit, 80 
bombardment, and 242 observation planes available. 
In other words, the replacements about kept up to 
the losses. We could have used more planes if we 
had had them, but they were not to be had. 

It is hardly worth saying whether we or the enemy 
had supremacy of the air, for that word supremacy 
is not very definite in its meaning in this connection. 
The ground soldier on either side would probably 
say that the other side had it. It is certain that 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 103 

neither we nor the Germans had sufficient supe- 
riority to prevent the other side from taking practi- 
cally all the observations he wanted to. The proba- 
bility is that the Germans got more use out of their 
air force than we did put of ours because they were 
more accustomed to using it, and their infantry and 
artillery had longer practice in coordination with 
their air service than ours had. 

We were, then, in many ways somewhat lacking 
in experience and equipment. On the other hand, we 
had numbers and a tremendous offensive spirit — 
"the will to victory" which the German military 
writers used to be so fond of writing about. This 
was as characteristic of the imagination and confi- 
dence of the command as it was the fighting spirit of 
the troops. This Argonne-Meuse battle had a time 
limit to it. Its object must be gained before the 
main 'German armies had retreated from the big 
salient in France. It was a question of breaking 
every German line on that front quickly and ending 
the war in 191 8, or fighting another year, and it is 
fortunate we had a general and an army that were 
willing to push the fighting, pay the price, and finish 
the war. 

At 2 :30 on the morning of the 26th of September 
the bombardment began. It is easier to get a pic- 
ture of what occurred by taking the action of one of 
the nine attacking divisions rather than trying to 
envisage the whole battlefield. Let us take the 4th. 
The high-water mark of the terrible German attacks 
on Verdun in the spring of 1916 were the two hills, 



104 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Le Mort Homme and Hill 304 west of the Meuse. 
The battle-scarred French trenches on Hill 304 
was the "jumping-off" place of the 4th Division. 
For the three hours from 2:30 to 5 130 in the morning 
the division's artillery, aided by the larger guns of 
the corps and army artillery, filled the German de- 
fences with exploding shells, and a machine gun 
battalion of the division sprayed the ground from 
the first to the second German lines at 75 shots a 
minute. 

When the zero hour arrived the men of the 4th 
Division "went over the top with a yell." The 
actual attacking force, as is usual, consisted of two 
battalions (1,000 men each) of infantry, two ma- 
chine gun companies, and a few wire-cutting teams 
of engineers. The two battalions of infantry repre- 
sent one third of one of the two brigades of the divi- 
sion. Immediately behind them went two more 
battalions as support. The last two battalions of 
the attacking brigade made up the brigade reserve. 
The other brigade In the capacity of division reserve 
followed within reach in case of emergency but keep- 
ing as safe and fresh as possible for the time when 
their turn would come. 

At the jumplng-off place, the 4th Division's swath 
was quite narrow, being less than two thousand yards 
across. Their first task was to cross the Forges 
Brook (for which the engineers were carrying foot 
bridges) and the swamp on both sides of it. There 
was a lane of wire along the brook, and a maze of 
wire lanes beyond before the men reached even the 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 105 

first German trench. The German defence did not 
contemplate holding at this point. Our men cut 
the wire, or scrambled through, and crossed the 
trenches with as little opposition as at St. Mihiel. 
The field gun emplacements at this first line were 
empty. Even at the second line the German de- 
fence was not serious. A few machine guns fired 
for a while but they were quickly silenced. 

According to schedule the artillery was concen- 
trating on each defence line before the infantry were 
to reach it. By half-past two the troops had gone 
six miles to the corps' objective, as far as their origi- 
nal orders covered. The Germans were withdrawing 
their first line. The interesting thing then was what 
was to happen next. When the 4th Division stop- 
ped on orders, the German infantry and artillery in 
its front was still retreating. After the Americans 
stopped the Germans came back, straightened them- 
selves out, and got ready for a better defence than 
they had been able to organize while on the retreat. 

The American plan had been that the whole line 
would go forward as the 4th had actually done but 
that after reaching its first objective that it would 
keep right on and break the next German line — the 
Kriemhilde Stellung which was where the Germans 
had intended to do their hardest fighting. As the 
French said, this plan required a little more than 
human accomplishment. It was spoiled by Mont- 
faucon which stuck up in this battlefield like Mont 
Sec at St. Mihiel. But the progress of the 4th Divi- 
sion east of Montfaucon was enough to show that 




io6 




^ 



RELIEF MAP OF MONTFAUCON AREA 

The woods (shaded) south of Montfaucon (point of arrow) are the Cheppy 
and Montfaucon woods through which the 37th Division pushed, the zone of 
the 79th on their right being along the edge of the woods. The 37th and 91st 
were on the hills to the left of Montfaucon at the end of the first day. 



107 



108 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

the original plan had some chance of success, and of 
course if it had succeeded the German army would 
have been in a hopeless position. That the advance 
did not go at the speed hoped for did not change 
either the plan itself or its purpose. But it did mean 
that the breaking of the Kriemhilde line had to be a 
somewhat slow task. 

Montfaucon was the stumbling block. It lay in 
the path of the 79th Division. The 79th, the draft 
men from Maryland and Virginia, who had trained 
at Camp Meade, were entering their first battle. 
They met a good deal of difficulty from the start. The 
wire in front of them was so thick that they did not 
get through it in the twenty-five minutes allotted. 
This meant that they were not ready to go forward 
when the barrage moved and they were accordingly 
left without its protection. This resulted in their 
having a harder time overcoming the machine gun 
nests, especially those firing at them from the Malan- 
court, Montfaucon, and Cuisy woods on their left 
and from the town of Malancourt on their right. 
The total result was that by dusk they were in front 
of Montfaucon, some four kilometers (2.4 miles) be- 
hind the line which the 4th Division on their right 
had reached at 2:30. 

This was the critical moment at which fate was to 
decide whether the "more-than-human" advance 
was to continue on with a rush or whether the attack 
was to slow up to hard plodding. The orders came 
to make one more effort to keep the push going. 
The 4th, the 79th, and the next two divisions on its 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 109 

left (37th, 91st), which were a Httle ahead of it, were 
all ordered to attack about dusk. The condition 
of the roads had made it impossible for their artillery 
to be up. The attacks had to be launched without 
much help from the guns. The crux of the situation 
was Montfaucon on its steep and abrupt hill. In the 
darkness the 79th attacked with the help of two 
tanks. The men had gone about 200 yards from the 
woods in which they had assembled for the attack 
when they were deluged with machine gun fire, 
artillery, and hand grenades. They could not see 
the machine gun positions, nor make any effective 
return fire. After suffering heavy casualties in the 
attempt, they had finally to withdraw again to the 
woods. 

The next morning the 79th attacked again and 
from 7 to II o'clock struggled to blot out the ma- 
chine guns ahead of them, and take the town. In 
the daytime, with the assistance of a machine gun 
barrage and the tanks again, the task was finally 
accomplished. At 3 130 the 79th started north 
again from Montfaucon and continued attacking until 
6. But the advance was not very fast and by night 
the men were badly tired. They were still about 
two kilometers (1.2 miles) behind the first day's ob- 
jective. 

With the 4th Division outflanking Montfaucon on 
the right, before the first day was over there might 
be some grounds to hope that the town's defenders 
would make the task of the 79th easier. But 
whether or not they should have, they didn't. 



110 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Montfaucon had fulfilled the mission given it by 
the German general. It had held up the first rush 
of our attack where it was to go fastest. The moun- 
tain and its defences were admirably fitted to do this. 
The American command, perhaps a little unreason- 
ably, hoped to pass it the first day. From the time 
we failed to pass this obstacle on schedule, the hope of 
running the Germans off their feet and turning their 
retreating defence into a clear break through had 
to be given up. By the night of the 27th it was cer- 
tain that the "more-than-human'* schedule was 
broken. The task then was to keep attacking, one 
attack after another, until the German army in front 
was slowly beaten and driven out of its defences. The 
advantage of the great artillery preparation which 
opened the battle was now gone. Our artillery had 
to get new positions and get what ammunition it 
could by road. The enemy artillery was in long pre- 
pared positions with heavy and light railroads to feed 
them and convenient, well-protected ammunition 
dumps. 

This means more than it seems to on the surface. 
His light railways fed his guns and carried other sup- 
plies as well, leaving his roads comparatively free. 
We, having no light railways, had to bring not only 
the ammunition but everything else over the roads. 
Our average daily expenditure of ammunition was 
72,500 shells. If these were all for 75 's it would mean 
725 tons. But as much of it was for heavier guns 
the average was probably more than 1,000 tons a day. 
That means a lot of trucking every twenty-four hours 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 111 

to get it to the distributing points and a lot of work 
for the horse transport distributing it to the guns. 
The German local reserves had gone into line and 
Von der Marwitz, knowing just where the great 
thrust was, could safely send his other reserve 
troops to the point where the battle was fixed. 
From five divisions in line and nine in reserve on 
September 26th, the German forces against us had 
grown to twenty-five divisions in line and seventeen in 
reserve on September 30th. In these four days our 
army had captured 9,000 prisoners and 100 guns. But 
almost more important than the men and guns and 
ground captured was the pulling of the extra German 
divisions from other parts of the front where they were 
desperately needed. The Germans saw their main 
line of supply threatened. 

On the 26th, the first day of the battle, the Germans 
had held their second position, especially at Mont- 
faucon, with great tenacity. By this they gained time 
for the arrival of reinforcements, and the full value 
of our surprise was lost. This second position was 
passed, however, on the succeeding days and the 
third position reached, and here the Germans made 
a desperate effort to hold. The lack of training and 
inexperience of some of our troops account for their 
inability to drive the trained enemy from his second 
position on the 26th or to carry the attack through 
the third position on the 27th. 

Our army had now left the prepared positions 
from which it started and was dependent for every- 
thing on poor roads and few of them — roads which 



112 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

had had to be rebuilt entirely across No Man's Land 
and repaired in the many places where the Germans 
had mined them or blown up bridges. It was fight- 
ing in a country which had been in enemy hands four 
years. The Germans, on the other hand, not only 
knew the positions they were in perfectly, but they 
likewise knew the positions we were in. Their artillery 
could reach every road, town, and piece of cover per- 
fectly. It was all absolutely familiar to them. 

And they had great skill using the advantages the 
character of the battlefield gave them, with flank 
and cross fire on our advance from the Argonne For- 
est and from across the Meuse River. They also 
made particularly effective use of a combination of 
single light guns and machine guns supporting each 
other. 

On the 28th of September the two wings of the 
army made progress, and on the first of October the 
centre made a small gain. These might be con- 
sidered the exploitation of the gains of the first day's 
attack. In the meanwhile, everyone was working 
feverishly to get ready for another general attack on 
the morning of October 4th. 

The severity of the first five days' fighting caused 
inevitable losses in the 79th, 37th, and 35th divisions 
and a certain amount of disorganization and mixing 
of units. It was necessary to relieve these troops 
before the attack could be pushed further. To re- 
lieve three divisions means the movement of more ■;!] 
than 150,000 men in and out of the battle line. The 
very restricted road situation and constant rain made 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 113 

the task more than normally difficult. However, it 
was accomplished in three days, the 3rd, 32nd, and 
1st divisions taking over from the 79th, 37th, and 
35th respectively. 

On the 4th of October came the first general 
attack all along the line after the initial rush. It 
gained, though not largely, at every point, but par- 
ticularly it pushed forward up the Aire valley along 
the eastern edge of the Argonne. The French had, 
in the meanwhile, been pushing up on their side, 
following the plan of forcing the Germans out 
of the forest without pushing them out by direct 
attack. By the night of the 4th of October 
the American line was as far north as Fleville on 
the flank of the Forest of Argonne. But the 
Germans, although threatened with being cut off, 
as at Montfaucon, stuck to their exposed position and 
kept their artillery working on our exposed flank. To 
remedy this situation two regiments of the 82nd Divi- 
sion and three regiments of the 28th Division attacked 
due west from the Aire valley into the forest. These 
troops performed one of the most extraordinary feats 
of the whole battle. They crossed the Aire river 
valley, climbed the hills 300 feet high on the other 
side, and by the night of the 8th had pushed the 
Germans off the dominating points. To pass a flat 
valley under artillery and machine gun fire, get 
across a river and up wooded heights on the other side 
in the face of machine guns and capture a strongly 
defended town, is a matter not to be undertaken 
lightly. The men of the 28th and 82nd can with con- 



114 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

fidence go home and discuss war with the remnants 
of those who went up Lookout Mountain in 1863; 
and if, on the one hand, the heights above the Aire 
are not as high as Lookout Mountain, on the other 
hand machine guns are much harder to face than 
single-shot rifles. 

Thus threatened from the flank the Germans 
began to retreat, and by the night of the loth the 
77th, the New York City draft division, had the satis- 
faction of emerging on the north end of the Argonne. 
While it was greatly helped in its task by the pressure 
from the sides which was to have caused the Germans 
to get out of the Argonne, the 77th deserves great 
credit for its part in the business, for it was consis- 
tently ahead of its stated objectives, keeping up an 
unexpected pressure on the Germans in the hitherto 
impossible country. It was during this period of the 
77th's struggles that Major Whittlesey and the lost 
battalion earned its fame. 

While these events were progressing the French 
were pushing rapidly forward while our line advanced 
slowly and painfully. The battle lines in the papers 
showed big French advances for several days until 
their line bulged out some ten kilometers (6 miles) 
ahead of ours. The comparison seemed very un- 
favourable to us, and the wise gossips who coin scandal 
and talk calamity began to ask what was the 
matter with Pershing and his army. After all, was 
the American Army too green to succeed? Wild 
stories of road congestion and terrible losses reached 
Paris. There were both losses and road congestion 




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116 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

with us, but the real explanation of the rapid French 
advance and our slow advance at this juncture of the 
battle was perfectly simple and logical, and without 
the tragic accompaniments given it by gossip. 

The explanation is the arrangement of the German 
defensive lines. Between September 26th and Octo- 
ber 4th we had passed all the German defence lines 
except the Kriemhilde Stellung. So had the French. 
The Kriemhilde Stellung ran directly across our 
advance. In front of the French the Briinhilde line, 
the continuation of the Kriemhilde line, made a big 
bend north following the Aisne River. The map on 
page 115 explains the whole situation. When the 
French broke the other lines, the Germans withdrew 
(under pressure) to the Briinhilde line. On the loth 
of October both our army and the French were 
immediately in front of this German stronghold. 
Measured by the German defences that had been 
passed the armies were even. Measured by kilo- 
meters of advance we were behind. But defences 
are harder to pass than kilometers. 

Both armies spent the next twenty days knocking 
holes — one in the Briinhilde and the other in the 
Kriemhilde line — preparatory to farther advance. 

It is very difficult to give a clear picture of our 
fighting at this period for it was neither like the fight- 
ing of previous wars nor of the earlier parts of this 
war. The American line, for example, was not a line 
at all, nor was the German, although as a last resort 
they had their trench and wire lines to hold. But the 
Germans had much more than this. In the first 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 117 

place, they had their artillery maps worked out so 
that they knew exactly where our men could take 
shelter. These places they systematically shelled. 
Then they had their machine guns planted in groups 
and well protected. To hold a valley they did not 
have a line of machine guns across it. They had 
them planted in the woods or on hills or in any favour- 
ing position which could sweep the valley. Until 
an attack was made no one could be certain from 
which direction the bullets which defended the valley 
would come. To make any progress, then, it was 
necessary to silence and take one or two of these 
specially pestiferous areas which covered the sur- 
rounding country. But this was only the first round 
in the game. The Germans had foreseen this and 
prepared from other positions a fire which was to 
make it impossible for us to hold one of these positions 
if we got it. Their third trick, if the first two failed, 
was to counter attack and take our prize away from 
us. The fourth move was to accept this particular 
advance if the first three moves went against them, 
retire a little way to their next combination, and work 
all four moves over again. This was a pretty hard 
game to beat, especially when played by some of 
the best troops in the German army, and a good 
many of them. 

The Bois des Ogons was one such centre of trouble. 
We got into it once but had to get out again. On 
the other end of the line our men got into Grand Pre 
several times before they could make their tenure 
permanent. Between our various attacks and the 



118 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

less frequent counter attacks of the Germans the 
artillery on both sides kept searching for the other 
side's guns, machine guns, and troops. In this 
contest the Germans had the advantage of having 
dugouts and other protection. Our men used the 
captured dugouts where possible, but mostly they 
dug little fox holes and crawled into them. All 
over the south side of every hill in this section 
are the American burrows, most of them just big 
enough for a man to lie down in. And all around 
among them are the shell holes made by the German 
effort to make these hillsides untenable. These 
places were bad enough. The shelter in the ruined 
villages was worse, for villages have a particular 
fascination for all artillerymen. 

Some professional opinion believes that the Ger- 
man artillery was a little short of ammunition, but it 
is doubtful if the men up front noticed it. If there 
was a shortage it showed in the Germans leaving our 
transportation alone at times when they might have 
reached it. But all agree that their guns were well 
served. They not only kept all places where our 
troops might be under fire, but from time to time 
they would pick particular spots of importance and 
deluge them. A German airplane would come over 
and drop a smoke bomb. Their artillery observers 
would observe the direction from two different points 
and where the lines from these two points crossed 
would be the spot. In a surprisingly short time after 
the smoke bomb fell the shells would follow, and with 
admirable accuracy. If it was an ammunition dump 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 119 

that was the object of attention, the thing to do was 
to go away right after the smoke bomb fell. 

The following extract of a diary by a machine gun 
captain will give a fair picture of how this struggle 
appeared to a line officer whose picture of the battle 
must be circumscribed by his own immediate locality : 

October Third. This day has lasted for 96 hours 
more or less. On October 3rd we got orders just 
as we were preparing to go to bed to go into the 
attack. I was not pleased. When youVe got your 
mind all set for the hay you hate like thunder to have 
to go into an attack of any kind. But we packed 
and moved up into position just behind the front 
line. We bivouacked on the ground and got some 
sleep, but as it drizzled a little and we were shelled a 
little and were scared a little, sleep was not too good. 
Our barrage came down early and shortly after that 
we started forward. This warfare . is quite open 
and we moved along the roads with our transport. 
We parked it much farther forward than was safe. 
The adjutant came running up shortly shouting 
above the roar of the guns: " Spread that transport 
out! The place is being shelled." I ran over to the 
limbers and told them to scatter out, and the words 
were hardly out of my mouth before a big shell hit 
within twenty yards of me. It bowled one of my 
sergeants completely over twice, but he got up un- 
hurt. The transport scattered all right and went in 
all directions like chickens in front of an automobile, 
and had hardly moved away before a shell dropped 



120 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

in the exact place where they had been. I went 
and told the adjutant: "They are all scattered, 
sir," I said. He answered, " I'm hit," and he certainly 
looked it. It was the best wound I ever saw. A 
piece of the shell that bowled over my sergeant had 
got in the point of his shoulder and had inflicted the 
nicest blighty that ever a man hoped for. We tied 
him up and laid him in a trench and later he went off 
to the dressing station. After that the shelling got 
worse and we had to get down. I had a little bit of 
a trench and was snug as the proverbial bug. I 
went out some time later and went around to see 
how the men were getting on. They were scattered 
around in shell holes and were getting on all right 
although the shelling was hot. I saw one man lying 
\down and thought for a second it was good old Larry. 
My heart stood still and I hardly dared look at him. 
He was quite dead — horribly mashed by a shell, 
but thank God, it was not Larry. At five minutes to 
five I got an order to send four guns forward with the 
infantry who would attack at five o'clock. I ran all 
the way to my most advanced guns and told them 
they must advance at once. I hurried them all I 
could to allow them to get through before the coun- 
ter barrage came down. Our barrage was to have 
started at five but there was so much shelling going 
on that you couldn't tell what was barrage and what 
wasn't. I saw them go forward over the ridge, and 
as they went by I wished them good luck little know- 
ing what was in store for them. 

They topped the crest and disappeared, and 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 121 

then I heard the German machine guns open. I 
didn't know what they were shooting at, but I felt 
it must be my men and I couldn't understand it, 
because if the infantry had gone forward at five there 
should not have been any machine guns there. I 
went back and told Larry. 

"Good God, man," said he, "that order said 5:30, 
not 5." 

I had given the order to Ned so I couldn't tell 
for sure, but the cold sweat broke out on me. I had 
sent them over before our own infantry! I had made 
a most terrible mistake ! I had sent a whole platoon 
to certain death through misreading an order ! Good 
God in Heaven, what am I to do! They have gone 
now. I can't possibly stop them. Larry is never 
wrong, he saw the order and said it read 5:30. 
I waited in anguish for 5 130 to see if the barrage came 
down then, and sure enough the artillery fire doubled 
at 5 130 and at six was a continuous roar. Just after 
six I saw the German S.O.S. lights go up and I knew 
that the mistake was made. A thousand thoughts 
flashed through my mind. I had sent a whole platoon 
to perdition. I would commit suicide. No, not 
that; I would resign my commission and enlist. No, 
that wouldn't do, either. Then I thought, j well, 
maybe the order said 5 o'clock after all, and that 
would clear me, and then I thought that Ned who 
had the order would probably be killed and I'd never 
know whether I had made the mistake or not. All 
this time orders were coming in and things had to 
be attended to. I had to force my tormented mind 



122 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

to think about the rest of the company. A lot of 
letters came in from Ned's fiancee, and that didn't 
make matters any better. It was terrible. Finally 
a wild-eyed runner came in to say that the platoon* 
had advanced to within one hundred yards of the 
German lines and then had had a dozen machine guns 
open on them. He said he had crawled on his hands 
and knees and the rest of the platoon had been 
wiped out. He had seen Ned go down and believed 
he had been killed. It was the worst possible news. 

"I am going mad," I thought. "What can I say 
to Ned's girl? How can I ever stay in the army? 
How can I ever look any one in the eye again ? " 

And all the time I have to think about to-morrow's 
advance. Finally in comes Ned himself risen from 
the dead. He was crying like a baby and confirmed 
what the previous runner had said : they had walked 
directly into a machine gun nest, and only three had 
managed to crawl out again on their hands and 
knees. Ned had been in charge of the platoon. 
The Major was there. 

"Have you the order?" he asked. 

"Yes," sobbed Ned, and held out a crumpled 
piece of paper. The Major took it and read it. He 
had signed it, and he handed it to me without a word. 
I swear my hand shook and I hardly dared look at it. 
It read as follows: "The infantry will attack at 5 
p. M." My heart leaped into my throat — the mis- 
take was not mine. I almost broke down. The strain 
had been horrible, but the miracle came later. 
The platoon had not been wiped out. Practically 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 123 

all of them had managed to crawl back. Two were 
killed, five unaccounted for, seven wounded, and 
twenty untouched. I don't understand it. It was 
broad daylight, and the Germans let them get within 
a hundred yards and there was no cover at all. It 
was a miracle, and that's all there was to It. 

Uncle Ned keeps writing me about praying. He is 
certainly a very devout man. And he probably 
would be glad to know that I actually did pray once 
or twice during the last attack. It was rather con- 
temptible of me, too. It is supposing too much to 
think that you can turn your back on God the way I 
have done and expect him to listen to a prayer, an 
instinctive, involuntary, but nevertheless fervent, 
prayer made while a particular shell is coming whist- 
ling down the wind directly toward you. But I 
prayed instinctively, I couldn't help it, and so, I 
find, did everyone else. I'll wager that large-calibre, 
high-explosive shells have caused more fervent prayer 
in the last four years than all the sermons that ever 
have been preached. No, it's no good, if you are 
going to pray when you hear the big shells you ought 
also to pray at other times, you ought to pray for 
the good of your soul, and for the welfare of others, 
and all that sort of thing. It would be surely con- 
trary to all fairness to be a pagan like I am all the 
time except when I am scared green. I think every- 
body will agree to that. Uncle Ned adds that if I 
don't pray myself there are others at home who 
pray for me daily, which is quite comforting, partly 
because I'm glad to have anybody who is interested 



124 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

enough in me, and partly because the people who 
are doing the praying are all devout Christians, and 
the Bible says that "the effectual, fervent prayer of a 
righteous man availeth much/' (I've got the quota- 
tion mixed but that's about it.) I don't want to die 
over here, as I have too much to do yet at home, and 
if prayer will bring me back then I'm all for it. It's 
all very well to figure in the "Killed and Action" 
reports. It sounds heroic and all your family and 
friends are glad to have known you, and write each 
other about it, but I'd a darn sight rather figure 
among the " arrivals at Hoboken" next fall, and Fve 
a very strong notion that I'm going to be in the latter 
list. 

The Kriemhilde defence system is approximately 
two and a half miles in depth. On the loth of Octo- 
ber we had reached it all along the line from the 
Argonne to the Meuse. It took us the next twenty 
days to go that two and a half miles. The hills 
around Romagne, Bantheville, and Landres-St. 
George were the backbone of the German resistance. 
General von der Marwitz was fighting to save the 
main German communications not only for his army 
but for all the German armies of Champagne and 
Picardy. Over the 4-track line from Sedan to 
Carignan and on to Longuyon and Metz flowed the 
life blood of supplies, munitions, and men for a large 
part of the German armies in France. 

General von der Marwitz' s order of October had 
said: 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 125 

According to information in our possession the enemy is about 
to attack the Vth Army east of the Meuse and try to push to- 
ward Longuyon. The object of this attack is to cut the Longu- 
yon-Sedan line, the most important artery of the Army of the 
West. Moreover, the enemy's intention is to render it impossi- 
ble for us to exploit the Briey basin, on which depends in a large 
part our steel production. Thus the heaviest part of the task 
will once more fall on the 5th army in the course of the combats 
in the coming weeks, and the safety of the Fatherland will be in 
its hands. It is on the unconquerable resistance of the Verdun 
front that depends the fate of a great part of the west front, perhaps 
even of the nation. 

In this order the General showed an expectation of 
a little different direction in our attack but he judged 
accurately that one of its objects was to cut the 
Longuyon-Sedan railroad, only in cutting it between 
Sedan and Carignan we would more completely ruin 
"the most important artery of the Army of the West^* 
on which *' depends the fate of a large part of the 
West Front, perhaps even of our (German) nation" 
than by cutting the road at Longuyon, for by cutting 
it west of Carignan the lines that came in there would 
also be cut. 

Von der Marwitz, then, was under the compelling 
necessity to hold the Kriemhilde line, for if that went 
there were no prepared defences between it and the 
railroad, and if his troops couldn't hold behind the 
Kriemhilde defences he couldn't expect them to hold 
in the open. Nor could he expect enough reinforce- 
ments to make this possible, for the pressure on the 
other parts of the German line was so intense that no 
German general could spare the men, and their 



126 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

general reserve was about gone. On the loth of Oc- 
tober, in fact, information was issued to our corps staffs 
that the last of the German rested reserves had been 
brought into the battle area. 

Although Von der Marwitz did not have as many 
men as he could have wished for, the composition 
of his force was rather better than the average of 
the German army at that time. On the front of our 
First Army from September 26th to November nth 
there were forty-four German and two Austro-Hun- 
garian divisions. Of these thirteen were used twice 
and two were used three times. The German force 
consisted of three guard divisions, twenty-nine line 
divisions, and twelve reserve and Landwehr divisions. 

Fifteen divisions, a third of the force, were rated 
first-class shock troops. 

Of the total force against us about half belonged in 
that area. Of the other half seventeen divisions 
came from the French front, four from the British, and 
two from the Russian front. Two divisions left our 
front, one going against the British and the other 
against the French. 

On our side, in the middle of our line between the 
forest and the river, were the ist, 32nd, 42nd, and 
3rd, among the best divisions with which we had 
carried on the attack on the Kriemhilde defences. 
The fighting was stubborn and hard, the daily ad- 
vances were small, the losses were heavy. There 
was much about this fighting like Grant's advance 
through the Wilderness. The enemy was suffering 
badly, his defence, though stubborn and skillful. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 127 

was limited. The thing to do was to give him no 
rest, but to force the fighting and pound him every 
day. Little by little, through the latter part of 
October, we wore through his line of defences. When 
the 30th of the month came our troops were through 
the Kriemhilde defences in places, in others the Ger- 
mans still held the last fringes of them, but Von der 
Marwitz knew that he could not cling to them and 
that there was no other line behind him that would 
save the precious railroad. He probably knew also 
that the comparative lull of the last few days of 
October were preparatory to another general attack. 

On the whole Western Front the Germans were in a 
desperate condition, a condition directly the result 
of defeats at the hands of all the Allied armies. The 
greatest German concentration had been against 
the British offensive, but it had failed as Von der 
Marwitz had failed against us. 

General Haig thus reports the German situation 
opposite him at the end of October: 

By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt by 
the British forces had had a cumulative effect, both moral and 
material, upon the German armies. The difficulty of replacing 
the enemy's enormous losses in guns, machine guns, and ammu- 
nition had increased with every fresh attack, and his reserves of 
men were exhausted. In the Selle battle the twenty-four British 
and two American divisions engaged had captured a further 
20,000 prisoners and 475 guns from the thirty-one German 
divisions opposed to them, and had advanced to a great depth 
with certainty and precision. Though troops could still be 
found to offer resistance to our initial assault, the German in- 
fantry and machine gunners were no longer reliable, and cases 



128 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

were being reported of their retiring without fighting in front 
of our artillery barrage. 

The capitulation of Turkey and Bulgaria and the imminent 
collapse of Austria — consequent upon Allied successes which 
the desperate position of her own armies on the Western Front 
had rendered her powerless to prevent — had made Germany's 
military situation ultimately impossible. If her armies were 
allowed to withdraw undisturbed to shorter lines the struggle 
might still be protracted over the winter. The British armies, 
however, were now in a position to prevent this by a direct 
attack upon a vital centre, which should anticipate the enemy's 
withdrawal and force an immediate conclusion. 

But the enemy was worse off than that and he 
knew it. He was not only threatened by the British 
with a "direct attack upon a vital centre," which he 
could not withstand, but he was also threatened by 
us with an attack on his main communications, and he 
knew he could not withstand this either. Even if the 
British could not have forced his collapse from in 
front, the German withdrawal was impossible if Von 
der Marwitz couldn't hold the Sedan-Longuyon rail- 
road. 

By the last of October, then, the fate of the Ger- 
man armies was really sealed, and Ludendorff and 
Hindenburg knew it as they have since frankly said. 
However, while the German Government tried to 
arrange some terms on which to stop, the German 
commanders did the best they could to rescue as 
much as possible from the approaching wreck. 

And Foch, having the enemy within his grasp, 
stimulated every effort to hasten and enlarge the 
great consummation of four years of war. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 129 

Although by October 31st we were through the 
Kriemhilde Hne from Mt. Landres at St. George to 
the Meuse, the lay of the land still was favourable to 
the German defence. The hard fighting had used 
up a number of his divisions but his line was short- 
ened and its configuration allowed him to transfer 
several divisions from in front of the French Fourth 
Army to our front. At this time he had twenty-eight 
divisions and parts of two others in line and ten 
divisions in reserve. 

On our side, between October i8th and 31st, while 
keeping the enemy busy, our army had reorganized, 
rested, and gotten ready for another big attack. The 
weather improved and the spirit of the army was 
raised to a high pitch. For the attack of November 
1st outline was 
I Corps. 

In line 77th, 78th, Both divisions. 

Reserve 82nd Division. 
V Corps. 

In line 2nd, 89th divisions. 

Reserve 42nd, ist divisions. 
Ill Corps. 

In line 90th, 5th divisions. 

Reserve 32nd, 3rd divisions. 

Ammunition, supplies, and equipment were up, 
and all hospitals had been evacuated. All was 
ready. 

The task of our army in this last phase was two- 
fold, part of it drove on north to gather the fruits of the 
previous thirty-five days' effort, and cut the railroad 



130 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

in the neighbourhood of Sedan. The other part 
turned east and north in a drive on the eastern side 
of the Meuse toward Longwy. 

The race for the railroad began on November first. 
At 5 :30, just at the break of dawn, the men of the 77th, 
79th, 80th, 2nd, 89th, 90th, and 5th divisions scrambled 
out of their fox holes and moved forward to enjoy an 
experience that no American troops had had since 
the day the battle opened in September — a progress 
measuring five or six kilometers per day. 

The right, and centre corps pushed their attack 
with spirit and speed to Barricourt ridge, breaking 
the German defence system and artillery lines. The 
right of the left corps kept up but its left could not 
make much headway. However, the completeness 
of the success on the rest of the front demoralized 
the enemy's whole resistance. He had to cross the 
Meuse near Dun and Stenay and this meant a general 
withdrawal. 

Duringthenext two days our attack still maintained 
its vigour. The III and V Corps pushed the enemy 
across the Meuse while the I Corps, preceding the 
French Fourth Army, drove the German rear guards 
north along the east bank of the Barre River. By 
November 9th the enemy was in full retreat. His 
rear guards tried hard to delay our advance but he 
made no attempt to establish another defensive line, 
until by November 6th his troops were across the 
Meuse on our army front from Wadelincourt south of 
Sedan to south of Dun sur Meuse. 

South of Stenay our troops had crossed the river 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 131 

in the drive toward Longwy. The operations east 
of the Meuse had, as a matter of fact, begun before 
November ist. These operations were under the 
control of the French XVII Corps which in turn was 
acting as a part of our First Army. This French 
Corps staff had under it the French Colonial II 
Corps and a number of American divisions. 

As the American troops on the west bank of the 
river pushed northward, farther and farther away 
from the old trench lines, they became more and more 
exposed to artillery and machine gun fire from the 
heights on the east bank. From this fire they suffered 
considerably and it soon became apparent that an 
attack on the other side of the river could not be 
longer delayed. One American division, the 29th 
(Virginia and Maryland National Guard), was 
assigned to General Claudel, the French commander 
of the corps, to take part in the attack with a second 
division, the 33rd (Illinois National Guard), to cross 
the Meuse and join up with the 29th should the 
original assault succeed. 

It was an extremely difficult operation due to the 
strength of the enemy's defences, the massing of his 
forces to protect the Briey basin, northeast of Verdun, 
and the problems of transport and supplies because 
of the river and the lack of sufficient roads. To 
overcome all these difficulties General Claudel 
counted principally on the element of surprise, and to 
insure surprise he launched the attack across the 
enemy's front instead of directly against it. 

This attack, which began on the morning of Octo- 



132 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

ber 8th, was completely successful, the enemy being 
driven from a series of important heights including 
Malbrouck Hill and Consenvoye Woods. The Illi- 
nois troops accomplished an extremely difficult task 
in getting across the Meuse, and as soon as they had 
joined up with the 29th these two units were sub- 
jected to a terrific fire from the enemy's massed 
artillery on the Etrayes Ridge and beyond. The 
veteran 26th Division then came into the line on the 
right of the 29th. For several days these troops suf- 
fered heavily but they not only held to their positions 
but managed, after several rebuffs, to work their way 
forward. By October 23 rd the 29th, assisted by 
one regiment of the 26th, had stormed the Etrayes 
Ridge, and four days later the 26th succeeded in 
clearing the Bois de Belleu, a little patch of woods 
which because of its name and the stubborn defence 
which the Germans put up there recalled the wood 
of similar name near Chateau-Thierry where the 
Marines first won fame. The New Englanders also 
had to their credit the capture of the Bois d'Ormont, 
one of the most formidable heights in this region. 

The Americans now had a firm hold on the high 
wooded ground from which their comrades across 
the river could be protected in the operation that 
was then being planned, and which proved to be the 
final phase of the Argonne-Meuse battle and of 
America's part in the war. 

The line east of the river stayed pretty much as 
it was on October loth until the 5th of November. 
By that time our line west of the river was much 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 133 

farther north, and the 5th Division held a 13-kilo- 
meter flank along the Meuse from about BrieuUes to 
the neighbourhood of Montigny. The task of the 5th 
was to cross the river and take the hills on the other 
side. The river bottom was flat and unprotected. 
The opposite shore was studded with machine guns. 
It would be pretty difficult to convince any ordinary 
man standing on the east bank of the Meuse now that 
troops could cross the flats, get over the river, and 
efi^ect a lodgment in the face of rifle fire, not to men- 
tion machine guns and artillery. It does not look 
possible but it must have been for it happened. 

Two attempts were made to cross the river, one at 
Brieulles on the night of November 3rd-4th and the 
other the following day at Clery le Petit. In the 
first attempt two companies only got across, but these 
men by clinging desperately to their positions were 
the direct cause of the entire division's getting across 
and clearing the heights beyond. One battalion of 
the 60th Infantry crossed the river on rafts, duck- 
boards, with poles and ropes, and by swimming, and 
established itself in the Bois de Chatillon. The 
following morning, November 5th, this wood was in 
our hands, and the left of the division was able to 
cross the river at Clery le Petit where its first at- 
tempts had been extremely costly. By 8 o'clock 
that morning the division had a secure hold on the 
east bank of the river and by dark that night the 
entire line of heights from Milly to Vilosnes was in 
our hands. Two days later the 5th Division had 
stormed the famous Cote St. Germain, the northern 




THE VERDUN HILLS AND THE WOEVRE PLAIN 

The hills in the lower left-hand corner hold the famous Douaumont (point of 
arrow) and Vaux forts. By November nth the Germans were not only clear of 
these, as they had been for some time, but practically the whole line of hills as 
shown in this map was in American hands. Compare with the large map 
of Argonne-Meuse battle. 



134 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 135 

bulwark of the heights of the Meuse. With the 
assistance of the division on its right the 5th had 
driven the enemy into the plain of the Woevre. 

When the armistice was proclaimed the Germans 
had lost practically every commanding position 
northeast of Verdun and had been backed out into 
the Woevre plain with no natural defences to rely 
on, and no such artificial defence lines as those they 
had already lost. 

There is still one more element to the picture. It 
is not really a part of the Argonne-Meuse battle but 
it is closely related to it. Although certain that the 
Germans must sign any terms presented to them, our 
army was determined to lose none of its advantages 
by delay until the armistice was actually in operation. 

While the First Army was preparing to push out 
toward Longwy the Second Army, which had been 
formed on October 12th under Major-General Robert 
Bullard, was preparing to launch an attack from the 
new line across the base of the St. Mihiel salient to- 
ward Briey. The beginnings of this action were 
stopped by the armistice. The Second Army's 
operation would have driven a wedge into the Ger- 
man line north of Metz. 

At the same time a little farther south, opposite 
Chateau-Salins, there was a French force, under 
General Mangin, ready to go through the Hin- 
denburg system there, and drive a wedge into the 
German lines south of Metz, thus isolating that 
fortress. To withstand these attacks there were 
only the German troops in that area and there was 




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WHERE WE CUT THE GERMAN COMMUNICATIONS 

His two main supply lines were to the south the lines from Sedan to 
Longuyon and to the north the lines through Belgium. According to the 
Germans themselves the southern line was vital. By November 6th we had 
it under fire. From that time surrender was necessary. Shaded portion 
shows Allied advance. 



137 



138 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



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nowhere for them to get reserves. The cutting 
of the Sedan railroad had practically cut the 
German army in two, the greater part of it was 
north of Sedan, and if it had had any reserves 
they could reach Lorraine only by the roundabout 
route through Belgium. On the other hand, as our 
line and the British had approached nearer each 
other, the French line in between kept getting shorter 
and shorter, and the troops thus relieved could 
quickly and easily reach Lorraine where, joined with 
ours already there, they could present an over- 
whelming force against the Germans on that front. 
The armistice went into effect just in time to save the 
Germans from this threatened catastrophe to them 
which bid fair to be more rapid and complete than 
any disaster they had previously suffered. 

But without this the results of the Argonne- 
Meuse battle were great enough. We had cut the 
main German supply line of the German western 
army, which was their main army. They depended 
practically altogether on the four-track line from 
Mezieres to Carignan and on the railroad system in 
Belgium (see map on page 137). Having cut their 
main supply line at a time when they were in the con- 
fusion of retreat made it doubly impossible for them 
to escape the effects of this disaster to their trans- 
portation system. 

At the time of the armistice the Germans had 184 
combat divisions. We had had against us forty-five of 
them and defeated them. In doing this we had used 
up the local reserves normally belonging to that area 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 139 

and taken care oftwenty-five divisions from other fronts. 
There were in all about 600,000 Germans against our 
First Army. On information captured from German 
sources it is estimated that their killed and wounded 
amounted to about 100,000. We took 26,000 pris- 
oners. The American losses — killed, wounded, and 
prisoners — were about 1 17,000, and the French serving 
with us about 7,000. This is an extraordinary re- 
sult for a not fully trained army to achieve in attack. 
We captured besides men 874 German guns, more 
than 300 trench mortars, and more than 3,000 ma- 
chine guns. 

The decisiveness and the significance of our great 
battle in France will continue to grow as people 
continue to study the war. As that study progresses, 
a good many lessons of the struggle will grow plain 
also, and as the picture gets plainer public apprecia- 
tion of the valour of our soldiers and the work of our 
line officers and staffs will continue to grow. 

Many officers came out of the battle marked ''unfit 
for combat service." When the public realizes how 
meagre these men's training was — regulars, guards- 
men, and national army — the cause for wonder will 
not be that there were so many officers relieved but 
that there were enough fit for this kind of combat to 
make the thing a success. If some troops retreated 
three kilometers in the face of a Prussian guard coun- 
ter attack, if other troops got so disorganized in a 
rapid advance that they had to be taken to the rear 
to re-form, the wonder is not that this happened but 
that it did not happen more. There will be learned 



140 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

arguments to the effect that if we had used fewer 
troops we could have avoided some of the traffic 
jams that occurred, and that had our battle plans 
been less elemental we might have taken greater 
advantage of terrain, etc. Before these and similar 
criticisms be counted just, they must take into ac- 
count that it may take more green troops to take a 
position than it does experienced ones, and that the 
simplest battle instructions are plenty complicated 
for officers half of whom had never been in a big 
battle before, and most of whom had had a uniform 
on less than eighteen months. A lot of men are buried 
in the Argonne because people cannot in a short 
time learn even the elements of warfare so as not 
to forget them in the stress of battle. 

The more the forty-seven days of the Argonne-Meuse 
is studied the more grateful the American public must 
become to General Pershing, his staff, and the officers 
and men of the American Army, and the more fixed 
should become the public resolution never again to 
make an American general take the moral respon- 
sibility of facing such a task, with an army " hurriedly 
raised and hastily trained,'* and never again to send 
our citizens into battle in which all the advantages 
that come from proper training are with the enemy. 

The great decisions of Pershing and his staff to 
train for open warfare, to push the fighting whether 
ready or not, the ability to make a million men into 
an army that could function without fatal blunders 
and fight to victory — these things are as great in the 
annals of the nation as the courage of our men. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 141 

And always it is well to remember in estimating 
our last great battle Von der Marwitz's statement that 
the fate of the German western army, perhaps even 
of the Fatherland, depended on holding the Sedan- 
Longuyon railroad which was the prize of our victory 
won by forty-seven days of bitter fighting in the last 
decisive struggle of the great war. 



CHAPTER VI 

WITH THE ALLIES 

DURING the Argonne-Meuse battle there were six 
American divisions with the AlHes, and all of 
them saw distinguished service. Toward the end of 
October the 37th and 91st divisions, which had been 
in the opening of the battle on September 26th, were 
taken from our army and sent to Belgium and as- 
signed to the composite army under the King of the 
Belgians who had the French General Degoutte as 
Chief-of-Staff. From the 31st of October on these 
divisions were in action and they acquitted themselves 
well. They were among the troops at the point of 
the Belgian advance. 

The same was true of the two American divisions, 
the 27th and 30th, that were with the British. 
These two divisions were the first troops through the 
Hindenburg Line on the British front in the attack 
near Cambrai which began on September 27th. 
These two divisions were again in action on the 17th 
of October in the opening stages of the battle of the 
Selle River. Their work, on both occasions, received 
the highest praise from the British. In these two 
battles these two divisions took more than 6,cxx) 
prisoners. 

Still farther south the 2nd and 36th divisions were 

142 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 143 

loaned to the French, and the 2nd Division had here 
the honour of being the first to break the German Hne 
in its area. The 2nd took the strong hill Blanc Mont 
and the town of St. Etienne, breaking a line the Ger- 
mans had held since 1914, and playing a conspicuous 
part in the wide attack which resulted in a general 
German retreat to behind the Aisne from Rheims 
to the Argonne. The 36th relieved the 2nd and was 
in the French advance following this German retreat. 
From this service the 2nd came back and appeared in 
the Argonne in the attack of November ist. 

There is every reason for pride in the record of 
these loaned divisions as there is in the record of 
the First Army. 

Concise Official Histories of the Combat 
Divisions 

1st Division 

This division was organized from troops of the U. 
S. Regular Army. The first units left the United 
States June 14, 19 17, and the last units arrived in 
France July 2, 1917. The division went into the 
Gondrecourt (first area) training area for training. 

The division insignia is a crimson figure "i*' on 
khaki background. Chosen because the numeral 
**i'* represents the number of the division and many 
of its subsidiary organizations. Also, as proudly 
claimed, because it was the " First division in France ; 
first in sector; first to fire a shot at the Germans; 



144 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

first to attack; first to conduct a raid; first to be 
raided; first to capture prisoners; first to inflict cas- 
ualties; first to suffer casualties; first to be cited 
singly in general orders; first in the number of divi- 
sion, corps, and army commanders and general staff 
officers produced from its personnel/' 

It entered the line in the Sommerville sector, ten 
kilometers southeast of Nancy, for instructional pur- 
poses under French command October 21st, and with- 
drew the night of November 20, 19 17. This sector 
was quiet. 

The division entered the Ansauville sector under 
the tactical command of the French. This sector was 
approximately twenty kilometers northwest of Toul. 
Sector quiet with occasional active days. Division 
withdrew April 3rd. The ist Artillery Brigade was 
the only American artillery in action during this 
period. 

The division entered the Cantigny sector, five 
kilometers west of Montdidier, April 25th. 

The Cantigny operation was carried out the morn- 
ing of May 28th, the division advancing the line 
300 to 600 yards on a 2,200 yard front. Division 
was relieved July 7, 19 18. 

The division entered the line the night of July 17, 
191 8, for the Soissons operation, approximately fifteen 
kilometers southwest of Soissons. The fighting was 
severe throughout the attack, especially July 20th 
and 2 1 St. The division was relieved after having 
reached Berzy le Sec. 

Saizerais sector. The ist Division entered the 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 145 

sector on August 7th. The sector was quiet and 
the division was relieved August 24th. 

St. Mihiel operation. Elements of the division 
commenced entering the sector on September 6th, 
completing the relief September nth. The division 
began an attack on September 12th in the Beaumont 
sector, twenty kilometers northwest of Toul. On Sep- 
tember 13 th the division was regrouped and held 
in reserve of the IV Army Corps. The division had 
advanced its line fourteen kilometers in nineteenhours. 

Operation east of the Argonne and west of the 
Meuse. The division moved into line October ist 
and attacked in the Cheppy sector, one kilometer 
west of Varennes, continuing the attack until the night 
of October nth, when it was relieved. The division 
had advanced approximately seven kilometers. 

Operation against Mouzon. On November 5th, 
elements of the division entered the line and at- 
tacked the next morning in the area of Mouzon. At 
2 P.M. orders were received to assemble the division 
and march to Sedan. 

Operation south and southwest of Sedan. The 
division attacked the heights south and southwest 
of Sedan on the morning of November 7th. At 
2 P.M. the division was ordered to withdraw. 

The division commenced its march to the Coblenz 
Bridgehead from Abaucourt on November 17th. 
Marched through Lorraine and the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg. Crossed the Rhine on December 
13th. Occupied its area east of Rhine in the Coblenz 
Bridgehead, December 14th. 



146 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

To include March 8, 1919, there had been 23,974 
casualties, which included 106 prisoners, reported 
from the division. Three hundred individuals of 
this division had been awarded the Distinguished 
Service Cross up to March i, 1919. The division 
captured 165 officers and 6,304 men, numerous ma- 
chine guns, pieces of artillery of all calibres, and a 
great quantity of supplies. 

The 1st Division made a total advance, against 
resistance, of fifty-one kilometers. 

The commanding generals of the division were as 
follows: Maj. Gen. WilHam L. Sibert, June 8, 
1917, to December 12, 1917; Maj. Gen. Robert L. 
BuUard, December 12, 1917, until he became a corps 
commander. On March 15, 19 19, Maj. Gen. E. F. 
McGlachlin, Jr., was in command of the divi- 
sion. 

The following units composed the division: the 
i6th, i8th, 26th, 28th Infantry regiments; 5th, 6th, 
7th Artillery regiments; ist Engineers Regiment and 
Train; 2nd Field Signal Battalion; 3rd, 4th, 5th, 
Ambulance companies and Field Hospital. 

2nd Division 

The division was organized from elements of the 
Regular Army and Marines in France during the last 
three months of 191 7. 

The division insignia is an Indian head on star 
background and shield with colours varying according 
to unit. 

After a period of training with the division head- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 147 

quarters at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, from October 
26, 1917, to March 16, 191 8, the division entered 
the Verdun and Toulon sectors with headquarters 
at Sommedieu. The division was in sector with 
the French, the sector being quiet, no advance being 
made. Constant patrolHng and several enemy raids 
repulsed. Division was relieved March 24th. 

The 2nd Division on this date moved into the 
Chateau-Thierry sector, passing from the VII A.C. 
French to the XXI A. C. French as reserve. The 
division went forward about June i, 191 8, to meet 
a strong enemy attack which had developed on the 
line west of Chateau-Thierry. The attack of June 
3rd and 4th was halted June 4th on the line west 
of Chateau-Thierry and the division advanced two 
kilometers in the neighbourhood of Vaux and in 
Belleau Wood, between June 6th and July ist. 
The relief of the division was completed on night 
of July 9th. 

On July i6th the 2nd Division entered the sector 
south of Soissons and attacked on the morning of the 
1 8th and again on the morning of the 19th, advanc- 
ing a total distance of eleven kilometers after severe 
fighting. The relief was completed on July I9th-20th. 
On July 20th the division moved into reserve posi- 
tion and left the sector. 

On August 9th the division entered the Marbach 
sector. This was a quiet sector and division was 
relieved on August 24th. 

The division entered the line on the St. Mihiel 
salient September 9th, where there was very active 



148 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

fighting, withdrawing on September i6th, after 
having advanced approximately nine kilometers. 

Entered the front line of the Blanc Mont sector 
near Somme Pye under the French. After severe 
fighting the division was relieved October 27th. 

The division entered the Meuse-Argonne sector 
on October 30th and attacked November ist, ad- 
vancing to the Meuse. Division was relieved after 
declaration of armistice. The division had made 
an advance of twenty-nine kilometers. 

Some of the units of the division, as a part of the 
1st Division, left the United States in June, 1917. 
The division captured 228 officers, 11,738 men, 
343 pieces of artillery, 1,350 machine guns, and made 
a total advance of sixty kilometers against resistance. 

Its training in France was obtained in the third 
training area which is known as the Bourmont 
area. 

The units composing the division were the 9th 
and 23rd Infantry; 5th and 6th Marine Corps regi- 
ments; 1 2th, 15th, and 17th Artillery regiments; 
4th, 5th, and 6th Machine Gun battalions ; 2nd Trench 
Mortar Battery; ist Field Signal Battalions; 2nd En- 
gineer Regiment and Train; ist, 15th, i6th, and 23rd 
Ambulance companies and Field hospitals; which 
composed the 2nd Sanitary Train, 

Brig. Gen. Charles A. Doyon, U. S. Marine 
Corps, commanded the division to include No- 
vember 7, 1917; Maj. Gen. Omar Bundy com- 
manded the division from November 8, 19 17, to July 
14, 1918. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 149 

4th Division 

The 4th Division (Regulars) was organized at 
Camp Greene, Charlotte, North Carolina, on Decem- 
ber 10, 1917. 

The division is known as the "Ivy Division," 
its shoulder insignia is a green four-leafed ivy, 
about a circle in cross shape, superimposed upon a 
square olive-drab diamond. 

The division began leaving Camp Greene April 
18, 1918, by way of Camp Merritt and Camp Mills. 
Overseas movement began May i, 1918, and most of 
the division landed in England and proceeded to 
Calais. By June 3rd, all organizations, except artil- 
lery, were in the Samer area for training with the 
British. The artillery trained at Camp de Souge. 

On June 9, 19 18, the division moved to Meaux 
and vicinity and on June 15th moved to La Ferte, 
being at the disposal of the 164th French Infantry 
Division. During the operations beginning July 
i8th the division (less 7th Brigade) was under 
orders of the VII Army Corps (French) and the 7th 
Brigade under the II Army Corps (French). Units 
of the division participated in the fighting around 
Haute-Vesnes, Courchamps, Chevillon, St, Gen- 
goulph, and Sommelans until July 22nd, when the 
division was made reserve. Some of the infantry units 
were detached and put into the fighting with an- 
other American division. 

The division went into the front line August 3rd, 
advancing to the Vesle, and was relieved on night of 



150 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

August nth, and on August 19th was withdrawn 
to the Reynel training area, and on September ist 
all units were moved to Vavincourt for further 
training. 

On September 7th troops of the 59th Infantry 
went into the line in the Toul sector southeast of 
Verdun. During this period the balance of the 
division was in reserve in this sector, except the 
artillery which was in action with other divisions. 

The 59th Infantry was relieved September 15th 
and the entire division moved to woods near Lennes 
on the night of September I9th-20th. 

The division, as part of III Corps, attacked on the 
first day in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, September 
26th, advancing six and a half kilometers the first day, 
and continued in this offensive until October 19th, 
when it was relieved while holding Bois de la Cote 
Lemont and Bois de Brieulles. 

On October 20th the division was assigned to the 
Second Army; started to move to Vignot and Lucey 
areas on October 21st. 

On November 4th the division was assigned 
again to the First Army and started moving to Bler- 
court November 6th, but was reassigned to the Second 
Army on November 8th. The division returned to 
Void on November 9th, attached to the IV Corps. 

After the signing of the armistice the division con- 
centrated around Bourcq on November 13th and 
the artillery brigade, which had been kept in action 
almost continuously along the Meuse, rejoined the 
division November 14th. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 151 

The division began its march into Gennany No- 
vember 20th, under the Third Army, and on December 
i6th the division was occupying the Kreises of Adenau 
and Cochem, Province of the Rhine, as its perma- 
nent area of occupation. 

The total battle casualties reported to include 
March 8, 19 19, were 12,948. The number of Dis- 
tinguished Service Crosses awarded to individuals 
of this division to include March i, 1919, were 66. 

The commanding generals of the division from 
the time of its organization to include the date of 
the armistice were as follows: 

Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Cameron, December 10, 1917, 
to August 24, 191 8; Brig. Gen. Benj. W. Poore, 
August 24, 1918, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. 
John L. Hines, August 31, 1918, to October 17, 
1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Cameron, October 17, 
1918, to October 24, 1918; Brig. Gen. Benj. W. 
Poore, October 24, 1918, to November 7, 1918; Maj. 
Gen. Mark L. Hersey, November 7, 1918, to Novem- 
ber II, 1918. 

5th Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions, 
the 5th Division (Regular Army) was organized at 
Camp Logan, Texas, in the latter part of May, 1917. 
The division was made up from the 6th, nth, 60th, 
and 61 st Regular Army Infantry regiments. The 
60th and 6ist Infantry were organized from the old 
7th Infantry; the 19th and 20th Field Artillery or- 
ganized from the old 7th Field Artillery; the 21st Field 



152 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Artillery organized from the old 3 rd Field Artillery ; the 
7th Engineers Regiment organized from Companies E 
and F of the ist Engineers; and the 9th Field Signal 
Battalion organized from personnel of the signal corps 
of the Regular Army. The 13th, 14th, and 15th Ma- 
chine Gun battalions ; 5 th Trench Mortar Battery; 5th 
Headquarters Trains and Military Police; 5th Ammu- 
nition Train; 5th Sanitary Train, were organized from 
Regular Army and National Army drafts. The first 
organization to leave for overseas entrained from 
Camp Merritt about the first of March. Division 
headquarters arrived at Havre, France, May i, 1918. 
The division was sent to the Bar-sur-Aube area for 
training and remained there until June ist, when it 
moved by rail to the Vosges. There it entered the 
Colmar sector in conjunction with the 21st Division 
(French) and remained there until July i6th. The 
division then moved by bus to the St. Die sector 
and remained there until the 23 rd of August, when it 
moved by bus and foot to the St. Mihiel sector. In 
the St. Mihiel operation this division was a part of 
the I Army Corps and was placed in the line north- 
east of Regnieville-en-Haye with the 2nd Division 
on their left and the 90th Division on their right. 
The division continued in the St. Mihiel offensive 
until September i6th when it moved by road and bus 
to the Argonne front and went into the attack on 
October 12th east of Montfaucon. The division 
continued in the attack until October 22nd when it 
was relieved by the 90th Division, and was with- 
drawn to the vicinity of Malancourt. On October 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 153 

27th the division was again brought into the attack 
southwest of Brieulles, crossed the Meuse River and 
took Dun-sur-Meuse, and continued the attack until 
November nth when it had reached a position just 
south of Marville. On November 13th the division 
was moved back to the vicinity of Murvaux and on 
November 20th to Lion-Devant-Dun. When the 
Third Army was formed this division constituted a 
part of the command and was marched to the vicinity 
of Longwy where it was placed in charge of the lines 
of communication, taking over the control of the ter- 
ritory in its area. On December 8th the division 
marched to vicinity of Remich, Luxembourg, and 
upon arrival there was placed under command of the 
Second Army. 

Maj. Gen. James E. McMahon, U.S.A., commanded 
this division from December 13, 19 17, until October 
24, 191 8; Maj. Gen. Hanson E. Ely from October 
24th to November nth. 

The shoulder insignia of the 5 th Division is a red 
diamond. The division captured from the enemy 
the following: 2,405 prisoners, 98 pieces of artillery, 
802 machine guns, and made a total advance of 
twenty-nine kilometers against resistance. 

During active operations, the division suffered 
the following losses (as reported to the War Dept. 
to include May 10, 1919): killed, 1,908; wounded, 
7,975 ; prisoners of war, 98 men. 

To include March i, 19 19, 163 Distinguished Ser- 
vice Crosses have been awarded to individuals of this 
division. 



154 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

6th Division 

In compliance with War Department instruc- 
tions, the 6th Division was organized at Camp 
Forrest, Ga., and Camp McClellan, Ala., on No- 
vember 26, 191 7. This division was a Regular Army 
division and was popularly known as the " Star Divi- 
sion." 

On March 13, 1918, the division headquarters 
moved to Camp Forrest, Ga., and later left on May 
8th and was established at Camp Wadsworth, S. C. 

Practically every state in the Union was repre- 
sented in the volunteer personnel of the division; 
however, the majority of the men were from the 
South. 

The shoulder insignia of the division is a six- 
pointed star of red with the numeral "6" in blue 
superimposed on the centre of the star. 

The division, less artillery and engineers, began 
embarking from New York on May 8, 191 8, and be- 
gan debarking in England on July 17th, the last 
units arriving in France August 28, 191 8. From 
England the troops were transported to France, be- 
ginning July 2 1 St, debarking at Le Havre. 

Preceding the division, the engineers arrived on 
May 1 8th at Brest, France, and were engaged in con- 
struction work at Gievres before joining the division 
in August near Chateauvillain. 

The artillery landed at Le Havre on July 29th and 
began its training at Valdahon. 

After training in the vicinity of Chateauvillain, 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 155 

the division, less artillery, left on August 27, 19 18, 
for Gerardmer where it occupied, under French 
command, a sector in the Vosges until October 11, 
1918. 

On October 27th the division moved from Ger- 
ardmer by rail to the vicinity of Les Islettes and 
established headquarters at Beauchamlc Farm. 

On November 2, 1918, the division began to march 
forward in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. On No- 
vember 6th the division headquarters was established 
at Stonne. 

The army objective in this drive having been 
reached, the division then marched to a sector 
northeast of Verdun, where it entered the line on 
November 14th and maintained this position until 
November 21st, when the division was relieved and 
proceeded by marching to the fourteenth training 
area. November 30th the division headquarters was 
established at Aignay-le-Duc. 

To include March 8, 19 19, the 6th Division had 
reported 285 casualties during the war of which 3 
were prisoners of war. 

The commanding generals of the division were 
as follows: Brig. Gen. Jas. B. Erwin, November 26, 
1917, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. Walter P.Gordon, 
August 31, 1918, to November 11, 1918. 

To include March i, 1919, ten individuals of this 
division had received the Distinguished Service 
Cross. 

The 6th Division was composed of the following 
units : 



156 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

nth and 12th Infantry brigades. 
51st, 52nd, 53 rd, 54th Infantry regiments. 
17th and 1 8th Machine Gun battalions. 
6th Artillery Brigade. 
3rd, nth, and 78th Artillery regiments. 
6th Trench Mortar Battery. 
i6th Division Machine Gun Battalion. 
318th Engineer Regiment and Train. 
6th Field Signal Battalion. 
6th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 
6th Supply Train. 
6th Ammunition Train. 
6th Sanitary Train. 

20th, 37th, 38th, 40th Ambulance companies aad 
Field hospitals. 

7th Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions 
this division was organized January i, 1918, at 
Chickamauga Park, Ga. 

The division insignia consists of two triangles 
with apexes touching, in black, on red circular base. 

Division headquarters arrived at Camp Mac- 
Arthur, Waco, Texas, February 5, 1918, at which time 
the division began assembling and training. 

Began leaving Camp MacArthur for Camp Merritt, 
N. J., July 18, 1918. Sailed from Hoboken, N. J., 
on July 31st; 14th Brigade followed during the 
next two weeks. The last units arrived in France 
on September 3, 1918. 

On August 19th division arrived in fifteenth training 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 157 

area with headquarters at Ancy-le-Franc. Entire 
division (less artillery) arrived in training area by 
September 20, 191 8. 

On September 30, 1918, the division moved to 
Toul area, with headquarters at Gondreville. En- 
gaged in training and equipping. 

Relief of the 90th Division was completed October 
10 and II, 1918, in the Puvenelle sector. Divi- 
sion headquarters moved from Gondreville to Villers- 
en-Haye. Fifth Field Artillery Brigade assigned to the 
support of the 7th Division. Defensive occupation 
of this sector from October 10 to November 9, 1918. 
Offensive occupation of this sector to November 
I ith. Participated in the Second Army offensive. 

On January 3, 1918, the 5th Field Artillery Bri- 
gade was relieved from the 7th Division. 

On January 10, 19 19, the division headquarters 
moved from Euvezin to Salzerais. Units of the 
division moved south from battle area and engaged 
in active training. 

(The 7th Field Artillery Brigade trained at Camp 
Meucon; did not join division until February, 1919.) 

During the operations of the division, i officer 
and 68 men, 28 machine guns and numerous supplies 
were captured from the enemy. This division made 
a total advance into enemy territory of J kilometer. 

To include March 8, 1919, there had been reported 
from this division 1,546 casualties of which 3 were 
prisoners of war. 

The commanding generals of the division were 
as follows: 



158 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Brig. Gen. C. H. Barth, August lo, 191 8, to Octo- 
ber 24, 1918; Maj. Gen. Edmund Wittenmeyer, 
October 24, 1918, to November 11, 1918. 

To include March i, 1919, 30 individuals of the 7th 
Division had been awarded the Distinguished Service 
Cross. 

The units composing the division were as follows: 

13th Infantry Brigade. 

55th, 56th Infantry regiments. 

20th Machine Gun Battalion. 

14th Infantry Brigade. 

34th, 64th Infantry regiments. ' 

2 1 St Machine Gun Battalion. 

19th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. 

7th Artillery Brigade. 

8th, 79th, and 80th Artillery regiments. 

7th Trench Mortar Battery. 

5th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

loth Field Signal Battalion. 

7th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

7th Supply Train. 

7th Ammunition Train. 

7th Sanitary Train, consisting of the 22nd, 34th, 
35th, and 36th Ambulance companies and Field 
hospitals. 

8th Division 

,The Eighth, " Pathfinder," Division was organized 
by letter of the Adjutant General, December 17, 
19 1 7. At that time some of the organizations now 
comprising the division were as yet unborn, while 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 159 

some of those that had been organized were widely 
scattered. The 12th Infantry, and its offshoot, the 
62nd Infantry, were then at the Presidio, San Fran- 
cisco, CaHfornia. On the morning of January 3, 
191 8, the 62nd Infantry left the Presidio and pro- 
ceeded to Camp Fremont, near Palo Alto, Cali- 
fornia, pursuant to telegraphic instructions from 
Headquarters, Western Department, arriving there 
January 5, 19 18. The 62nd Infantry was brigaded 
with the 1 2th Infantry forming the 15th Infantry 
Brigade; and the 8th and 13th Infantry were bri- 
gaded, forming the i6th Infantry Brigade. These 
two brigades constituted the 8th Division, Regular 
Army, at the beginning of 1918, with station at Camp 
Fremont, California. Routine duties in connection 
with making the camp habitable were immediately 
taken up, and shortly afterward intensive schedules 
of training were begun with the object of preparing 
the organizations for early overseas duty. 

In the early part of 1918 the 2nd, 8ist, and 83rd 
Field Artillery regiments were added to the division. 
The 8 1st and 83 rd Field Artillery regiments were 
originally cavalry organizations. The three ma- 
chine gun battalions sprang from the four infantry 
regiments. The 24th Machine Gun Battalion was 
organized January 2, 19 18, under Table 10, Table 
of Organization, as amended by telegram A.G.O., 
December 31, 191 7, its personnel being taken from 
the 8th and 13th Infantry regiments or the i6th 
Infantry Brigade, then under the command of Colo- 
nel S. E. Smiley. The 23rd Machine Gun Battalion 



160 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

was organized February i, 191 8, its personnel being 
taken from the 12th and 62nd Infantry regiments. 
The organization of this Machine Gun Battalion 
was effected under the supervision of Captain, now 
Lieutenant Colonel, A. C. Gillem, the present com- 
manding officer thereof. The 22nd Machine Gun 
Battalion was organized during the latter part of 
March and early part of April, 191 8, under the 
direction of Captain James I. Muir who was author- 
ized to take one officer from each the 23 rd and 24th 
Machine Gun battalions, and two officers from the 
other organizations of the division. On April 13, 
191 8, nine of the officers transferred from the 91st 
Division at Camp Lewis, Washington, to the 8th 
Division were assigned to this Machine Gun Bat- 
talion. 

The organization of the 8th Train Headquarters 
and Military Police was initiated by the War De- 
partment December 17, 1917, the first enlisted per- 
sonnel for skeleton companies being obtained by 
transfer from the infantry regiments of the division. 
Colonel William K. Jones, infantry, who was as- 
signed as Commander of Trains, reported and as- 
sumed command January 15, 1918. In March, 
1918, a full quota of officers was assigned and on 
April 4, 191 8, the organization was effected. On 
this latter date the 8th Ammunition Train was 
organized at Camp Fremont and placed under tempo- 
rary command of Captain Len Bond until the ar- 
rival of Lieut. Col. John B. Schoeffel who was in 
command until he was promoted Colonel and trans- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 161 

ferred. The present commanding officer, Lieut. Col. 
William E. Persons, assumed command of this train 
July I, 1918. The first personnel of the Ammuni- 
tion Train consisted of 32 officers and 115 enlisted 
men. It is estimated that 95 per cent, of the per- 
sonnel of this train were new men in the service with 
only a few months' military training at the most. 

The 8th Sanitary Train was formed at Camp Fre- 
mont the first part of January, 19 18, and was com- 
posed of field hospitals and ambulance companies 
that had been formed at the Presidio, San Francisco, 
California, from May to December, 1917. The 
nucleus of the train was Field Hospital and Ambu- 
lance companies No. 2 which had seen service on 
the Mexican border. They were re-numbered Field 
Hospital and Ambulance companies No. 11, and 
from them were formed Provisional Field Hospital 
and Ambulance companies "A" which were given the 
number 3 1 . From the excess personnel of the latter 
were formed Provisional Field Hospital and Ambu- 
lance companies "C," No. 32. Provisional Field 
Hospital and Ambulance companies "B," No. 43 
were next organized. At the time of the organi- 
zation of the division, Major H. H. Sharpe, M. C, 
was in command of the sanitary train. Field Hos- 
pital and Ambulance companies No. 32 were the 
first organizations of this train to reach Camp 
Fremont, having arrived there in October, 1917. 
Sanitary Squads Nos. 83 and 84 were organized by 
the War Department in February, 191 8, and as- 
signed to the 8th Division at Camp Fremont for duty. 



162 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

The 8th Motor Supply Train was organized at 
Camp Joseph E. Johnston, Jacksonville, Florida, 
January 26, 191 8, the officers all being in the Quarter- 
master Corps and the enlisted personnel being trans- 
ferred from provisional companies, Quartermaster 
Corps, stationed at Jacksonville, Florida. The train 
left Camp Johnston for Detroit, Michigan, March 
12, 1918, and on March 20th and 21st left Detroit 
for Camp Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland, where it 
maintained a headquarters until October 30, 191 8. 
During this time the commanding officer and one 
half to two thirds of the enlisted personnel were fre- 
quently on detached service with companies on the 
road engaged in convoy work between Detroit, 
Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and other 
points. Major Charles D. Kenison, Q. M. C, who 
was assigned in command of the supply train August 
20, 1918, was relieved October 24, 1918, and at- 
tached to the train as motor transport officer, 8th 
Division. The present commanding officer, First 
Lieutenant, now Captain, Alonzo W. Jones, Q. M. C, 
was assigned in command of the train October 26, 
1918. 

The 320th Field Signal Battalion, assigned to the 
8th Division, was organized at Camp Dodge, Des 
Moines, Iowa, November 12, 1917. One hundred 
and twenty men of the Signal Enlisted Reserve Corps 
reported, and approximately 50 men from Des Moines 
and the vicinity were added to the organization. 
Capt. Walter L. Thomas assumed command of the 
battalion November 14, 19 17, and was in command 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 163 

chereof until December 12, 1917, when Major E. 
Mason took command and served as commanding 
officer until his discharge, January 15, 19 19, and the 
assignment of the present commanding officer, 
Major William T. Crook. The battalion entrained 
for Camp Fremont January 2, 19 18, arriving there 
January 6, 1918. 

Bakery Company No. 338 was organized at Camp 
Fremont September 26, 1917, as Bakery Company 
No. 50; the number being changed to 338 in Novem- 
ber, 1917. Second Lieut. John G. Schronk was 
placed in command. The personnel of this company 
consisted of Regular Army bakers then in the service 
and of men from various schools for bakers and 
cooks in the Western Department. It might be 
observed here that four other bakery companies, 
drawing largely upon Bakery Company No. 338 
for their personnel, were organized at Camp Fremont, 
and that as many as six men from this company 
were commissioned officers and assigned to the other 
bakery companies. 

Other organizations of the 8th Division were the 
319th Engineers and Train; division and brigade 
headquarters; the Trench Mortar Battery and the 
8th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop. The 319th En- 
gineers and Train left Camp Fremont for the Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Forces under the command of 
Col. C. W. Otwell in September, 1918. This office 
does not have at hand the necessary data to furnish 
the details of the organization of the 319th En- 
gineers. 



164 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

In January, 1918, Col. Elmore F. Taggart, in- 
fantry, assumed command of the division and camp 
and was in command thereof until March, 191 8, 
when Colonel Van Denson, artillery, took com- 
mand. In April, 191 8, Brig. Gen. Joseph D. Leitch 
became the commanding officer and was in com- 
mand until May when Maj. Gen. John F. Morrison 
assumed command. Major General Morrison was 
relieved from this command and placed in command 
of the Western Department in July, 19 18, and Brig- 
adier General Leitch again commanded the division 
until the assignment of Maj. Gen. William S. Graves 
the same month. Major General Graves retained 
command until September, 1918, when he was re- 
lieved and placed in command of the American 
Expeditionary Forces in Siberia. The last com- 
manding general of the 8th Division, Maj. Gen. 
Eli A. Holmick, assumed command thereof in Sep- 
tember, 1918. 

The home of the 8th Division was Camp Fremont, 
about one mile from Palo Alto, California, and thirty 
miles from San Francisco, situated in one of the most 
beautiful parts of the state, Santa Clara Valley. 
The camp was named after that great pioneer and 
soldier Gen. John G. Fremont, the pathfinder of the 
West. The division was therefore called the " Path- 
finder" Division. At one time all of the organiza- 
tions comprising the division were at Camp Fre- 
mont with the exception of the Motor Supply Train 
and the Mobile Field Laboratory No. 64, which 
latter unit was organized at Yale University, New 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 165 

Haven, Connecticut, and attached to the division 
at Camp Mills, New York, in October, 1918. The 
camp consisted of tents although division head- 
quarters, the mess buildings, base hospital and 
infirmaries, warehouses, and a few other were frame 
structures. Owing to the populous neighbourhood 
adjacent to the camp it was more or less irregular 
in shape and slightly crowded, without sufficient 
ground near by for close-order drill. The rifle ranges 
were exceptionally good, but about three miles from 
camp, usually necessitating the transportation of 
troops by rail at least one way when engaged in rifle 
practice. The use of the artillery ranges blocked 
traffic on the adjoining highways, and it was nec- 
essary to maintain a close guard when these ranges 
were being used. 

From the very start intensive training was carried 
on by the organizations of the division, and highly 
trained skeleton organizations were rapidly developed 
for the purpose of training prospective recruits and 
with the object of engaging in early overseas service. 
In the early part of May, 191 8, several thousand draft 
men arrived at Camp Fremont and were assigned 
to the division. Major General Morrison was in 
command of the division at the time and under his 
able direction the training of the various organiza- 
tions progressed by leaps and bounds, and the new 
recruits were rapidly whipped into shape. 

About the first of July, 191 8, the three field 
artillery regiments and the trench mortar battery, 
constituting the 8th Field Artillery Brigade under 



166 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

command of Brig. Gen. Alfred A. Starbird, were sent 
to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to complete their training 
preparatory to overseas duty. During this period, 
the 8th Motor Supply Train received valuable 
training in the convoy work it was engaged in be- 
tween Baltimore, Washington, and other cities. 
The 8th Train Headquarters and Military Police 
were trained as both infantry and cavalry troops, 
and in addition received special training to fit them 
for overseas duty. This organization furnished the 
provost guard for Camp Fremont and established 
detached posts in all towns and cities near camp 
for police duty separately and in conjunction with the 
civil authorities. The training of the ammunition 
train was somewhat handicapped by lack of sufficient 
combat wagons, and mules, trucks, and other motor 
transportation, but it made the best of the situation, 
substituting other forms of training when necessary. 
The training of the other units progressed in accor- 
dance with arranged schedules and was highly satis- 
factory. 

Practically every organization in the division 
engaged in one or more practice marches, some of 
which were extended over a period of several days. 
There were also practice marches of whole brigades 
at a time. The infantry regiments were given com- 
bat practice and trained in the new methods of war- 
fare, using War Department Pamphlet 802 as a basis 
for the training. Trenches were dug and wire en- 
tanglements constructed and the usual course of 
training pursued in accordance with latest schedules 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 167 

and circulars of training from the War Department. 
The bayonet training of this division was excep- 
tionally fine, drawing a great deal of comment from 
officers of other camps and divisions, as well as from 
foreign officers. A number of parades and reviews, 
including one brigade review and two reviews of 
the entire division, were held at Camp Fremont. 
The two division reviews took place when Major 
General Helmick was in command of the division 
and passed before him as reviewing officer. 

One of the fourth officers' training schools was 
conducted at Camp Fremont, with Major, now Lieut. 
Col., George G. Bartlett, infantry, in command under 
the general jurisdiction of the 8th Division. When 
the training school at Camp Kearny was discon- 
tinued, prior to the movement of the 40th Division 
overseas, the infantry of that school were trans- 
ferred to the school at Camp Fremont for the com- 
pletion of the course of training. At the termination 
of this school about 150 new second lieutenants 
were either assigned or attached to the various organ- 
izations of the division. 

At the time Major General Graves was in command 
of the division. Brigadier General Leitch commanded 
the 15th Infantry Brigade and Brig. Gen. John J. 
Bradley the i6th Infantry Brigade. Brigadier Gen- 
eral Leitch was relieved as commanding officer of 
the 15th Infantry Brigade and transferred to Camp 
Lewis as commanding officer of the new division 
being formed there about the first of October, 191 8, 
when Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson assumed com- 



168 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

mand of the 15th Infantry Brigade. At this time 
the commanding officers of the four infantry regi- 
ments were as follows: Lieut. Col. Morris M. Keck, 
and later Col. Walter C. Short, 8th; Col. Charles B. 
Hagadorn, 12th; Col. L. S. Sorley, 13th; and Col. 
James R. Lindsay, 62nd. 

On or about August 3, 19 18, instructions were re- 
ceived from the Adjutant General's Office direct- 
ing the transfer of Major General Graves and part 
of his staff and some 5,000 men and nearly 100 
officers to American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia. 
This was the most serious loss the division ever sus- 
tained as it was evidently the cause of a new delay 
of several weeks in starting the eastward movement 
of the division and of the failure to reach France on 
the part of most of the organizations comprising the 
division. About 2,000 men sailed on the first trans- 
ports which left Fort Mason, San Francisco, Califor- 
nia, about the middle of August, 191 8, and more than 
3,000 men sailed from the same port on the second 
transports about September i, 191 8. Major Gen- 
eral Graves took with him his Chief-of-Staff, the two 
assistant division adjutants, a few army field 
clerks, the division judge advocate, and a number 
of other officers. The line officers and enlisted per- 
sonnel sent to Siberia were largely drawn from the 
four infantry regiments. A number of medical and 
dental officers and enlisted men, as well as_one field 
veterinary unit, and a few ordnance and quarter- 
master corps officers and men were sent with these 
forces. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 169 

In September, 191 8, after the transfer of the above 
men to replacement troops, unassigned, for duty 
with the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, 
new recruits began pouring into Camp Fremont, 
and by the latter part of September most of the or- 
ganizations were again practically full strength. 
Major General Helmick now took command of the 
division with Lieutenant Colonel, now Col., Asa L. 
Singleton as Chief-of-Staff. The training of all 
units was speeded up and the new recruits were 
rapidly trained in elementary military principles 
and drill. The rifle ranges were kept busy constantly 
on every day of the week including Sunday and re- 
gardless of weather. Numerous schools were con- 
ducted for officers and all were required to attend. 
Major General Helmick himself, with all the officers 
of division headquarters who had not already had 
the work, took the course in gas, while the entire 
staff was required to take certain prescribed horse 
exercises. It was evident that the division was re- 
ceiving its finishing training and was expecting orders 
for overseas duty. 

In September, 19 18, orders were received from 
the Adjutant General's Office directing the move- 
ment of the 319th Engineers and Train to Camp 
Upton, New York. A few days later these organiza- 
tions under command of Colonel Otwell entrained 
and departed for the East. They were never again 
united with the other organizations of the division 
and their present location is not known. 

About the first of October, 19 18, the epidemic of 



170 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

influenza broke out in a number of cities near Camp 
Fremont, and in order to prevent the disease from 
spreading among the men, on October 5th the whole 
camp was placed in close quarantine, and no one 
except medical officers was permitted to leave or 
enter the camp without a special pass from division 
headquarters, which was granted only in case of most 
exceptional circumstances. This quarantine was 
strictly enforced and was not lifted until the organ- 
izations were about to entrain for Camp Mills, New 
York. While there were, of course, a number of 
cases of influenza and some deaths among the men 
and officers, it is believed that the precautionary 
methods adopted by the division did much to lessen 
the seriousness of the situation and resulted in saving 
many lives. 

On or about October 10, 191 8, telegraphic instruc- 
tions were received from the Adjutant General's 
Office directing movement of the division to Camp 
Mills, Long Island, New York, beginning October 
1 8th. Every effort was now made to have all organi- 
zations ready to entrain when the appointed time 
came. The aforesaid telegraphic instructions, in 
so far as pertinent, were repeated to the 8th Artillery 
Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and to the 8th Motor 
Supply Train at Camp Holabird, Maryland. These 
organizations were directed to leave their respective 
camps in time to join the division at Camp Mills. 

The schedule of entraining provided for the de- 
parture of six trains each day beginning at 8 a.m. 
and at intervals of one and one half hours thereafter. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 171 

Major General Helmick delegated Captain, now 
Maj., G. D. Gorton, Q.M.C., to act as his personal 
representative with instructions to see that the 
trains were properly prepared and moved out on 
time. The first train containing one company of 
military police, the advance school, and advance 
representatives of the staff departed at the exact 
time designated, 8 a.m., October i8, 191 8, and all 
the other trains moved out as scheduled. The trains 
were routed over several different roads and in a way 
to prevent congestion. The entire movement took 
only seven days and was conducted in a most orderly 
and methodical manner. Many of those who were left 
behind because of temporary sickness were later for- 
warded to Camp Mills on a special train for casuals. 

Upon arrival of the first train at Camp Mills, a 
headquarters was established, and preparations made 
for receiving detachments arriving later. It is es- 
timated that the trip from Camp Fremont to Camp 
Mills took on an average six days. Upon arrival 
at Camp Mills, each organization prepared the re- 
quired passenger lists and equipped its troops with 
overseas caps and helmets. The division had been 
well furnished with the woolen clothes and under- 
wear required for overseas service and there was little 
or no difficulty in completing its equipment as far 
as clothing was concerned. 

At the time the movement of the division to 
Camp Mills began, the staff of Major General Hel- 
mick consisted in part of: 

Col. Asa L. Singleton, infantry, Chief-of-Staff; 



172 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Lieut. Col Frank F. Jewett, infantry, Assistant 
Chief-of- Staff; Maj. L. S. Schmitt, A. G., Division 
Adjutant; Maj. R. M. Alton, A. G., Division Per- 
sonnel Adjutant; Col. L. L. Smith, M. C, Division 
Surgeon; Lieut. Col. Ned M. Green, infantry. 
Division M. G. Officer; Lieut. Col. Alfred T. Clifton, 
S. C, Division Signal Officer; Lieut. Col. Clenard 
McLaughlin, infantry. Division Inspector; Maj. 
Rob C. Musser, V. C, Division Veterinarian; Maj. 
Charles M. Taylor, D. C, Division Dental Officer; 
Maj. G. M. Everetts, Q.M.C., Division Quarter- 
master; Maj. George D. Rice, Chaplain, Division 
Chaplain; Maj. Joseph J. Kerrigan, infantry. Divi- 
sion Intelligence Officer. 

At this time the artillery and infantry brigades 
were commanded as aforesaid, viz., Brig. Gen. Hugh 
S. Johnson in command of the 15th Infantry Brigade, 
and Brig. Gen. John J. Bradley in command of the 
i6th Infantry Brigade. Lieut. Col., now Col., Morris 
M. Keck commanded the 8th Infantry at the time 
it left Camp Fremont; Col. Alfred Aloe, the 12th 
Infantry; Col. Lewis S. Sorley, 13th Infantry; and 
Col. James F. McKinley, the 62nd Infantry. There 
had been no change in the commanding officer of the 
320th Field Signal Battalion up to this time. The 
below organizations were commanded then, as they 
still are, as follows: 

8th Sanitary Train, F. W. Townsend, Lieut. Col., 
M. C. 

22nd Machine Gun Battalion, Frank B. Jordan, 
Major, Inf. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 173 

23rd Machine Gun Battalion, Alvln C. Gillman, 
Lieut. Col., Inf. 

24th Machine Gun Battalion, William J. Mc- 
Caughey, Major, Inf. 

8th Motor Supply Train, Alonzo W. Jones, Cap- 
tain, M.T.C. 

8th Train Headquarters and Military Police, 
William K. Jones, Colonel, Inf. 

8th Ammunition Train, William E. Persons, 
Lieut. Col., Inf. 

Sanitary Squads No. 83 and No. 84, George W. 
Green, Captain, S. C. 

The embarkation of the units of the 8th Division 
began on or about October 30, 19 18, at Hoboken, 
New Jersey. The 8th Artillery Brigade Headquarters 
and the 2nd, 8ist, and 83rd Field Artillery regiments; 
the 8th Trench Mortar Battery; division head- 
quarters; the i6th Infantry Brigade Headquarters 
and the 8th Infantry; the advance school; the 319th 
Engineers and Train and Headquarters Troop were 
the only organizations of the 8th Division that 
crossed overseas. The 15th Infantry Brigade Head- 
quarters and the 320th Field Signal Battalion em- 
barked at Hoboken but never sailed owing to the 
signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918. 
This battalion remained on shipboard for about a 
week awaiting orders to proceed, and was then re- 
turned to Camp Mills. The 12th, 13th, and 62nd 
Infantry regiments, the 15th Infantry Brigade Head- 
quarters, 320th Field Signal Battalion, 8th Train 
Headquarters and Military Police, 8th Ammunition 



174 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Train and Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop, 8th Motor 
Supply Train; the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Machine Gun 
battalions, 8th Sanitary Train, Sanitary Squads No. 83 
and No. 84; Mobile Field Laboratory No. 64, and 
Bakery Company No. 338 remained at Camp Mills for 
about one month. 

The organizations remaining at Camp Mills were 
under command of Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson of the 
15th Infantry Brigade. During the period these or- 
ganizations remained there they engaged in usual 
camp duties and drill, and in addition furnished large 
labour and fatigue details for camp work. After the 
signing of the armistice, it became necessary to keep 
the men constantly busy in order to prevent them 
from nursing their disappointment at not getting 
overseas. A review of the 8th Division Detachment 
which remained at Camp Mills was held before Brig. 
Gen. Johnson as reviewing officer November 22, 1918. 
On this occasion Brigadier General Johnson observed 
the troops from an aeroplane. The quarantine under 
which the camp had been ever since the arrival of the 
8th Division was lifted November 14, 1918, and the 
men were then given liberal pass privileges enabling 
them to visit New York City and neighbouring 
points of interest. 

On November 23, 191 8, orders were received 
directing the movement of all organizations of this 
detachment except the 12th and 13 th Infantry regi- 
ments to Camp Lee, Virginia. The 12th Infantry 
was sent to Camp Stuart, Virginia, and the 13th 
Infantry to Camp Merritt, New Jersey. The first 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 175 

troops for Camp Lee left Camp Mills at about 9 
A.M., November 25, 191 8, and proceeded to Hoboken, 
New Jersey, leaving there about 4 p.m. the same day 
on the U. S. Transport President Grant for Norfolk, 
Virginia, and arriving about 6 p.m., November 26th. 
The troops boarded river boats at Norfolk, disem- 
barking at City Point, Virginia, on the James River, 
from whence they were marched a distance of about 
eight miles to Camp Lee. The 15th Infantry Bri- 
gade Headquarters immediately established itself 
with Brigadier General Johnson still in command 
and began its duties as both brigade headquarters 
and Headquarters for the Detachment 8th Division 
which comprised the 62nd Infantry, 8th Train Head- 
quarters and Military Police, 8th Ammunition Train 
and Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop, 8th Motor 
Supply Train, 320th Field Signal Battalion, 22nd, 
23 rd, and 24th Machine Gun battalions, 8th Sanitary 
Train, Sanitary Squads No. 83 and No. 84, Mobile 
Field Laboratory No. 64, and Bakery Company No. 
338. 

Routine duties were resumed at Camp Lee and in 
addition to the drills and other training, large fatigue 
details of as many as 1,600 men a day at times were 
furnished daily by the detachment for camp work. 
Brigadier General Johnson left Camp Lee for Wash- 
ington, D. C, December 19, 191 8, and remained 
there on special duty per verbal orders the Adju- 
tant General's Office about December 20, 191 8. In 
his absence Col. William K. Jones, the commanding 
officer of the 8th Train Headquarters and Military 



176 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Police, acted as commanding officer of the Detach- 
ment with Maj. WiUiam R. Schmidt, infantry, as 
adjutant; on January 6, 1919, garrison and post- 
graduate schools were started pursuant to camp 
orders, and all line officers were required to attend. 

The first organization of the detachment to be 
demobilized was Bakery Company No. 338 which 
was finally disbanded January 20, 19 19. Telegraphic 
instructions from the Adjutant General's Office, 
January 8, 1919, authorized the discharge of enlisted 
personnel of the 8th Division eligible for discharge 
under Circular No. 'j^^ War Department, 1918, up 
to 50 per cent, of the strength of the division as 
reported November 30, 19 18. Under this authority 
applications for the discharge of about 42 per cent, 
of the detachment's strength November 30, 1918, 
had been approved at these headquarters when 
telegraphic instructions from the Adjutant General's 
Office, January 17, 19 18, were received directing the 
demobilization of all organizations of the 8th Divi- 
sion at Camp Lee except those belonging to the 
Regular Army. At the time of writing demobiliza- 
tion is now progressing and it is expected that 
within the next few weeks all the organizations of 
this detachment except the 62nd Infantry will have 
been demobilized and finally disbanded. 

This division is not mentioned in General Per- 
shing's cabled communiques. None of the units 
of this division was in action. 

The shoulder insignia of the division was a black 
Indian head within an orange circle. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 177 

The following units composed the division: 

8th Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop 
and Detachment. 

15th and i6th Infantry brigades. 

1 2th, 62nd, 8th, and 13th Infantry regiments. 

22nd 23 rd, and 24th Machine Gun battahons. 

8th Field Artillery Brigade composed of the 8th 
Trench Mortar Battery, the 8th Ammunition Train, 
and the 2nd, 8 1 st, and 83 rd regiments of Field Artillery. 

319th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

320th Field Signal Battalion. 

8th Train Headquarters and Military t*olice. 

8th Supply Train. 

8th Sanitary Train, consisting of the nth, 31st, 
32nd, and 43 rd Ambulance and Field Hospital com- 
panies. 

26th Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions, 
the 26th (National Guard) Division was organized 
August 22, 1917, in Boston, Mass. Units of the 
division were made up from the National Guard 
troops of the New England States (Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Mass., Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut), together with a contingent of National 
Army troops from Camp Devens. 

The division received the popular name of "Yankee 
Division." Its shoulder insignia is a blue mono- 
gram YD superimposed on a diamond of khaki. 

The first units sailed for France September 7, 1917, 



178 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

and during September and October, 19 17, the divi- 
sion was transported to France through both English 
and French ports. Division headquarters was estab- 
Hshed at Neufchateau, France, October 31, 1917. 

The division went into Hne in the Chemin des 
Dames sector February 6th; was reHeved from that 
sector March i8th, and moved to the La Reine 
sector northwest of Toul, entering the sector March 
31st. The division left this sector June 28th, and 
moved by rail to area east of Meaux. 

From July 5th to 18th the division marched to 
support position behind line Torcy-Belleau-Bois- 
Vaux, northwest of Chateau-Thierry, and took over 
the Pas Fini sector. 

From July i8th to 25th it attacked, as a unit of the 
I Corps in the Chateau-Thierry offensive (2nd Battle 
of the Marne), penetrating to a depth of seventeen 
kilometers. Was relieved July 25th and marched 
to an area in vicinity of La Ferte. It then moved 
by rail on August ist-3rd to Chatillon training area. 

On August 25th the division moved to area north 
of Bar-le-Duc and from there by marching to the 
Troyon sector where it entered the line. On Sep- 
tember 1 2th the division attacked in the St. Mihiel 
salient, penetrating as far as VigneuUes. From 
September 13 th to October 7th it consolidated and 
occupied the Troyon sector. 

On October 8th the division moved to vicinity 
of Verdun as army reserve. 

The division was engaged in operations north of 
Verdun from October i8th to November nth.' 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 179 

The division was relieved and proceeded to the 
eighth training area where headquarters was estab- 
Hshed at Montigny-le-Roi, November 23 rd. 

The following National Guard units were absorbed 
in forming the division: 

Maine: 2nd Infantry, ist Regiment Heavy F. A.; 
1-13 Company, C.D.C. 

New Hampshire: ist Infantry, M. G. Troop Cav- 
alry; Battery A., F. A.; Company South Caro- 
lina; Field Hospital Company No. i, i to 4th com- 
panies C.A.C. 

Vermont: ist Infantry. 

Massachusetts: 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th Infantry; 
Headquarters 2nd Brigade; Squadron Cavalry; ist 
and 2nd Regiments F. A.; ist Regiment Engineers; 
Ambulance companies i and 2; ist Field Signal 
Battalion; i to 12th Companies C.A.C. 

Rhode Island: ist Sep. Squadron Cavalry; ist 
Battalion Field Artillery; Ambulance Company 
No. I. 

Connecticut: ist and 2nd Infantry; ist Squadron 
Cavalry; Batteries E and F. Field Artillery; Ambu- 
lance Company No. i ; Field Hospital No. i . 

Division commanders: 

Brig. Gen. Peter E. Traub, October 31 to No- 
vember II, 1917; Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Edwards, 
November 11, 1917, to October 24, 191 8; Brig. Gen. 
Frank E. Bamford, October 24, 1918, and in command 
November nth. 

The following units composed the division: 

5istand52ndInfantrybrigades;ioist, 102nd, 103rd, 



180 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

104th regiments Infantry; 102nd, 103rd Machine Gun 
battalions; 51st Artillery Brigade; loist, 102nd, 103rd 
Artillery regiments; loist Trench Mortar Battery; 
loist Division Machine Gun Battalion; loist En- 
gineers Regiment and Train; loist Field Signal 
Battalion; loist Train Headquarters and Military 
Police; loist Supply Train; loist Ammunition Train; 
loist Sanitary Train; loist, 102nd, 103rd, and 104th 
Ambulance companies and Field hospitals. 

To include May 15, 1919, the following losses hiad 
been reported from this division: 

Battle deaths, 2,168; wounded, 13,000; prisoners 
of war, 451. 

To include March i, 1919, two hundred and 
twenty-nine individuals of this division had been 
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 

This division captured from the enemy the follow- 
ing: 61 officers, 3,087 men, 16 pieces of artillery, 
132 machine guns, and numerous supplies. 

The division made a total advance against resist- 
ance of thirty-seven kilometers. 

14,41 1 replacements were furnished this division. 

27th Division 

The division was organized in compliance with 
War Department instructions at Camp Wadsworth, 
South Carolina, in September, 191 7. The New 
York National Guard as its nucleus, the following 
units being used: 

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 1 2th, 14th, 23rd, 71st, and 74th 
New York Infantry. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 181 

Squadron A, ist New York Cavalry. 

1st, 3rd New York Field Artillery. 

22nd New York Engineers 

ist Battalion New York Signal Corps. 

New York Ammunition Train. 

New York Supply Train. 

New York Sanitary Train. 

New York Headquarters and Military Police, 
6th New York Division Headquarters Troop. 

The division embarked for overseas at Newport 
News, Virginia, the first units sailing on May 8th, 
and the last arriving in France July 7, 19 18. 

It was ordered to a training area and later entered 
the line with British units opposite Mt. Kemmel. 
On August 20th a move was made to the Dickebush 
sector, Belgium, which was occupied next day. On 
August 31st the division was a front-line division in 
the attack on Vierstaadt Ridge, the 30th U. S. Divi- 
sion on its left, the 34th British Division on its right. 

As part of the II Corps (U. S.) British Fourth Army, 
the division was in action near Bony, September 24th 
to October ist. On October 12th it again entered 
the line in the St. Soupiet sector crossing the Seille 
River in the attack on the Jonc de Mer Ridge. 

Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan, New York National 
Guard, commanded the division from its organiza- 
tion until mustered out. 

The division insignia is a black circle with a red 
border in which are the letters NYD in monogram sur- 
rounded by the seven stars of the constellation Orion. 

The division captured from the enemy 2,358 



182 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

prisoners, and advanced eleven kilometers against re- 
sistance. During active operations it suffered the 
following losses: killed, 1,791; wounded, 9,427; 
prisoners, 3 officers and 225 men. 

One hundred and thirty-nine Distinguished Service 
Crosses have been awarded members of the division. 

The following organizations composed the division : 

105th, io6th, 107th, io8th regiments Infantry. 

104th, 105th, io6th Machine Gun battalions. 

104th, 105th, io6th Field Artillery regiments. 

102nd Trench Mortar Battery. 

102nd Engineers. 

102nd Field Signal Battalion. 

102nd Headquarters Train and Military Police. 

102nd Ammunition Train. 

102nd Supply Train. 

102nd Sanitary Train, consisting of 105th, io6th, 
107th, io8th Ambulance companies and 105th, io6th, 
107th, io8th Field hospitals. 

102nd Engineer Train. 

28th Division 

In compliance with War Department Orders the 
28th Division was organized from units of the Penn- 
sylvania National Guard at Camp Hancock, Ga., 
August 5, 1917. The majority of the officers and 
enlisted men were from the State of Pennsylvania. 
On November 15 th the division was reorganized to 
conform to the new Tables of Organization. The 
division is known as the "Keystone Division," and 
has for its shoulder insignia a red keystone. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 183 

The division commenced leaving the States April 
21, 1918, moving through Camp Upton. It landed 
at Calais May i8th, and trained with the British in 
the vicinity of Neilles les Blequin for about two 
weeks. It then moved to Connesse where it trained 
with the French for another two weeks' period, and 
then moved to a sector near the Marne. 

On July I, 1918, two platoons of the iiith Infan- 
try took part in an attack on Hill 204. On July i6th 
part of the infantry entered the line on the Marne 
River and the entire division was in sector on the 
Ourcq River by July 27, 1918. 

The division was relieved on the night of July 30th- 
31st, and from then to August 6th was in rest in the 
vicinity of Jaulgonne on the Marne. On the night 
of August 6th-7th it again entered the line on the 
Vesle River, the sector extending from about Courland 
on the east to Fismes on the west. Here it remained 
actively engaged until September 8th, when it was 
relieved by a French division. 

Upon relief of the division, it moved to a position 
south of the Argonne Forest, and on September 20th 
took part of the sector extending from Boureuil- 
les on the east to Cote 285 on the west. It was one 
of the attacking divisions in the offensive of Septem- 
ber 26th, pushing as far as Chatel Chehery, where it 
was relieved on October 9th. It then moved by bus 
to an area northeast of Commercy. 

On October i6th it took over a sector near Thia- 
court extending from northeast of Jaulny on the east 
to the southern end of Etang de Lachaussee on the 



184 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

west. It held this sector until the signing of the 
armistice and then went to the divisional training 
area. 

To include May 15, 19 19, the division's casualties 
were 2,531 battle deaths and 13,746 wounded. 
Seven hundred and twenty-six individuals of this 
division were taken prisoners by the enemy. 

Fifty-eight Distinguished Service Crosses had been 
awarded to individuals of this division to include 
March i, 1919. 

The commanding generals of the division were 
as follows: Maj. Gen. C. M. Clement to December 
II, 1917; Maj. Gen. Chas. H. Nuir, December 15, 
1917, to October 24, 1918; Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Hay, 
October 24 to November 11, 1918. 

The units composing the division were as follows : 

55th and 56th Infantry brigades. 

109th, iioth, iiith, II 2th Infantry regiments. 

io8th and 109th Machine Gun battalions. 

53rd Artillery Brigade. 

107th, 108th, and 109th Artillery regiments. 

103rd Trench Mortar Battery. 

107th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. 

103rd Engineer Regiment and Train. 

103rd Field Signal Battalion. 

103 rd Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

103rd Supply Train. 

103 rd Ammunition Train. 

103 rd Sanitary Train. 

109th, iioth, iiith, 1 1 2th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 185 

29th Division 

(This history, written on a different scale than the 
others, has been cut somewhat to the general size of 
the other histories.) 

In compliance with paragraph 56, S. O., No. 189, 
Headquarters, Eastern Department, July 26, 191 7, 
the 29th Division was organized at Camp McClellan, 
Alabama, and was originally constituted from Na- 
tional Guard units from the District of Columbia and 
the states of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and 
Virginia. The representatives from Delaware were 
withdrawn from the division and organized as sepa- 
rate pioneer infantry units. 

On account of the fact that states from both the 
North and South were thus represented in the division 
the name of Blue and Gray Division was adopted for 
it early in history, and by this name it has been 
known during its service in France. 

In June, 1918, the division left the United States 
and arrived in France the latter part of that month 
at the ports of Brest and St. Nazaire. 

After a few days at the port of debarkation the 
division was ordered to the tenth training area, with 
the division headquarters at Prauthoy. 

The 54th Artillery Brigade, 104th Ammunition 
Train, 104th Supply Train, 104th Sanitary Train, 
and 104th Train Headquarters and Military Police 
landed in England and proceeded to France via 
Le Havre. The artillery brigade and ammunition 
train were sent to the artillery training centre at 



186 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Camp Meucon. The other units of the division that 
had landed in England joined the division later in 
Alsace. 

The middle of July found the division en route to 
Belfort and from the 17th to 25th of July the division 
was stationed in billeting areas near Belfort and under 
command of the XL Corps of the French Tenth 
Army. 

On July 25th infantry units began their movement 
into line with the French units occupying the centre 
sector, Haute Alsace. The French units were grad- 
ually withdrawn and on August loth at noon the sec- 
tor was occupied solely by units of the 29th Division, 
and at that time the command passed from the 
French division commander to the commanding 
general, 29th Division. From this date until Sep- 
tember 23 rd the division remained in this sector, be- 
ing engaged in the usual stationary warfare common 
to all quiet sectors. 

On September 23 rd the division, having been with- 
drawn from sector to the vicinity of Belfort, was 
ordered to the Robert Espagne training area. How- 
ever, the Meuse-Argonne offensive having been 
planned to begin on the 26th of September, the divi- 
sion after leaving Belfort was placed in First Army 
(American) Reserve. It remained in First Army 
Reserve with P. Cs. (Posts of Command) succes- 
sively at Conde, St. Andre, and Blercourt from Sep- 
tember 24th to October ist when it was relieved from 
the First Army and placed in reserve of the French 
XVII Corps with P. C. at Citadel, Verdun. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 187 

58th Brigade (iiSth Infantry, 11 6th Infantry, 
1 1 2th Machine Gun Battalion) went into action, 
attached to the French i8th Division, the remainder 
of the division less 104th Engineers remaining in 
French XVII Corps Reserve. 

Preliminary movements of 2Qth Division 

In trenches Haute Alsace, July 25th to September 
23 rd. 

September 24th to October ist, First Army Re- 
serve. 

P. C's Conde, St. Andre, Blercourt. 

October 2nd to 7th reserve of the French XVII 
Corps P. C. Verdun. 

58th Brigade (115th, ii6th Infantry and 112th 
Machine Gun Battalion) went into action the night of 
October yth-Sth. 

On the afternoon of October yth the Division P. C. 
was moved from the Citadel of Verdun to Vacherau- 
ville. 

On the morning of October 8th, at 5 o'clock, the 
58th Brigade, consisting of the 115th, ii6th, and 
ii2th Machine Gun Battalion, after a night march of 
about fourteen kilometers, attacked without artillery 
preparation. This attack was supported by the 158th 
Artillery Brigade, which, on October 2nd, had been re- 
leased from the V Corps and attached to the 29th 
Division. 

The action was planned to be a surprise and that 
it was such is proven by the fact that the German 
artillery did not react for more than half an hour. The 



188 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

brigade attacked under the orders of the French iSth 
Division, which had previously held the sector. 

The assaulting battalions of the 58th Brigade were 
placed in a jump-off position along the canal between 
Samogneux and Brabant in what had formerly been 
"No Man's Land." 

On the night of October yth-Sth a company of 
French infantry was placed in Brabant to cover the 
formation for the assault and to act as left flank 
guard. This company did not advance with the 
brigade on the following day. 

The direction of the attack was due north ; and as 
the Meuse from Brabant to Sivry runs northwest, 
the advance of the 58th Brigade opened an increas- 
ingly wide space between its left flank and the river. 

During the attack of the 8th this space was filled, 
and the left flank of the 58th Brigade covered by a 
regiment of the 33 rd Division. This regiment crossed 
from the west bank of the Meuse, as the bridges 
were made available by the advance of the 58th 
Brigade. 

Until the Consenvoye Woods were reached, late on 
the 8th, the ground was open and the troops advanced 
without disorganization and in good liaison. 

A large number of prisoners was taken on that day, 
many being in the dugouts where they had been 
driven for shelter by the unexpected heavy artillery 
fire of the rolling barrage, which was closely followed 
by the infantry. 

The line attained on October 8th ran along the west 
of the Bois de Consenvoye, from 23.8-80.4 to 24.2- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 189 

8i.o; thence southeast to the crest of Cote 338; thence 
along the high ground, through the Bois de Consen- 
voye and Brabant-sur-Meuse to 26.6-79.4 

The frontage of the brigade was somewhat more 
than three kilometers, which gave a strength of less 
than two rifles per meter. 

The net results of the day's work were : The cap- 
ture of approximately 1,500 prisoners, several pieces 
of artillery, many heavy machine guns, and the con- 
trol of the Malbrouck Hill position, which broke the 
organized German line of resistance. 

On the right, the attack of the i8th Division 
(French) did not progress as planned. 

The right flank of the 58th Brigade had to be re- 
fused to link up with the i8th Division, and in order 
that the latter might fulfill its mission, the corps com- 
mander directed that the continuation of the at- 
tack planned for the next morning be not made. 

During this period of inaction the Boche brought 
up reinforcements and his resistance from that time 
on was very stiffs. 

At 6 o'clock on the morning of October loth the 
attack of the 58th Brigade, still operating under the 
orders of the French i8th Division, was renewed 

The 113th Infantry of the 57th Brigade, v/hich had 
hitherto been in corps reserve, was turned over to 
the 1 8th Division, to attack on the right of the 58th 
Brigade, between it and the French troops. 

The objectives of the 113th Infantry were the Bois 
de la Reine and the Bois de Chenes. 

To the 66th and 77th regiments of the French i8th 



190 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Division were assigned as objectives the Bois d'Or- 
mont and the Bois de Moirey. 

The 113 th Infantry completely obtained its ob- 
jectives in less than six hours, capturing 72 prisoners 
and 3 guns. 

The French attack gained only fifty meters on the 
west edge of the Bois d'Ormont, which lay on the 
flank and in part behind the 113 th Infantry, so that 
it became necessary to put in two companies of the 
reserve battalion of the 113 th Infantry facing south 
toward the Bois d'Ormont. 

The position of this regiment changed only slightly 
until the attack on the Ridge d'Etrayes, to be men- 
tioned later. 

The 58th Brigade, in conjunction with the troops 
of the 33 rd Division on its left, advanced on the Bois 
Plat Chene and the Bois de Consenvoye, encounter- 
ing very stiff resistance. 

The result of this attack was to secure Richene 
Hill with its observing station ; the line at the end of 
the day being Ravin Plat Chene — a point 400 meters 
north of the Richene observatory — south edge of 
Molleville Farm clearing; east along the Ravin de 
Molleville to the eastern tip of the Bois de la Reine, 
thence bending back along the south edge of the same 
woods. 

At 5 o'clock on the morning of October nth the 
command of the 58th Brigade, with its front between 
parallels 24 and 26, passed from the i8th Division 
(French) to the 29th Division. The 113th Infantry 
still remained under the command of the French. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 191 

At 6 o'clock, October nth, an attack was made by 
the 58th Brigade due north, encountering an intense 
machine gun and artillery fire. 

The open ground of the Molleville Farm Ravine lay 
in front of the i i6th Infantry on the right of the 58 th 
Brigade, with smooth slopes fully exposed to view 
from the woods on the north edge of the clearing. 

The eastern side of the ravine was also held by the 
enemy. 

The ii6th Infantry advanced across this open 
ground nearly to the farther side but received severe 
machine gun fire from the edge of the woods on both 
front and flank and could not gain the woods to the 
north. 

A counter attack delivered at the junction of the 
115th and ii6th regiments, in the woods on the west 
side of the clearing, threatened for a time to cause 
some loss of ground, but was repulsed. 

The line of the 11 6th Infantry was drawn back 
after dark to the edge of the woods on the south side 
of the clearing, the 115th Infantry advancing as much 
as possible, its right flank being held in place by the 
check of the 11 6th Infantry. 

Careful preparation was made before the renewal 
of the attack on October 15th on the hostile position 
north of Molleville Farm. 

In the meanwhile, the i8th Division (French) con- 
tinued to be held up. Its original objective for Octo- 
ber 8th had never been reached. 

On the 1 2th of October it was reenforced by the 
114th Infantry, heretofore in corps reserve. 



192 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

This put all four regiments of the 29th Division in 
the line; one with two battalions; one with ten com- 
panies ; a total of more than one half of the division in 
the front line; the two regiments of the 58th Brigade 
operating with one battalion each in the front line. 

The front assigned the troops on October 12th 
was seven kilometers, which gave less than one rifle per 
meter. 

On October 12th the i8th Division employed the 
fresh 114th Infantry from a jump-off position in the 
Ravin de Coassinvaux. The French 66th Infantry, 
holding the western edge of the Bois d'Ormont and 
thus lying between the 113th and 114th Infantry, was 
ordered to attack simultaneously with the 114th 
Infantry, the objective of both regiments being the 
Bois d'Ormont. 

The French 66th Infantry made no headway. The 
French 77th Infantry, on the right of the 114th In- 
fantry, also failed to advance. 

The 1 14th Infantry gained and held the south edge 
of the woods, but were checked by the failure of the 
attack on their left and right. 

The French 18th Division then threw in two com- 
panies of the 113 th Infantry, heretofore in reserve, 
from a point north of and facing the Bois d'Ormont. 

The two companies attacked at 15 o'clock on the 
afternoon of October 12th and passed entirely through 
the western half of the woods from north to south. 

On October 15th the French i8th Division was 
relieved by the American 26th Division, having been 
in action about one week. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 193 

On that date the attack was renewed by the 58th 
Brigade, the 113 th Infantry on its right pushing for- 
ward detachments to maintain Haison. 

The front of the 58th Brigade was now between 
meridians 24 and 26, the objective being Hill 375 in 
the Bois de la Grande Montagne. 

Artillery preparation was limited to one half hour 
on account of the lack of ammunition. 

This was directed mainly on the German organized 
position at the north edge of the Molleville Farm 
Clearing, and on Bultruy Bois which covered the high 
ground to our right. 

Machine guns, artillery trench mortars, and a 
battery of 75 's were employed well to the front. 

The attack resulted in active fighting in dense 
woods, the hostile defence being largely machine gun 
fire from numerous well-selected positions. On the 
following morning, October i6th, the attack was re- 
newed and the objectives attained after another full 
day of fighting. 

As this was considered by the corps commander 
to be the ultimate advance practicable to the north 
until the capture of Ormont Woods, the position was 
consolidated along suitable ground at about 24.0- 
82.7; 25.0-83.0; 25.6-82.6; 25.7-82.2; 25.8-82.1. 

The line presented a peculiar aspect in that it 
formed the arc of a circle between meridians 24 and 
26, bending back on the left to link up with the troops 
of the 33 rd Division, which had orders to conform to 
our movement and had advanced to the ridge through 
the Bois de Chaume, with the 57th Brigade on the 



194 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

right, facing Etrayes Ridge, along the south side of 
the Ravin de Molleville. 

The Etrayes Ridge, extending due east from the 
Molleville Farm clearing, was densely wooded and 
held by the Germans within forty yards of our troops 
in the western ridge. 

A counter attack launched from it would have 
been a serious threat, striking at the flank and rear 
of the 58th Brigade. 

Defence against such an attack was difficult be- 
cause the deep open ravine of Molleville Farm lay 
immediately behind the front line. 

The brigades joined at this point. 

Movement was so difficult in the thin strip of woods 
held that the liaison was more one of information than 
of actual strength for combat. 

The ridge afforded excellent hostile observation. 

Ormont Woods had not been taken and it had be- 
come apparent that it would not be so long as Belleau 
Wood, looking down on it, was held by the enemy. 

The capture of Etrayes Ridge was a necessary pre- 
liminary to an attack on Belleau Wood. 

Etrayes Ridge was captured on October 23 rd. 

One battalion of the 102nd Infantry, 26th Division, 
participated with our troops, attacking down the 
Molleville Farm Ravine across the face of the 113th 
Infantry, with Belleau Wood as its objective. 

In conference with the 26th Division it was decided 
to draw the troops back in the Molleville Farm clear- 
ing to allow artillery preparation on the most ad- 
vanced German machine gun positions. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 195 

Up to this time, every day since October 7th had 
been rainy or foggy. 

The safety of the assaulting battalions in the jump- 
off position was dependent on secrecy, but for the first 
time in more than two weeks the sky was cloudless 
and a full moon made the night almost bright as day. 

It happened, however, that fog filled the low 
ground around the farm, concealing the troops. 

The attack was preceded by 45 minutes artillery 
preparation in which all auxiliaries took part. 

The three machine gun battalions had been care- 
fully located , two of them being so placed as to gain 
an oblique fire on the enemy, one of them almost a 
flanking fire. 

Approximately 250,000 rounds were fired on the 
enemy by the machine gun during the day, and many 
prisoners stated that this fire was terrific. 

The advance of the infantry continued until late 
in the afternoon, when the ridge of Etrayes was com- 
pletely captured, the success of the 113th Infantry 
in this attack securing our line against the danger 
which had constantly menaced it from the enemy 
positions on the ridge. 

The line held by the division now lay across the 
north slope of Hill 375 in the Bois de la Grande Mon- 
tague, was drawn in and around the head of the 
Ravine d'Etrayes, and continued east along the north 
and east slopes of Etrayes Ridge, joining the 26th 
Division near the south edge of Houppy Bois. 

The front of the division was now four kilometers, 
or I.I rifles per meter. 



196 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

The main part of our remaining stay in the front 
line was occupied by consolidation of lines gained and 
gradual relief by the 79th Division command passing 
on October 30th. 

The net result of our operations was an advance 
of seven kilometers, breaking through all organized 
lines of resistance of the enemy, the capture of about 
2,400 prisoners, about twelve guns ranging from 7 
to 210 mm., 250 light and heavy machine guns, and a 
large amount of other military property. 

We were in line about three weeks. 

Our losses were necessarily considerable. 

30th Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions 
the 30th Division was organized at Camp Sevier, 
South Carolina, in October, 19 17. This division was 
formerly the old 9th National Guard Division (ist, 
2nd, and 3rd Tennessee Infantry; ist Tennessee Field 
Artillery, Troop D, Tennessee Cavalry; ist Tennessee 
Field Hospital; ist, 2nd, and 3rd North Carolina In- 
fantry; 1st North Carolina Field Artillery; ist squad- 
ron North Carolina Cavalry; ist North Carolina 
Engineers ; Company A, North Carolina Signal Corps ; 
North Carolina Supply Train; ist North Carolina 
Field Hospital; ist North Carolina Ambulance Com- 
pany; 1st and 2nd South Carolina Infantry; Company 
A, South Carolina Signal Corps; ist South Carolina 
Field Hospital; Troop A, South Carolina Cavalry). 
In addition to the above the division was augmented 
by draft men from North and South Carolina, Ten- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 197 

nessee, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and North 
Dakota. 

The division remained in training at Camp Sevier 
until May, 191 8. The first units sailed for overseas 
on May 7, 1918, and the last units landed at Calais, 
France, on June 24, 19 18. The division was ordered 
to the Eperlecques training area (Pas-de-Calais) 
and remained there until July 4th, when it was 
ordered into Belgium under command of the British 
II Corps and placed in support of the 33 rd and 49th 
British divisions. Division headquarters was lo- 
cated at Watou and it was here that this division re- 
ceived its first training in the line. On August 17th 
the division took over the Canal sector extending 
from the southern outskirts of Ypres to Voormezeele 
and from August 31st to September ist engaged in 
the battle before Mt. Kemmel. The division was 
then withdrawn and placed in reserve until Septem- 
ber 17th, when it was again sent into the line with 
division headquarters at Herissart. On September 
22nd the division was placed under command of the 
British Fourth Army and took over the Beauevoir 
sector the following day. The division participated in 
the battle of Bellincourt September 29th-30th, which 
resulted in the breaking of the Hindenburg Line. On 
October 4th the division took over the line near Mont- 
brehain where it attacked on four successive days, 
making an advance of more than seventeen thousand 
yards. On October 17th the division participated 
in the battle of La Selle River, and remained in the 
attack until October 20th. The division was with- 



198 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

drawn to the Heilly training area immediately after 
the battle, where it was located at the signing of the 
armistice. On November 24th the division was 
ordered to the Le Mans area preparatory to returning 
to the United States. 

The divisional artillery was not present for opera- 
tions with the division, but was in active operations 
in the Toul sector, St. Mihiel offensive, Meuse- 
Argonne offensive, and the Woevre sector. 

The commanding generals of the division were: 
Maj. Gen. John F. Morrison, from organization to 
November 20, 1917; Maj. Gen. C. P. Townsley, No- 
vember 20, 1917, to December 17, 1917; Maj. Gen. 
George W. Read, April 27, 1918, to August 10, 1918; 
Maj. Gen. Edward M. Lewis, August 10, 191 8, to 
November 11, 191 8. 

The division insignia is a monogram in blue of the 
letters "C and "H" standing for "Old Hickory," 
the nickname of Andrew Jackson. The cross bar of 
the "H" contains the triple "XXX," the Roman 
numerals for thirty. The whole is on a maroon back- 
ground. 

This division captured from the enemy the follow- 
ing: 3,848 prisoners, 81 pieces of artillery, and 426 
machine guns. It made a total advance of twenty- 
nine and a half kilometers against resistance. 

During active operations the division suffered the 
following losses as reported to the War Department 
to include May 10, 1919: killed in action, 1,652; 
wounded, 9,429; number taken prisoner, 6 officers 
and 71 men. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 199 

One hundred and seventy-seven Distinguished 
Service Crosses were awarded to individuals of this 
division up to March 8, 1919. 

The units composing the division were as follows: 

59th, 60th Infantry brigades. 

117th, 1 1 8th, 119th, 1 20th Infantry regiments. 

114th, 115th Machine Gun battalions. 

55th Artillery Brigade. 

113th, 114th, 115th, Artillery regiments. 

105th Trench Mortar Battery. 

113th Division Machine Gun Battalion. 

105th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

105th Field Signal Battalion. 

105th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

105th Supply Train. 

105th Ammunition Train. 

105th Sanitary Train. 

117th, ii8th, 119th, I20th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

31st Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions 
the 31st Division (National Guard) was organized 
at Camp Wheeler, Georgia, on October i, 1917. 
The nucleus of this division was composed of Na- 
tional Guard troops from Georgia, Alabama, and 
Florida (ist and 2nd regiments, Alabama Infantry; 
1st Regiment Alabama Cavalry; Company A, Ala- 
bama Field Signal Battalion; Field Hospital Com- 
pany No. i; 1st, 2nd, and 5th Georgia Infantry; ist 
Squadron Georgia Cavalry; ist Battalion Georgia 



200 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

Field Artillery: Company A, Georgia Engineers; 
Georgia Field Hospital No. i). The division was 
brought up to full strength by National Army drafts 
from Illinois and Michigan. The 31st Division re- 
mained in training at Camp Wheeler until September, 
1918. 

The first units sailed for overseas on September 16, 
191 8, and the last units arrived in France on Novem- 
ber 9, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division 
was designated as a replacement division and ordered 
to the Le Mans area. The personnel of most of the 
units were withdrawn from the division and sent to 
other divisions as replacements, causing the 31st to 
exist only as a skeletonized division. 

The commanding generals of the division were: 
Maj. Gen. Francis J. Kernan, August 25, 1917, to 
September 18, 1917; Brig. Gen. John L. Hayden, 
September 18, 1917, to March 15, 1918; Maj. Gen. 
Francis H. French, March 15, 1918, to May 15, 1918; 
Maj. Gen. LeRoy S. Lyon, May 15, 1918, to Novem- 
ber II, 1918. The division insignia is the letters 
"DD" back to back, embroidered in red, placed on a 
khaki circle. 

The units composing the division were : 

6 1 St, 62nd Infantry brigades. 

56th Field Artillery Brigade. 

1 21 St, 122nd, 123 rd, 124th Infantry regiments. 

ii6th, 117th, ii8th Machine Gun battalions. 

ii6th, 117th, Ii8th Field Artillery regiments. 

io6th Trench Mortar Battery. 

1 06th Engineer Regiment and Train. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 201 

io6th Field Signal Battalion. 
io6th Headquarters Train and Military Police. 
io6th Ammunition Train. 
io6th Supply Train. 

io6th Sanitary Train (121st, 122nd, 123rd, and 
124th Field hospitals and Ambulance companies.) 

32nd Division 

In compliance with General Orders, No. 95, War 
Department, 19 17, the 32nd Division was organized 
at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, in September, 
19 17. This division was formerly the old 12th Na- 
tional Guard Division, composed of troops from 
Wisconsin and Michigan (ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 
6th regiments; Wisconsin Infantry, 31st, 32nd, and 
33rd Michigan Infantry; ist Wisconsin Field Artillery, 
and 1st Michigan Field Artillery; ist Wisconsin 
Cavalry and ist Michigan Cavalry; ist Battalion 
Wisconsin Engineers and ist Battalion Michigan 
Engineers; ist Wisconsin Field Signal Battalion and 
1st Michigan Field Signal Battalion, Wisconsin and 
Michigan Field Hospital and Ambulance Corps 
Nos. I and 2. 

The division remained in training at Camp Mac- 
Arthur until January, 19 18. The first units of the 
division embarked for overseas at Hoboken on Janu- 
ary 19, 191 8, and the last units arrived in France 
March 12, 1918. The division was ordered to the 
tenth training area with headquarters at Prauthoy, 
Haute-Marne, and was designated as a replacement 
division. On May 15, 1918, the status of the divi- 



202 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

sion was changed to a combat division and moved 
into Alsace where it took over a front-line sector 
near Belfort. The division held this sector until 
July 2 1st when it was relieved by the French and 
ordered to the Ourcq where it relieved the 3rd Division 
in the Aisne-Marne offensive on July 30th. In this 
offensive the 32nd Division broke the German line of 
resistance on the Ourcq and drove the enemy back to 
the heights north of the Vesle makinga total advance 
of nineteen kilometers. On August 28th it entered 
the front line northeast of Soissons as a part of the 
French Tenth Army and contributed to an important 
extent to the success of the French in outflanking the 
German line on the Chemin des Dames. In this 
drive the 32nd Division captured the strong German 
position on the Juvigny plateau, advancing to a depth 
of five and one half kilometers. On September 2nd 
the division was relieved by the 2nd Moroccan Divi- 
sion and sent back to Joinville for a rest period. On 
September 20th the division left the Joinville rest area 
and moved by bus to the Meuse-Argonne front. On 
September 30th the division entered the front line 
before the Kriemhilde Stellung near Romagne-sous- 
Montfaucon. In a series of attacks during the next 
three weeks the division penetrated the enemy position 
to a depth of eight and one half kilometers. On 
October 20th the division was relieved and placed in 
the III Army Corps Reserve until November 6th when 
it again entered the line at the Dun-sur Meuse bridge- 
head and on November loth attacked east of the 
Meuse, and was in' line when the armistice was signed. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 203 

The division became part of the Third Army upon its 
organization and on November 17th began its march 
from Vilosnes-sur-Meuse to the Rhine, and on Decem- 
ber 13th, after marching 300 kilometers, crossed the 
Rhine and occupied a sector in the Coblenz Bridge- 
head with the 1st Division on the right and the 2nd 
Division on the left. 

The commanding generals of the division were: 
Maj. Gen. Jas. Parker, August 26, 191 7, to September 
19, 1917; Brig. Gen. W. G. Haan (afterward Major 
General) September 19, 1917, to November 20, 1918; 
Maj. Gen. William Lassister, November 20th. 

The insignia of this division is a flying red arrow 
with a red cross bar in the middle. 

This division captured from the enemy the fol- 
lowing: 2,153 prisoners, 21 pieces of artillery, and 190 
machine guns. It made a total advance of thirty- 
six kilometers against resistance. 

During active operations this division suffered the 
following losses as reported to the War Department 
to include May 10, 1919: killed 2,898; wounded, 
10,984; number taken prisoner, i officer and 155 men. 

One hundred and thirty-four Distinguished Ser- 
vice Crosses were awarded to individuals of this divi- 
sion up to March 8, 1919. 

The 32nd Division was composed of the following 
organizations : 

63rd and 64th Infantry brigades. 

125th, 126th, 127th, 128th Infantry regiments. 

119th, 1 20th, I2ist Machine Gun battalions. 

57th Field Artillery Brigade. 



204 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

119th, I20th, i2ist Field Artillery regiments. 

107th Trench Mortar batteries. 

107th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

107th Field Signal battalion. 

107th Headquarters Train and Military Police. 

107th Ammunition Train. 

107th Supply Train. 

107th Sanitary Train consisting of 125th, 126th, 
127th, and 128th Ambulance companies and 125th, 
126th, 127th, and 128th Field hospitals. 

33rd Division 

In compliance with War Department instruction, 
the 33 rd Division, popularly knov^n as the Prairie 
Division, was organized at Camp Logan, Houston, 
Texas, about the middle of August, 19 17. The 
nucleus of the division was the Illinois National Guard 
(ist and 2nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters; ist, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry regiments; 
2nd and 3rd regiments Field Artillery; Company A, 
Signal Corps; ist Engineers; ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Field 
hospitals and Ambulance companies). The first 
organization left Camp Logan April 23, 19 18, for 
Camp Merritt. The rest of the division followed 
shortly afterward and sailed from Hoboken for 
France, disembarking at Brest. The last units ar- 
rived in France June 11, 1918. 

Upon arrival in France the division was first sent 
to the Huppy area, near Abbeville, and on June 9th 
proceeded to the Eu training area. On June 20th 
and 2 1 St the division moved into the Amiens sector, 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 205 

where it was trained under the British, occupying 
portions of the British trenches and participating in 
a number of small operations. On July 4th Com- 
panies C and E, 131st Infantry, and A and G, 132nd 
Infantry, took part in the attack on Hamel, which 
was the first time American troops had fought with 
the Australians. On August 8, 19 18, began the great 
British offensive, In which the 33 rd Division broke the 
German line at Chlpllly Ridge and Gressaire Wood. 
On August 23 rd It was transferred by rail from the 
British front to the area of the American First Army 
In the Toul sector, being concentrated on August 
26th in the region of Tronville-en-BarroIs. On Septem- 
ber 5th it started for Verdun, where It relieved on the 
nights of September 7th, 8th, and 9th the French 120th 
Division. In the Meuse-Argonne battle, commenc- 
ing September 26th, the 33 rd Division formed the 
right of the American III Army Corps. For the next 
eleven days it formed the pivot of this corps. On Octo- 
ber 6th the division was transferred to the French 
XVII Army Corps and participated (October 8th) 
in the attack of the French XVII Corps east of the 
Meuse. Upon being relieved the 33rd Division 
marched to the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector on the St. 
Mihiel front, relieving the 79th Division on the nights 
of October 23rd, 24th, and 25th. From this date to 
include the date of the armistice the division partici- 
pated in a number of minor operations In this sector. 

Maj. Gen. George Bell, Jr., United States Army, 
commanded the division from August 16, 191 7, to in- 
clude November 11, 1918. 



206 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

The shoulder Insignia of this division Is a yellow 
cross on a round black patch. 

This division captured from the enemy the following : 
65 officers, 3,922 men, 100 pieces of artillery, 414 ma- 
chine guns; 20 trench mortars, and other material. It 
made a total advance against resistance of thirty-six 
kilometers. 

During active operation the division suffered the 
following losses: killed, 153 officers and 701 men; 
wounded, 153 officers and 6,844 men; missing, 148 
men; prisoners of war, i officer and 17 men. 

The following is a list of the decorations conferred 
on Individuals of this division: 

Congressional Medals- of Honour, 8. 

Distinguished Service Crosses, no. 

British Distinguished Service Orders, i. 

British Military Crosses, 5. 

British Distinguished Conduct Medal, 5. 

British Military Medal, 41. 

French Croix de Guerre, 47. 

Belgian Order of Leopold, i. 

The following organizations composed this division : 

65th and 66th Infantry brigades. 

129th, 130th, 131st, and 132nd Infantry regiments. 

123 rd and 124th Machine Gun battalions. 

58th Artillery Brigade. 

122nd, 123 rd, and 124th Artillery regiments. 

io8th Trench Mortar Battery. 

122nd Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. 

io8th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

io8th Field Signal Battalion. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 207 

io8th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 
io8th Supply Train. 
io8th Ammunition Train. 
loSth Sanitary Train. 

129th, 130th, 131st, and 132nd Ambulance com- 
panies, and Field hospitals. 

34th Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions, 
the 34th Division (National Guard) v^as organized at 
Camp Cody, New Mexico, on October 2, 1917, under 
General Orders, No. 18, Headquarters, 34th Division. 
The division was made up of National Guard troops 
from Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota. (Headquarters ist Minnesota Bri- 
gade ;ist, 2nd, and 3rd Minnesota Infantry; Minnesota 
Field Hospital and Ambulance companies No. i; 
Headquarters ist Iowa Brigade; ist and 2nd Iowa 
Infantry; ist Squadron Iowa Cavalry; ist Iowa Field 
Artillery; ist Battalion Iowa Engineers; Company 
C, Iowa Signal Corps; Iowa Ammunition Train; 
Iowa Field hospitals and Ambulance companies 
Nos. I and 2; 4th, 5th, and 6th Nebraska Infantry; 
Company B, Nebraska Signal Corps; ist Regiment 
North Dakota Infantry, and North Dakota Field 
Hospital Company No. i; ist Regiment South 
Dakota Cavalry.) The 34th Division remained 
in training at Camp Cody, New Mexico, until Sep- 
tember, 19 1 8. The first units sailed for overseas on 
September 16, 1918, via England, and the last units 
arrived in France on October 24, 191 8. Upon ar- 



208 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

rival in France the division was ordered to the Le 
Mans area where it was broken up and ceased to 
function as a division. In the early part of Decem- 
ber the division began its return to the United 
States by individual units. 

The commanding generals of this division were : Maj . 
Gen. A. P. Blocksom, September i8, 19 17, to May 7, 
1918 ; Maj. Gen. William R. Smith, September 28, 1918, 
to October 10, 1918; Maj. Gen. Beaumont B. Buck, 
October 17, 191 8, to November 7, 191 8 ; Brig. Gen. John 
A. Johnson, November 7, 1918, to November 1 1, 1918. 

The division insignia is a black ovafen circling a red 
bovine skull. This division was composed of the 
following organizations : 

67th, 68th Infantry brigades. 

69th Field Artillery Brigade. 

133rd, 134th, i3Sth, and 136th Infantry regiments. 

125th, 126th, 127th Field Artillery regiments. 

109th Trench Mortar Battery. 

109th Field Signal Battalion. 

109th Headquarters Train and Military Police. 

109th Ammunition Train. 

109th Supply Train. 

109th Sanitary Train (133rd, 134th, i3Sth, and 
136th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals). 

109th Field Train. 

109th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

35th Division 

The division was organized under War Depart- 
ment orders at Camp Doniphan, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 209 

September 13, 19 17, from the National Guard units 
of Missouri and Kansas. 

On April nth it began leaving camp for Camp 
Mills, New York, and sailed for France, April 25, 191 8, 
via Liverpool and Winchester, England, arriving in 
France May nth. It trained with the British first 
in the area of Eu until June nth, then to June 30th 
in the Arches area. 

From the training sector it went into the trenches in 
the Vosges in the De Galbert and Gerardner sectors. 

On September nth it was sent to the St. Mihiel 
sector where it acted as Army Reserve during the 
operations. 

On September 21st the division relieved a French 
division in the Grange le Compte sector. It next 
went into the Meuse-Argonne offensive September 
26th in the Vanquoise sector until October ist, when 
it was withdrawn and sent to the vicinity of Conde- 
en-Barrois where it arrived October 12th, and taking 
over the Sommediene sector. From there it was sent 
on November 9th to the training area near Com- 
mercy. 

Maj. Gen W. M. Wright commanded the division 
from August 25, 1917, to June 15, 191 8. Brig. Gen. 
N. F. McClure commanded for a period after June 
15, 1918. Maj. Gen. Peter M. Traub was next given 
the command which he held until the armistice. The 
shoulder insignia is the Santa Fe Cross. 

The division captured from the enemy the follow- 
ing: 781 prisoners, 24 pieces of artillery, 85 machine 
guns, and other material. It advanced twelve and a 



210 OUR 110 DAYS* FIGHTING 

half kilometers in the face of resistance. During ac- 
tive operations the following casualties were suffered : 
killed, 960; wounded, 6,894; captured, 169, total 8,023. 
Seventeen Distinguished Service Crosses were 
awarded to members of the division up to March i, 

1919- 

The following organizations composed this divi- 
sion: 

69th, 70th Infantry Brigade. 

137th, 138th, 139th, 140th Infantry regiments. 

129th, 130th Machine Gun battalions. 

60th Artillery Brigade, 

128th, 129th, 130th Artillery regiments. 

iioth Trench Mortar Battery. 

128th Division Machine Gun Battalion. 

I loth Engineer Regiment and Train. 

iioth Field Signal Battalion. 

iioth Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

Iioth Supply Train. 

Iioth Ammunition Train. 

Iioth Sanitary Train. 

137th, 138th, 139th, 140th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

36th Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions 
the 36th (National Guard) Division was organized 
at Camp Bowie, Texas, during the period extending 
from August 25 to October 15, 1917. The officers 
and men were drawn largely from the states of Texas 
and Oklahoma. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 211 

The division insignia is a light blue Indian arrow- 
head on a round khaki patch with a khaki T super- 
imposed. The division is sometimes popularly known 
as the Lone Star or Panther Division. 

The period of training at this station continued 
until July 4th, when the division left for Camp Mills, 
L. I. The division sailed from Hoboken, N. J., on 
July 18, 1918, units arriving at Brest, St. Nazaire, 
Le Havre, and Bordeaux,France,beginning July 30th, 
thence proceeding to the thirteenth training area in 
vicinity of Bar-sur-Aube. On September 27th the 
division left for the Champagne sector, detraining 
at Epernay and vicinity. 

Commencing October 6th the division took an ac- 
tive part in the operations of the French Fourth 
Army, advancing a distance of twenty-one kilometers 
to the Aisne River where it was relieved on the 
night of October 27th-28th and withdrawn to the 
Triaucoutt rest area. 

On November i8th the troops departed, by march- 
ing for the sixteenth training area surrounding Ton- 
nerre, arriving in billets in the Tonnerre area No- 
vember 28th. 

To include March i, 1919, 24 individuals of the 
36th Division had been awarded the Distinguished 
Service Cross. 

The losses of this division were as follows: battle 
deaths, 591; wounded, 2,119; prisoners of war, 25. 

Maj. Gen. E. St. John Greble, United States Army, 
organized and commanded the division for some time. 
Maj. Gen. W. R. Smith, United States Army, was in 



212 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

command of the division during the latter part of the 
war to include the date of the armistice, November 
II, 1918. 

The units composing the division were as follows: 

71st and 72nd Infantry brigades. 

141st, 142nd, 143rd, and 144th Infantry regiments. 

132nd and 133rd Machine Gun battalions. 

6ist Artillery Brigade. 

131st, 132nd, and 133 rd Artillery regiments. 

I nth Trench Mortar Battery. 

I nth Ammunition Train. 

131st (divisional) Machine Gun Battalion. 

I nth Field Signal Battalion. 

I nth Engineer Regiment and Train. 

iiith Supply Train. 

141st, 142nd, 143rd, and 144th Ambulance compa- 
nies and Field hospitals, composing the iiith Sani- 
tary Train. 

To form this division the following National Guard 
units were drawn from the states as indicated below; 

Oklahoma: ist Infantry, Squadron Cavalry; i 
Battalion Engineers; First Headquarters Company 
No. I. 

Texas: ist and 2nd Infantry brigades, Divisional 
Headquarters Troop ; 3rd, 4th, ist, 5th, 6th, 7th Infan- 
try; 1st Cavalry; ist and 2nd Field Artillery Regi- 
ment; I Battalion Engineers; Battalion S. C. ; Head- 
quarters Trains and Military Police, and Companies 
and Field Hospital companies Nos. i and 2. 

This division captured from the enemy 18 officers, 
531 men, 9 pieces of artillery, 294 machine guns. It 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 213 

made a total advance against resistance of about 
twenty-one kilometers. 

37th Division 

In compliance with General Orders loi. War De- 
partment, 1917, the 37th Division — known as the 
Buckeye Division — ^was organized at Camp Sheridan, 
Montgomery, Alabama, beginning in August, 19 17, 
when the first units of the Ohio National Guard 
arrived, and completed in October when the last had 
reached camp. 

The division was built around the ist, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and loth Ohio Infantry regi- 
ments, I St Ohio Field Artillery, ist Ohio Cavalry^ 
1st Ohio Engineers, and the Ohio Field Signal Battal- 
ion. 

On May 20th the division, less its artillery, was 
sent to Camp Lee, Virginia, where it was filled to war 
strength and on June nth Headquarters and Head- 
quarters Troop, 134th Machine Gun Battalion, and 
73rd Infantry Brigade began the movement to Hobo- 
ken, sailing on June 15th and arriving in France June 
22, 19 1 8. The 74th Infantry Brigade and Engineers 
left Camp Lee June 21st and sailing via Newport 
News arrived in France July 5th. 

The field artillery brigade, trench mortar battery, 
sanitary train, military police, and 1 14th Veterinary 
Section, left Camp Sheridan, Alabama, June 14th, 
for Camp Upton, sailing from there June 27th via 
England. 

With the exception of the field artillery brigade 



214 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

and ammunition train (less small arms section) the 
division was sent to the Bourmont area for training, 
and on August 4th went into the front lines in the 
Baccarat sector in the Vosges Mountains where it 
trained under the French VI Corps. 

On September i6th it was relieved from this sector 
and proceeded by rail to the vicinity of Robert- 
Espagne. After four days it was moved by bus to 
Recicourt and as part of the V Corps entered the 
Argonne drive at Avocourt. Relieved on October 
1st after having advanced to Cierges, the division 
was sent to Pagny-sur-Meuse from which point it was 
sent to hold a portion of the line in the St. Mihiel 
sector with headquarters at Euvesin. 

After nine days in this sector the division was with- 
drawn to Pagny-sur-Meuse and on October i8th 
began its move by rail to Belgium where with divi- 
sion headquarters at Hooglede in the Lys sector it 
was attached to the French XXX Army Corps on 
October 22nd. Advancing to and crossing the Es- 
caut River the division was relieved from the front 
lines on November 4th and 5th and returned to Thiel 
for rest. On November 8th the division was trans- 
ferred to the French XXXIV Corps and again entered 
the lines along the Escaut River in a sector with 
Syngem as its headquarters. Forcing a crossing of 
the Scheldt (Escaut) River on the night of November 
loth-iith the advance was begun early on the nth 
and pushed forward some five kilometers to the towns 
of Dickele and Hindelgem where the armistice at 
II A.M. brought the fighting to an end. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 215 

The artillery was sent to Camp de Souge for train- 
ing and assigned to the First Army in the Argonne 
offensive, never serving with its own division. It 
served successively with the American IV Corps, 
American Second Army, French Colonial Second 
Army, and French XVII Corps. At one time the three 
regiments of the brigade served with three different 
divisions, the 28th, 33 rd, and 92nd, and only joined 
the division just prior to its return to the United 
States. 

Maj. Gen. Charles G. Treat was the first com- 
mander of the division, being relieved April 24th. 
On May 8th Maj. Gen. Chas. S. Farnsworth was 
assigned to it and commanded until its return to the 
States. 

The division made the following captures from 
the enemy: officers, 26; enlisted men, 1,474; artil- 
lery, 19, 77's; 4, 105's; 10, 155's, 7 trench mortars, 
machine guns, 261, besides many rifles and a great 
deal of ammunition of all calibres. 

This division made a total advance against resis- 
tance of thirty and three fourths kilometers. 

During active operations the division suffered 
the following losses (as reported to War Depart- 
ment May 10, 1919): battle deaths, 992; wounded, 
4,931; prisoners of war, 23. One thousand two 
hundred and fifty replacements were furnished the 
37th Division. 

To include March i, 1919, 25 Distinguished Ser- 
vice Crosses were awarded individuals of this di- 
vision. 



216 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

The following units composed this division: 
73 rd and 74th Infantry brigades. 
145th, 146th, 147th, and 148th Infantry regiments. 
135th and 136th Machine Gun battalions. 
62nd Artillery brigade. 
134th, 135th, and 136th Artillery regiments. 
ii2th Trench Mortar Battery. 
134th Division Machine Gun Battalion. 
1 1 2th Engineers Regiment and Train. 
1 1 2th Field Signal Battalion. 
1 1 2th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 
1 1 2th Supply Train. 
1 1 2th Ammunition Train. 
1 1 2th Sanitary Train. 

145th, 146th, 147th, 148th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

37th Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions, 
the 38th Division (National Guard) was organized 
at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, August 25, 19 1 7. This 
division was made up of National Guard units from 
Kentucky, West Virginia, and Indiana, (ist Indiana 
Infantry Brigade Headquarters, ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 
4th Indiana Infantry, ist Squadron Indiana Cavalry, 
1st Battalion Indiana Engineers, ist Battalion 
Indiana Signal Corps, Indiana Ambulance com- 
panies Nos. I, 2, and 3, and Indiana Field Hospital 
companies Nos. i and 2, ist, 2nd, and 3rd regiments. 
Kentucky Infantry Company B, Kentucky Signal 
Corps, Kentucky Ambulance Company No i, and 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 217 

Kentucky Field Hospital companies Nos. i and 2, 
1st and 2nd regiments West Virginia Infantry.) 

Upon arrival in France in the middle of October, 
1918, the division was ordered to the Le Mans 
area, when it was broken up and ceased to function 
further as a combat division. The division was 
returned to the United States in December, 1918. 

The general officers .that commanded this division 
at different times were: Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Sage, 
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Lewis, Brig. Gen. Henry H. 
Whitney, Brig. Gen. Wm. V. Judson. 

The division insignia is a shield the right half of 
which is blue and the left half red. The *'C" and 
'* Y" in white are superimposed on the shield stand- 
ing for " Cyclone Division." 

The following organizations composed the 38th 
Division : 
75th and 76th Infantry brigades. 
63rd Field Artillery Brigade. 
[49th, isoth, 151st, and 152nd Infantry regiments. 
[37th, 138th, and 139th Machine Gun battal- 
ions. 

[37th, 138th, 139th Field Artillery regiments. 
13th Trench Mortar Battery. 
13th Engineers Regiment and Train. 
13th Field Signal Battalion. 
13th Headquarters Train and Military Police. 
13th Ammunition Train. 
13th Supply Train. 

13th Sanitary Train (149th, 150th, 151st, and 
152nd Ambulance companies and Field hospitals). 



218 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

42nd Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions, 
the 42nd Division was organized August 5, 191 7. It 
was completely assembled at Camp Mills by Sep- 
tember 13 th. It is composed of National Guard 
units coming from every section of the United States. 
The following states were represented as shown : 

New York (69th Infantry) 

Iowa (3rd Infantry) 

Wisconsin (Companies E., F., and G., 2nd Infan- 
try) 

Indiana (ist Field Artillery) 

Maryland (3rd and 4th Companies C. A. C.) 

Kansas (ist Ammunition Train) 

Oklahoma (Ambulance Company No. i) 

District of Columbia (Field Hospital Company 
No. I) 

Ohio (4th Infantry) 

Pennsylvania (3rd Battalion 4th Infantry) 

Illinois (ist Field Artillery) 

Minnesota (ist Field Artillery) 

California (ist Battalion Engineers) 

New Jersey (Ambulance Company No. i) 

Michigan (ist Ambulance Company) 

Nebraska (Field Hospital Company No. i) 

Colorado (Field Hospital Company No. i) 

Oregon (Field Hospital Company No. i) 

Alabama (4th Infantry) 

Georgia (Companies B, C, and F, 2nd Infantry) 

Louisiana (ist Sep. Troop Cavalry) 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 219 

South Carolina (ist Battalion Engineers) 

North Carolina (Eng. Train) 

Texas (Supply Train) 

Virginia (ist and 2nd Companies C. A. C.) 

Tennessee (Ambulance Company No. i) 

Missouri (ist Battalion Signal Corps) 

The division is known as the "Rainbow Division," 
the shoulder insignia being a rainbow on a field of 
black. 

On October 18, 19 17, the division embarked for 
France. Division headquarters landed at St. Na- 
zaire November ist. Debarkation completed De- 
cember 7th. Debarked at St. Nazaire, Brest, and 
Liverpool. Troops were assembled in the Van- 
coulers training area. Division marched to La 
Fauche area beginning December 12th, thence to 
Rolampont area where it remained until February, 
1918. 

On February 16, 1918, the division moved to 
vicinity of Luneville where they trained, serving in 
the line with corresponding French units. 

The division on March 23, 191 8, was withdrawn 
preparatory to marching to another area, but orders 
were revoked and it relieved the French 128th 
Division in the Baccarat sector. 

It was relieved on June 21st and moved by rail 
to Camp de Chalons, and while preparing to go into 
more extensive training, news of impending German 
attack caused the division to be thrown into the 
line in the sectors of Souain and Experance as re- 



220 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

serve, taking up the second position, also portions 
of the intermediate and outposts, under the French 
XXI Army Corps. 

On July 15, 1918, the German attack against this 
corps was broken and the division was withdrawn by 
July 1 8th, moved by train and camion, and on July 
25th it took over the front of the U. S. Army I Corps 
in the vicinity of Epieds. During subsequent at- 
tacks it drove the enemy for a distance of fifteen 
kilometers. 

Relieved August 3rd, and moved by rail and march- 
ing to Bourmont area where it went into intensive 
training, moving to the St. Mihiel salient August 
30th, where it delivered the attack from the south, 
being the centre division of the IV Corps, and ad- 
vancing nineteen kilometers during two days' attack, 
September 12th and 13 th. 

On October ist the division was relieved, moving to 
the Bois de Montfaucon on October 6th as reserve of 
the V Army Corps. It relieved one of the line divi- 
sions north of Fleville-Exermont on October 13th 
in the Argonne, and attacking, advanced two kilo- 
meters. Division was relieved October 31st. 

The division again advanced to support the attack 
of November ist, relieving a line division, and ad- 
vanced nineteen kilometers in two days to the Meuse 
River and the heights south of Sedan. 

On November loth the division withdrew and 
moved to the Brandeville region, becoming a part of 
the Army of Occupation. 

On December 15 th it moved to the Kreis of Ahr- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 221 

weiler, division headquarters being established at 
Ahrweiler, Germany. 

To include May 15, 1919, there had been re- 
ported from this division 2,713 battle deaths, 13,292 
wounded, and 102 prisoners captured by the enemy. 

To include March i, 1919, 205 individuals of this 
division had been awarded the Distinguished Service 
Cross. 

The commanding generals of the division were as 
follows : 

Maj. Gen. Wm. A. Mann, September, 1917, to 
December 14, 1917; Maj. Gen Charles T. Menoher, 
December 14, 1917, to November 7, 1918; Maj. Gen. 
Chas. D. Rhodes, November 7, 19 18, to November 
II, 1918. 

The units comprising the division were as follows: 

83rd and 84th Infantry brigades. 

165th, i66th, 167th, and i68th Infantry regiments. 

150th, 151st Machine Gun battalions. 

67th Artillery Brigade. 

149th, 150th, 151st Artillery regiments. 

117th Trench Mortar Battery. 

149th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. 

117th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

117th Field Signal Battalion. 

117th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

117th Supply Train. 

117th Ammunition Train. 

117th Sanitary Train. 

165th, i66th, 167th, i68th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 



222 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

The battles engaged in by the 42 nd Division entitling 
organizations to silver bands on their regimental 
colour staffs were: 

(i) Luneville sector, Lorraine, France, February 
21 to March 23, 1918. 

Organizations entitled to silver bands: 

165 th Regimental Infantry. 

1 66th Regimental Infantry. 

167th Regimental Infantry. 

i68th Regimental Infantry. 

149th Machine Gun Battalion. 

150th Machine Gun Battalion. 

151st Machine Gun Battalion. 

149th Regimental Field Artillery. 

150th Regimental Field Artillery. 

151st Regimental Field Artillery. 

117th Regimental Engineers. 

117th Field Signal Battalion. 

(2) Baccarat sector, Lorraine, France, March 21 to 
June 21, 19 1 8. Organizations entitled to silver bands 
— Same as in (i). 

(3) Esperance-Souain sector. Champagne, France, 
July 4 to July 14, 1918. Organizations entitled to 
silver bands — Same as in (i). 

(4) Champagne-Marne defensive, France, July 15 
to July 17, 19 1 8. Organizations entitled to silver 
bands — Same as in (i). 

(5) Aisne-Marne offensive, France, July 25 to 
August 3, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver bands 
— Same as in (i) with exception of the Field Artillery^ 
regiments. 



4 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 223 

(6) Aisne-Marne offensive, France, July 25 to Au- 
gust 11,1918. Organiz at ions entitled to silver bands : 
149th Field Artillery, 150th Field Artillery, and 151st 
Field Artillery. 

(7) St. Mihiel offensive, France, September 12 to 
September 16, 1918. Organizations entitled to silver 
bands — Same as in (i). 

(8) Essey and Pannas sector, Woevre, France, 
September 17 to September 30, 1918. Organizations 
entitled to silver band — Same as in (i). 

(9) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, October 12 
to October 31, 1918. Or anizations entitled to silver 
bands — Same as in (5). 

(10) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, October 7 to 
November i, 19 18. Organizations entitled to silver 
bands: 149th, 150th, and 151st regiments. Field 
Artillery. 

(11) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, November 
5 to November 10, 191 8. Organizations entitled to 
silver bands — Same as in (5). 

(12) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, November 
5 to November 9, 191 8. Organizations entitled to 
silver bands — Same as in (10). 

77th Division 

In compliance with General Orders, No. loi, Au- 
gust 23, 1 91 7, the 77th Division was organized August 
30th at Camp Upton. The majority of the officers 
were from New York City and the enlisted men 
were sent from New York City and Long Island, 
New York. 



224 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

On October lo, 191 7, many of the men were trans- 
ferred, the vacancies in the different units caused 
thereby being filled by men from Camp Devens, 
Massachusetts, and from northern New York State. 
The division was popularly named the "Metropolitan 
Division" and has for its insignia a gold statue of 
Liberty on a truncated triangle of flag blue. 

The division began leaving Camp Upton on March 
28, 1918, and sailed from Boston and Portland, Maine, 
via Halifax and New York City. With the excep- 
tion of the artillery (units) all units proceeded 
through Liverpool, across England, and landed at 
Calais, France. The artillery sailed from New 
York In April and went direct to Brest, France. 

The division moved immediately to a training 
area back of the British front near St. Omer and 
while being trained by the British 39th Division, 
was held in reserve to meet the anticipated German 
attack against the channel ports which never ma- 
terialized. The artillery brigade on arrival moved 
to an American training area at Souges. 

On June 16, 191 8, the division moved by train to 
the Baccarat sector. 

On July 12, 191 8, the artillery brigade relieved the 
French artillery In the Baccarat sector. During 
the time spent in this sector the division held a 
broad frontage. 

On August 4th the division moved to the Vesle 
sector in the neighbourhood of Fismes, on August 
nth entering the line. With French troops on both 
flanks and forming a part of the French Sixth Army, 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 225 

the division commenced the attack of the German 
positions north of the River Vesle on August i8th, 
crossing the Vesle on September 5th, and advancing 
its left flank to the River Aisne. The division was 
relieved September 15 th, moving for two days' rest 
to the region of Arcy-le-Poin Sart. 

Division began moving September 17th by bus 
and marching to St. Menehould. On September 21st 
elements of the division moved into position in the 
Argonne trenches. By September 25th the whole 
division was in position and on September 26th 
attacked on the left of the American First Army in 
the Argonne Forest. 

On October 15th and i6th the division was relieved 
and concentrated in the vicinity east of Cornay 
(I Corps Reserve) where it was held in readiness for 
inamediate use if required. 

During this time the division troops were employed 
in reorganizing the line of defence. 

On October 25th the division relieved a line 
division and continued in the attack until No- 
vember 1 2th, advancing from St. Huvin to the 
Meuse. 

Division was relieved November 12th, and moved 
to the vicinity of Les Vignettes on November 21st, 
and thence proceeded on November 30th to the 
ninth training area and established division head- 
quarters at Chateau Villaine. 

To include March i, 1919, 146 individuals of this 
division had been awarded the Distinguished Service 
Cross. 



226 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

To Include May 15, 1919, the following losses had 
been reported for this division: battle deaths, 
1,990; wounded, 9,966; prisoners of war, 404. 

The commanding generals of the division were 
as follows: 

Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, August 18, 191 7, to 
May 18, 1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. B. Duncan, May 18, 
1918, to August 24, 1918 ; Brig. Gen. Evan M. Johnson, 
August 24, 1918, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. 
Robert Alexander, August 31, 1918,10 November 11, 
1918. 

The units comprising the 77th Division were as 
follows : 

153rd, 154th Infantry brigades. 

305th, 306th, 307th, 308th Infantry regiments. 

305th Machine Gun Battalion. 

152nd Artillery Brigade. 

304th, 305th, 306th Artillery regiments. 

302nd Trench Mortar Battery. 

304th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. 

302nd Engineer Regiment and Train. 

302nd Field Signal Battalion. 

302nd Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

302nd Supply Train. 

302nd Ammunition Train. 

302nd Sanitary Train. 

305th, 306th, 307th, 308th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

The division captured from the enemy the follow- 
ing: 13 officers, 737 men, 44 pieces of artillery, 323 
machine guns, and numerous supplies. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 227 

The 77th Division made a total advance against 
resistance of 71.5 kilometers. 

The well-known "lost battalion" was a part of the 
308th Infantry of this division. 

78th Division 

In compliance with General Order No. loi, War 
Department, August 23, 191 7, the 78th Division 
was organized about August 25 th at Camp Dix, 
New Jersey. The majority of the officers were from 
New York State and were trained at Madison Bar- 
racks. The enlisted personnel was drawn from 
northern New York State, New Jersey, and Delaware. 

The shoulder insignia of the division consists of a 
red semi-circle with lightning flash in white. 

About the middle of October, 1917, the division 
began the gradual transfer of more than 13,000 en- 
listed men, more or less trained, to other camps. 

On May 8, 19 18, the division began movement 
overseas. The artillery brigade landed in France 
and proceeded to Brittany for training. The in- 
fantry units landed in England on June 4th and 5th, 
and crossed to Calais by boat three or four days 
later. The last units of the division arrived in 
France June 11, 1918. 

Infantry units began training June 17, 191 8, be- 
hind the Hazebrouck front in the British area. On 
July 19th the division moved to an area east of 
St. Pol and trained there until August 19th, when the 
infantry units moved to the Bourbonne-les-Bains 
area. 



228 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

On August 31, 1918, the division began moving to 
the St. Mihiel front, arriving September loth. It 
remained in I Corps Reserve until September 15th 
and 1 6th, when it reUeved the 2nd and 5th divisions. 
The artillery brigade had meanwhile come up to this 
front and was supporting the 90th Division. 

The division occupied the Limey sector until 
October 4th when it was relieved and rejoined by 
the artillery brigade and moved to the Argonne Forest. 
The division relieved the 77th Division on October 
1 6th and continued in the line until November 5th, 
advancing twenty-one kilometers. 

On November 6th the division, less artillery 
brigade and ammunition train, moved back to the 
Argonne camps west of Varennes, then to Florent, 
Les Islettes, and to the south of Ste. Menehould. 
It entrained for the Semur training area on Novem- 
ber 15th. 

This division captured from the enemy 9 officers, 
392 men, several pieces of artillery, numerous ma- 
chine guns, and quantities of other military supplies. 
It made a total advance against resistance of twenty- 
one kilometers, or about thirteen miles. 

To include March 8, 1919, 813 casualties had been 
reported from this division, of which 6^ were pris- 
oners of war. To include March i, 19 19, 95 indi- 
viduals of the 78th Division had been awarded the 
Distinguished Service Cross. 

The commanding generals of the division were as 
follows: Maj. Gen. Chase W. Kennedy, August 
23, 1917, to December 27, 1917; Maj. Gen. Hugh L. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 229 

Scott, December 28, 1917, to March 15, 1918; Brig. 
Gen. Jas. T. Dean, March 16, 1918, to April 20, 
1918; Maj. Gen. Jas. H. McRae, April 20, 1918, 
to November 11, 1918. 

The units composing the division were as follows : 

155th, 156th Infantry brigades. 

309th, 310th, 311th, 312th Infantry regiments. 

308th, 309th Machine Gun battalions. 

153 rd Artillery Brigade. 

307th, 308th, 309th Artillery regiments. 

303rd Trench Mortar Battery. 

307th Division Machine Gun Battalion. 

303 rd Engineer Regiment and Train. 

303rd Field Signal Battalion. 

303 rd Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

303rd Supply Train. 

303 rd Ammunition Train. 

303rd Sanitary Train. 

309th 310th, 311th, 312th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

79th Division 

In compliance with General Orders No. 109, War 
Department, 19 17, the division was organized August 
25, 1917, at Camp Meade, Maryland. The officers, 
for the most part, were from Pennsylvania and the 
selected men in the early increments were drawn 
from eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, and District 
of Columbia. 

Beginning about this time large numbers of men 
were transferred to southern divisions and to special 



230 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

units throughout the United States. This continued 
until June, 191 8. Approximately 80,000 men were 
trained in this division and only about 25,000 re- 
tained. The later increments came from New York, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. While in 
training this division was popularly designated as 
the Liberty Division. 

The division commenced its overseas movement 
July 9, 19 1 8, the majority embarking at Hoboken, 
New Jersey, and debarking at Brest. The 154th 
Field Artillery Brigade embarked at Philadelphia 
and debarked in England, proceeding from there to a 
training area in France. The last units arrived in 
France August 3, 19 18. This artillery brigade joined 
division after the armistice. 

The division left Brest for the twelfth training area, 
but were diverted to the tenth training area around 
Prauthoy and Champlite. 

Left the training area for the Robert-Espagne 
area by rail. Subsequently proceeding by bus on 
September i6th relieved a division in Sector 304 
(Montfaucon). 

The division under the V Corps made its first 
offensive in the Meuse-Argonne drive, advancing 
through Haucourt and Malancourt. On September 
27th they passed through Montfaucon and on Sep- 
tember 28th through Nantillois. They were re- 
lieved in this sector on September 30th and passed 
to the command of the French Colonial II Corps, 
moving October 8th to the Troyon sector (Fresnes- 
en-Woevre-Doncourt). Were relieved in this sector 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 231 

October 26, 1918. Entered the Grand Montagne 
sector (right of Meuse) and participated in the 
second phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, under 
the French XVII Corps, advancing through Brone- 
du-Cornouiller (Hill 376) on November 6th, and 
through Damvillers and Wavrille on November 9th. 
Ville-devant-Chaumont was passed on November 
iith. 

The division remained in same location and also 
took over area from Meuse River to Eresnes-en- 
Woevre until November 26th. The division moved 
to Souilly area south of Verdun, December 27th. 

To include March 8, 1919, the total battle casual- 
ties of this division as reported were 3,223. To in- 
clude March i, 1919, 80 Distinguished Service Crosses 
were awarded individuals of the 79th Division. 

Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhm, U. S. A., com- 
manded the division from August 25, 19 17, to 
include the date of the armistice, November 11, 19 18. 

The division is known as the Liberty Division and 
has for its shoulder insignia a gray lorraine cross on a 
blue shield-shaped field, the whole outlined in gray. 

80th Division 

In compliance with War Department orders, the 
80th Division was organized August 27, 191 7, at Camp 
Lee, Virginia. The majority of the officers were 
from New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, and the 
enlisted men from western Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. 

The division is named the "Blue Ridge Division" 



232 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

and has for its shoulder insignia a shield outlined in 
white on a khaki background with three blue moun- 
tains superimposed. 

The division began leaving Camp Lee on May 17, 
1918, and was embarked at Newport News for 
France. Its principal points of entry were St. Na- 
zaire, Bordeaux, and Brest. The assembly point of 
the division was Calais, from which place it departed 
early in June for the Samur training area, with the 
British. The artillery was not trained in this area 
but rejoined the division September 13 th. The last 
units of the division arrived in France June 19, 1918. 

Division left Samur training area on July 4th for 
British Third Army sector, where it arrived July 5th. 
All units trained with the British in the Artois sector; 
while in this sector the troops were attached to the 
British and were on active duty. 

On August 1 8th the units of the division left this 
area and proceeded by rail to the fourteenth training 
area, where it remained until August 3 ist. On Septem- 
ber 1st it moved to the Stainville and later to Tronville 
area as reserve during the St. Mihiel operation. Dur- 
ing this time one infantry regiment and one machine 
gun battalion were serving with the French, taking 
part in active operations. 

Commencing September 14th, the division moved 
into the Argonne and began its preparation for the 
offensive in that region. On September 26th, in con- 
junction with other American divisions, it attacked 
at Bethincourt, advancing a distance of nine kilo- 
meters in two days. On September 29th it was re- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 233 

lieved and assembled in the vicinity of Ouisy, where 
on October 4th it again attacked, and over difficult 
ground attained a distance of four kilometers in nine 
days. 

On October 12th the division was again reHeved 
and proceeded by march and bus to the Thiaucourt 
area where it was re-equipped. On October 23 rd-24th 
it again moved, this time to the Le Neufour area 
where it remained until October 29th, making prepa- 
rations for the resumption of the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive. 

The division, on October 29th, entered the line St. 
Georges-St. Juvin and on November ist made an 
attack on that line, penetrating in the next five days 
to a distance of twenty-four kilometers, being relieved 
the morning of November 6th. Upon relief it pro- 
ceeded by marching to the Buzancy and Champ 
Mahaut areas. 

On the 1 8th of November the division proceeded 
by march to the fifteenth training area, completing 
the march December ist. 

The 155th Field Artillery Brigade, after its relief 
from duty with the 80th Division, remained in the 
Cunel sector, serving successively with American 
divisions in that sector. It was in action for forty- 
eight consecutive fighting days. It proceeded by 
rail from Dun-sur-Meuse to the fifteenth training 
area, arriving December 4th to 7th. 

Maj.Gen. Adelbert Cronkhite, United States Army, 
commanded the division from September 9, 1917, to 
include November 11, 1918. 



234 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

To include May 15, 19 19, there had been reported 
from this division the following casualties: 1,141 
battle deaths, 5,622 wounded, and loi prisoners of 
war taken by the enemy. 

To include March i, 19 19, 42 Individuals of this 
division had been awarded the Distinguished Service 
Cross. 

The following units composed the division: 

159th and i6oth Infantry brigades. 

317th, 318th, 319th, 320th Infantry regiments. 

314th, 315th Machine Gun battalions. 

155th Artillery Brigade. 

313th, 314th, 315th Artillery regiments. 

305th Trench Mortar Battery. 

313th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. 

305th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

305th Field Signal Battalion. 

305th Train Headquarters and Military Police.' 

305th Supply Train. 

305th Ammunition Train. 

305th Sanitary Train. 

317th, 318th, 319th, 320th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

8ist Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions 
the 8 1st Division was organized at Camp Jackson, 
South Carolina, in September, 19 17. This division 
was made up of National Army drafts from North 
and South Carolina and Tennessee. The division 
remained in training at Camp Jackson until July, 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 235 

1918. The first units embarked for overseas on July 
30, 191 8, and the last units arrived in France, via 
England, on August 26, 19 18. Upon arrival in 
France the division was ordered to the Tonnerre 
(Yonne) training area where it remained in training 
until the middle of August. The division then pro- 
ceeded to the St. Die sector (Vosges) where it held the 
line as a part of the XXXIII French Corps. On Octo- 
ber 19th, the division was relieved and ordered to join 
the First Army for the Meuse-Argonne offensive. The 
division arrived in the Sommedieue sector early in 
November and was attached to the Colonial II Corps 
(French) as corps reserve. On November 6th, it 
relieved the 35th Division in this sector, and on No- 
vember 9th the division attacked the German posi- 
tions on the Woevre plain, and was in the line when 
the armistice was signed. 

On November i8th the division moved to the 
vicinity of Chatillon-Sur-Seine (cote D'or) and the 
artillery brigade which had heretofore formed a part 
of the VIII Corps rejoined the division. On May 
2nd the division was placed under the control of the 
C. G., S.O.S. for return to the United States. 

The commanding generals of this division were: 
Brig. Gen. Chas. H. Barth, August 25, 1917, to Octo- 
ber 8, 1917; Maj. Gen. Chas. J. Bailey, October 8, 
1917, to November 11, 1918. 

The insignia of this division is a silhouette of a 
wildcat on a khaki circle. The colour of the wild- 
cat varies according to the different arms of the 
service. 



236 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

During active operations the division suffered the 
following losses: killed, 250; wounded, 801; 51 men 
taken prisoner. 

This division captured the following from the 
enemy: 5 officers, 96 men, 44 machine guns. The 
division advanced 5J kilometers against resistance. 

Nineteen Distinguished Service Crosses were 
awarded to individuals of this division up to March 
8, 1919. 

The following units composed the division : 

i6ist, 162nd Infantry brigades. 

321st, 322nd, 323 rd, 324th Infantry regiments. 

317th, 318th Machine Gun battalions. 

156th Artillery Brigade. 

316th, 317th, 318th Artillery regiments. 

306th Trench Mortar Battery. 

316th Division Machine Gun battalion. 

306th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

306th Field Signal Battalion. 

306th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

306th Ammunition Train. 

306th Sanitary Train. 

306th Supply Train. 

321st, 322nd, 323rd, 324th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

82nd Division 

In compliance with War Department instructions, 
the 82nd (National Army) Division was organized 
August 25, 19 1 7, at Camp Gordon, Georgia. The 
majority of officers were from Georgia, Alabama, and 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 237 

Florida. The enlisted men were from Georgia, Ala- 
bama, and Tennessee. 

On October loth the majority of the enlisted men 
were transferred out of the division to other divisions 
and newly drafted men were sent from Camp 
Devens, Upton, Dix, Meade, and Lee, which resulted 
in there being in the division men from every state 
in the Union, but principally from the eastern states. 

The division is known as the "All American Divi- 
sion." Its shoulder insignia consists of the letters 
"A.A." in gold on a circle of blue, the whole super- 
imposed on a red square. 

The division began leaving Camp Gordon on April 
9th, the movement continuing until May, and was 
through Camp Upton and England, except the artil- 
lery which landed in France. The first units left the 
United States April 25, 1918, and the last units ar- 
rived in France June i, 19 18. The main port of entry 
was Le Havre. Units, except artillery, engineers, 
and signal corps, trained with the British in Escar- 
botin area, west of Abbeville. The artillery was 
trained at La Courtine. 

The division left Escarbotin June i6th and entered 
the Toul sector with a French division on June 27th, 
occupied this quiet sector alone from July 18, 1918, 
to August 9th, moved to Blanod les Toul training 
area, taking over the sector Marbache, astride the 
Moselle, on August 19th and occupied it until Septem- 
ber 2ist. This was a quiet sector except during the 
battle of St. Mihiel from September 12th to i8th. 

The division moved to the Triaucourt area, west 



238 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

of Verdun by bus, and on October 6th entered ac- 
tively the Meuse-Argonne offensive, north of Baren- 
nes, continued in this offensive on the Hne in the Aire 
valley up to St. Juvin and St. George until October 
30th, when it was withdrawn to the vicinity of Chene 
Tondu and Camp Bouzon. Thence on November 
2nd to Florent-Les Islettes area, thence toVaucouIeurs 
training area, November 4th; Beaumont training 
area, November loth, and to the tenth training area 
on November 15th. (Prauthoy.) 

Sailed from Bordeaux in April, 1919. 

To include March 8, 1919, 8,300 casualties had 
been reported from the 82nd Division of which 169 
were prisoners of war. 

Thirty-four individuals of the division had re- 
ceived the Distinguished_ Service Cross up to March 
I, 1919. 

The commanding generals of the division from the 
time of its organization were as follows: Maj. Gen. 
Eben Swift, August 25, 19 17, to some time in May, 
191 8; Brig. Gen. Wm. P. Burnham, some time in May, 
1918, to October 10, 1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. B. Dun- 
can, October 10, 1918, to October 17, i9i8;Maj. Gen. 
W. P. Burnham, October 24, 19 18, to November 7, 
1918; Maj. Gen. Geo. B. Duncan, November 7, 1918, 
to November 11, 191 8. 

The following units composed the division: 

163 rd, 164th Infantry brigade. 

325th, 326th, 327th, 328th Infantry regiments. 

320th, 321st Machine Gun battalions. 

157th Artillery Brigade. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 239 

319th, 320th, 321st Artillery regiments. 

307th Trench Mortar Battery. 

319th Machine Gun Battalion. 

307th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

307th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

307th Field Signal Battalion. 

307th Supply Train. 

307th Ammunition Train. 

307th Sanitary Train. 

325th, 326th, 327th, 328th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 
Battle Engagements of 82nd Division. 

(i) Toul Sector, France, June 25-August 9, 191 8. 

Organizations entitled to silver bands on their 
regimental colour staffs. 

325th Regiment Infantry. 

326th Regiment Infantry. 

327th Regiment Infantry. 

328th Regiment Infantry. 

307th Field Signal Battalion. 

(2) Toul Sector, France, July 18- August 9, 191 8. 
Organizations entitled to silver bands: 

319th Machine Gun Battalion. 

(3) Toul Sector, France, July 14-August 9, 1918. 
Organizations entitled to silver bands: 

320th Machine Gun Battalion. 
321st Machine Gun Battalion. 
X4) Marbache Sector, Toul, France, August 17- 
September 11, 1918. 
Organizations entitled to silver bands : 
325th Regiment Infantry. 



240 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

326th Regiment Infantry. 
327th Regiment Infantry. 
328th Regiment Infantry. 
307th Regiment Engineers. 
319th Machine Gun Battalion. 
320th Machine Gun BattalioUo 
321st Machine Gun BattaUon. 
307th Field Signal Battalion. 

(5) Marbache Sector, Toul, France, August 19- 
September 11, 1918. 

Organizations entitled to silver bands: 
319th Regiment Field Artillery. 
320th Regiment Field Artillery. 
321st Regiment Field Artillery. 

(6) St. Mihiel Offensive, France, September 12- 
September 16, 19 18. 

Organizations entitled to silver bands : 
325th Regiment Infantry. 
326th Regiment Infantry. 
327th Regiment Infantry. 
328th Regiment Infantry. 
307th Regiment Engineers. 
319th Machine Gun Battalion. 
320th Machine Gun Battalion. 
321st Machine Gun Battalion. 
307th Field Signal Battalion. 
3 19th Regiment Field Artillery. 
320th Regiment Field Artillery. 
321st Regiment Field Artillery. 

(7) Meuse-Argonne Offensive, France, October 6- 
October 31, 191 8. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 241 

Organizations entitled to silver bands : 
325th Regiment Infantry. 
326th Regiment Infantry. 
327th Regiment Infantry. 
328th Regiment Infantry. 
307th Regiment Engineers. 
319th Machine Gun Battalion. 
320th Machine Gun BattaHon. 
321st Machine Gun BattaHon. 
307th Field Signal Battalion. 
(8) Meuse-Argonne Offensive, France, October 6- 
November7, 19 18. 
Organizations entitled to silver bands: 
319th Regiment Field Artillery. 
320th Regiment Field Artillery. 
321st Regiment Field Artillery. 

90th Division 

I. Organization. In compliance with General 
Orders No. loi, War Department, 19 17, the 90th 
Division was organized August 25, 1917, at Camp 
Travis, Texas, under the command of Maj. Gen. 
Henry T. Allen. All of the first men in the division 
were from Texas and Oklahoma, those from Okla- 
homa being in the 179th Brigade and those from 
Texas in the i8oth Brigade. From that time these 
brigades have been known as the Oklahoma and 
Texas brigades. The division insignia, adopted in 
France, symbolizes the native states of the first 
members of the division. 

Like all other National Army divisions in the States, 



242 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

the 90th sent away great numbers of men to fill up 
Regular and National Guard divisions and to form 
special organizations of army, corps, and S.O.S. 
troops. In the early spring of 19 18 the division 
was filled up with men from other camps, a large 
number coming from Camp Dodge, Iowa. 

2. Move to France. The division commenced 
leaving Camp Travis early in June for Camp Mills, 
near New York. By June 30th all units had sailed 
from Hoboken. A few organizations went direct to 
France but the majority of the division landed in 
England. The 358th Infantry paraded before the 
Lord Mayor of Liverpool on July 4th, and was 
given a banquet by the city. 

Immediately upon arrival in France the artillery 
brigade was sent to a training area near Bordeaux. 
The rest of the division was moved by train to the 
Aignay-le-Duc training area, northeast of Dijon. 
Headquarters of the division, 179th Brigade and 
357th Infantry, were at Aignay-le-Duc. Headquar- 
ters of the 1 80th Brigade and the 359th Infantry 
were at Recey-sur-Ource. The 358th Infantry was at 
Minot, and the 360th Infantry was at Rouvres. The 
division stayed six weeks in this area, training eight 
hours a day for the time when it should take its 
place in line. 

3. Relief of First Division. In the middle of 
August the division was ordered to relieve the ist 
Division, which held the Saizerais sector along the 
Moselle River, near Toul. The division was moved 
by train on the i8th and 19th of August from its 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 243 

training area to towns in the vicinity of Toul. The 
reHef of the ist Division commenced on the 19th 
of August and was completed on the 24th, General 
Allen taking command of the sector at 8 o'clock on 
the morning of August 24th. 

The sector was about nine kilometers in width, 
from Remenauville to a point about a kilometer 
west of the Moselle River. The sector had been 
the scene of heavy fighting in 19 15 when the French, 
with very heavy losses, had attempted to take the 
Bois le Pretre, but since 1915 had been what was 
known as a quiet sector. The front line on the left 
ran across broken open country just behind Fey- 
en-Haye, and on the right ran through the woods of 
the Bois le Pretre. No Man's Land was wide and 
full of old trenches, wire entanglements, and obsta- 
cles of every sort. The rear areas were heavily 
wooded and filled with all sorts of camps, dugouts, old 
gun emplacements, and every kind of construction 
which had accumulated during three years of trench 
warfare. The regiments went into line in order 
from left to right — 3 5 7th Infantry (Colonel Hart- 
mann), 358th Infantry (Colonel Leary), 3S9th In- 
fantry (Colonel Cavenaugh), 360th Infantry (Colo- 
nel Price). General O'Neil, commanding the 179th 
Brigade, had his headquarters at Martincourt, and 
General Johnston, commanding the i8oth Brigade, 
was at Griscourt. Division headquarters was estab- 
lished at Villers-en-Haye. 

The 82nd Division was on the right and the 89th 
Division on the left. 



244 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

On August 27th General Johnston became a Major 
General and was given the 91st Division. Brig. 
Gen. U. G. McAlexander, who had served with the 
3rd Division on the Marne, took command of the 
1 80th Brigade. 

4. St. Mihiel Offensive. When the division went 
into line, preparation had already begun for the St. 
Mihiel offensive. Artillery of all calibres was being 
moved into the sector every night and it was obvious 
to everyone that an operation of some sort was being 
planned. Early in September orders were received 
from the I Army Corps which outlined the opera- 
tion and gave the 90th Division its part in the 
attack. The American First Army, which had just 
been organized under the personal command of 
General Pershing, was to cut off the St. Mihiel 
salient. The general plan was that the V Corps 
would attack on the west base of the salient and 
drive east, and that the I and IV Corps on the 
east base of the salient would attack north. When 
the V and IV Corps met, they would close the 
neck of the bottle, and the salient and the German 
troops left in it would be cut off. The advance of 
the I and IV Corps was to swing forward like a 
door with the hinge of the door on the Moselle River. 
The divisions on the left of the advance would push 
forward the farthest, and by meeting the V Corps, 
cut off the salient. 

The 82nd Division on the extreme right was not to 
advance at all, and the 90th Division on its left was 
given the mission of protecting the right flank of 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 245 

the advance and seeing that the hinge on which the 
whole attack pivoted was not broken off. This 
was an extremely important and delicate mission, 
as with the 82nd Division standing fast it was obvious 
that the 90th Division, when it advanced, would leave 
its whole right flank open to the enemy. 

5 . The Attack — September 12-16. The front of the 
division was narrowed for the attack by three kilo- 
meters which were taken over by the 5th Division. 
On the three nights before the 12th, patrols were busy 
all along the front cleaning out the old trenches and 
cutting wire so that everything would be ready for the 
jump-off on the morning of the 12th. For the attack, 
the division was lined up with the regiments side 
by side in the same order that they held the sector. 
The infantry was supported by the 153rd Artillery 
Brigade (78th Division). The plan for the first day 
was that the division, like the corps, would advance 
farthest on the left and pivot on the right. 

A terrific artillery preparation opened at one 
o'clock on the morning of the 12th. At 5 o'clock 
the infantry went over the top under a rolling bar- 
rage and by 2 o'clock in the afternoon all objectives 
had been reached and the enemy completely dis- 
organized in spite of the immensely difficult country 
through which the advance had been made. The 
357th Infantry on the left had advanced a maximum 
distance of four kilometers through dense wood, 
wire, and trench defences of every description. All 
of the other regiments, while their advance was not 
as deep as that of the 357th Infantry, had accom- 



246 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

[plished their missions. During the night strong 
patrols were sent out all along the front to exploit 
the success of the day. 

On the 13th the i8oth Brigade captured the Bois 
le Pretre with its maze of barbed-wire entanglements 
and innumerable machine gun emplacements. The 
French are said to have had more than 120,000 casual- 
ties in 1915 in attempting to take this piece of ground. 
On the same day the 179th Brigade cleaned out the 
Vencheres woods and advanced their line to the vi- 
cinity of St. Marie Farm. One of the battalions of the 
357th Infantry encountered two enemy regiments 
moving across our front to counter attack the 5th 
Division and completely broke up their advance. 

On the 14th the 179th Brigade pushed forward on 
the left into the Bois des Rappes to the vicinity of 
La Souleuvre Farm, while the i8oth Brigade cap- 
tured Villers-sours-Preny and established a foot- 
hold on the heights beyond. 

On the 15th the advance was continued, Van- 
dieres taken, the Bois de Villers and the Bois des 
Rappes cleaned up, and the line established along the 
Huit Chemins (*'White Chimmy") road. 

On the 1 6th the front line was pushed forward to 
the edge of the woods in front of Preny where it 
remained until the division was relieved in October. 

While the 90th Division was carrying all objectives, 
the rest of the First Army was equally successful. 
Within twenty-four hours after the attack started, 
divisions from the IV and V Corps had met at 
Vignuelles in rear of the salient and the whole Ger- 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 247 

man position, which had been held since 1914, was 
cut off. During this first operation of the American 
Army more than 14,000 prisoners, a great amount 
of artillery, and vast stores of all sorts were cap- 
tured. 

The 90th Division's contribution was, in prisoners, 
14 officers and 650 men, 8 pieces of artillery, 24 heavy 
trench mortars, and a large number of rifles, ma- 
chine guns, and miscellaneous weapons. The divi- 
sion's casualties were 39 officers and 886 men. 

6. From close of St. Mihiel offensive to relief by yth 
Division. Shortly after the St. Mihiel offensive was 
ended, the 82nd Division on our right was relieved by 
the French 69th Division and the 90th's sector was 
extended to the Moselle River. The 5th Division on 
the left was relieved by the 78th Division, which was 
itself shortly withdrawn, its sector being turned over 
about equally to the 89th and 90th. This extended 
the 90th's sector approximately four kilometers to 
the west. During the last week that the division 
was in line it was holding a front of approximately 
twelve kilometers. During the period following the St. 
Mihiel operation the four regiments continued to hold 
the line in the same order as before. Colonel Sterling 
had relieved Colonel Cavenaugh in command of the 
359th Infantry. 

During all this period enemy artillery activity was 
intense. The front and support lines were almost 
continually bombarded with high explosive and gas 
shell. Much of the fire came from the flank, and 
from places even in rear of our own line. While there 



248 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

was no considerable enemy Infantry activity during 
this period casualties were heavy from artillery. 

Patrolling was active and daring. Scarcely a day 
passed that one of the regiments did not bring in 
prisoners. 

On the night of September 23 rd the 357th Infantry 
raided the Hindenburg Line near Sebastapol Farm and 
brought in five prisoners with only slight casualties. 

On the 26th of September the American First Army 
west of the Meuse commenced the last great battle 
of the war, and the divisions between the Meuse and 
the Moselle assisted that operation by carrying out 
local operations to give the impression that the great 
attack extended along the entire front. Both infan- 
try brigades took part in the operation which was 
planned as a deep raid on the enemy positions. The 
raid was preceded by a six-hour artillery preparation, 
as was the big attack west of the Meuse, and the in- 
fantry jumped off at the same hour as the troops 
making the real attack. Statements of prisoners and 
evidence discovered since the armistice prove , that 
the division successfully accomplished its mission 
and that the enemy on our front believed until well 
into the morning of September 26th that a great at- 
tack was being made on their front. The success 
was attained, however, only with very heavy casual- 
ties, as our raiding parties were caught in an intense 
artillery bombardment and heavy machine gun fire 
from concrete emplacements all along the Hinden- 
burg Line. 

7. Relief by yth Division and move to the Meuse. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 249 

Early in October the division was relieved by the 7th 
Division, the reHef being completed on the loth of Oc- 
tober. The division was concentrated for a few days 
in billets in the vicinity of Toul and was then moved 
by truck to the Blercourt area, about twenty kilo- 
meters from Verdun. Here the division was billeted 
for a few days in huts and barracks in the woods and 
was then moved forward from the billeting area into 
bivouac in the vicinity of Montfaucon, Cuisy, Nan- 
tillois, Septsarges, and as a part of the III Corps. 

8. The Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Commencing 
with the counter offensive in July which cleared the 
Marne salient, the Allied armies, particularly the 
British Army, had steadily driven the enemy back 
until nearly all of the ground gained in his great offen- 
sive of March, April, and May, 1918, had been re- 
covered. It became evident that the enemy was 
planning, if not already executing, a general retreat 
with the Meuse as his pivot, and that if the Allied 
armies could continue their offensive, and particu- 
larly if they could break the enemy's pivot on the 
Meuse, a decision might be reached. With this in 
view the great attack of September 26th, which de- 
veloped into the battle of the Meuse-Argonne, was 
planned and the American First Army was given the 
honour position on the Meuse with the all-important 
task of breaking the pivot of the enemy's retreat. 
The part which the 90th Division played on Septem- 
ber 26th has already been described. The first at- 
tack met with great success on the entire front of the 
army. The advance was rapid. Then, as divisions 



250 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

became exhausted, communications and supply be- 
came extremely difficult and the enemy threw in great 
numbers of reserve divisions, the advance slowed 
down, and the first stage of the battle was concluded. 
During the second stage there was continual fighting 
along the line but no concerted attack was launched 
by the entire army. The effort was rather on the 
part of individual divisions and corps to straighten 
out the line and reach a position from which a second 
great attack could be launched. 

9. Relief of Sth Division — Capture of Bantheville; 
The 90th Division went into line near the end of this 
second period. The 179th Brigade relieved the loth 
Brigade of the 5th Division on the night of October 
2ist-22nd. The i8oth Brigade was held in division 
reserve. The 3rd Division was on the right and the 
89th Division on the left. At this time the front line 
ran from just north of Romaone and Cunel around 
the northwestern edge of the Bois des Rappes. The 
89th Division had pushed forward and occupied the 
Bois de Bantheville on the left so that the line of the 
90th Division formed a pocket a little more than two 
kilometers in depth in the front of the corps. In this 
pocket were the villages of Bantheville and Bourrut. 
The first mission of the division was to straighten 
out the line. The 357th Infantry attacked at 3 
o'clock on the afternoon of October 23rd, captured 
Bantheville and the high ground north and northwest 
of that town, and established a line from the north- 
east corner of the Bois des Rappes over the high 
ground north of Bourrut to the northeastern corner 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 251 

of the Bols de Bantheville where the line joined with 
the 89th Division. The 358th Infantry in the Bois 
des Rappes at the same time extended its left to con- 
nect with the 357th Infantry north of Bourrut,and the 
same night two companies of the 358th Infantry 
crossed the Andon Brook and estabHshed a Hne from 
a point about 500 meters southwest of Aincreville 
along the Aincreville-Bantheville road to the line 
held by the 357th Infantry. This extremely suc- 
cessful operation, upon which the division was highly 
complimented by the army and corps commanders, 
resulted in giving the division an excellent position 
from which it could jump off in case of a great attack. 
This advance position was held until November ist, 
despite many counter attacks and continuous intense 
shelling. 

10. Attack of November ist. With the capture of 
Bantheville by the 179th Brigade, everything was in 
readiness for the great attack by the American First 
Army and the French armies on its left, by which it 
was hoped finally to break the enemy's last line of 
resistance and change his retreat into a rout. This 
attack was ordered for November ist. On the night 
of October 30th the i8oth Brigade relieved the 179th 
Brigade which had suffered heavy casualties during 
its eight days in line and was withdrawn into division 
reserve. The i8oth Brigade went into line and at- 
tacked with the 360th Infantry on the left and the 
359th Infantry on the right. The 345th Machine 
Gun Battalion and the 343rd Machine Gun Battalion 
were in position on the front line from which they 



252 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

could cover the advance with overhead fire. On the 
morning of the ist these companies fired more than 
1,200,000 rounds and contributed largely to the very 
great success of the attack. 

The plan of the attack was that the 360th Infantry 
on the left, on a narrow front and assisted by a con- 
centration of all available artillery, should drive for- 
ward through the Carre Farm and the immensely 
strong wooded position on the left of the sector up to 
and beyond Andevanne. With this attack a success 
the 359th Infantry on the right would be able to ad- 
vance across the open ground west of Aincreville 
without disastrous losses. An extremely heavy ar- 
tillery preparation opened at 3.30 a. m., on the ist 
of November, and at 5.30 a. m. the infantry went over 
the top. From the outset the fighting was desperate. 
The best veteran troops available in the German 
Army were thrown in to stop the advance of the divi- 
sion. Machine gun nests were everywhere, the gun- 
ners sticking to their guns until wiped out. The 
360th and 359th Infantry, splendidly supported by 
the 155th Field Artillery Brigade (8oth Division), 
advanced practically without halt. Grande Carre 
Farm was taken and mopped up. The woods to the 
north were cleaned out, Andevanne and Cote 243 
captured, and the line pushed a kilometer beyond by 
the 360th. Chassogne Farm and St. Marguerite 
Farm were captured by the 359th Infantry, and by 
late afternoon our troops were on or beyond their 
objectives. The Freya Stellung, the last known 
enemy position, was definitely and completely broken. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 253 

On the 2nd of November the advance was continued 
against desperate resistance. Villers devt. Dun was 
taken and passed, Hill 321 was occupied, and the Bois 
de Raux was put within our lines before night. On 
the right the 359th Infantry advanced more than 
three kilometers, and one battalion, extending over 
into the sector of the 5th Division on the right, ad- 
vanced through the "punch bowl'* all the way to the 
Meuse. 

On the 3rd of November the 179th Brigade passed 
through the i8oth Brigade and at 8 o'clock attacked 
with the 358th Infantry on the left and the 357th 
Infantry on the right. It was evident after a few 
hours that the attacks of the preceding days had 
broken the enemy's resistance and that he was com- 
pletely disorganized. By night the brigade had 
penetrated the dense woods of the Bois de Tailly and 
occupied the towns of Montigny, Saulmaury, Sassey, 
and Mont devt. Sassey. 

On the 4th and 5th of November the exploitation 
was continued and the hold on the river towns was 
strengthened. Halles, Wiseppe, and Laneuville were 
occupied. 

The divisions on the left of the 90th were meeting 
with equal success and were driving the enemy back 
to the Meuse River. With the breaking of the Freya 
Stellung by the 90th Division the vitally important 
railroad from Sedan to Montmedy was brought under 
our artillery fire and the enemy's hold on the river 
was broken. The 5th Division, on our right, suc- 
ceeded in crossing the Meuse at Dun-sur-Meuse and 



254 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

was forcing the enemy up the right bank of the river. 
It was evident that the enemy's retreat was becoming 
completely disorganized and if our pressure could be 
contiliued he would break. 

On the 9th of November the 179th Brigade crossed 
the Meuse at Sassey, and by all-night marching oc- 
cupied Mouzay on the right bank of the river. The 
next day the 358th Infantry captured Blanc Fontaine, 
and after desperate fighting secured a foothold in 
Stenay. At the same time the 357th Infantry on the 
right had advanced over rolling country, swept by 
machine gun and artillery fire, and reached the 
heights overlooking Baalon and later occupied the 
town. On this day the enemy threw into line against 
the 90th his last reserve division on the Western Front. 

The 89th Division on our left had, in the meantime, 
forced a crossing of the river at Pouilly and was 
ordered to send troops to protect the left flank of the 
90th Division north of Stenay. When these troops 
were in position, it was planned to pass the i8oth Bri- 
gade again through the lines of the 179th Brigade and 
to continue the attack in the direction of Montmedy. 

II. The Armistice. Early on the morning of No- 
vember nth word was received that the greatest 
battle in which American troops had ever been en- 
gaged was ended by Germany's acceptance of the 
Allied terms and that hostilities would cease at 11 
o'clock. Before that hour patrols from the 358th 
Infantry forced their way into Stenay and completely 
occupied the town, the enemy having evacuated after 
the desperate fighting of the previous day. 



OUR 110 Dx\YS' FIGHTING 255 

From the armistice until the division started its 
march into Germany the only activity was patrolling 
along the old front line to collect returned prisoners 
of war and civilians and to locate and guard aban- 
doned and surrendered material of war. 

Shortly after the conclusion of the armistice Maj. 
Gen. Henry T. Allen left the division to take com- 
mand of the VIII Corps. Command passed to Brig. 
Gen. J. P. O'Neil, who continued in command dur- 
ing the march into Germany and until December 
30th when Maj. Gen. C. H. Martin assumed com- 
mand. 

12. March to Germany. On the 23rd of November 
the 90th Division, having been designated as one of 
the nine divisions of the Army of Occupation (of 
which only one other, the 89th, was a National Army 
division), moved forward toward Montmedy. The 
division marched from Stenay across Luxembourg 
to Rhenish Prussia, where, as a part of the VII Corps, 
it shortly before Christmas settled into winter quar- 
ters along the Moselle River in the vicinity of Bern- 
castel, Germany, occupying the Krieses of Daun, 
Wittlich, and Berncastel. Here it was joined by the 
165th Field Artillery Brigade. 

13. Summary. The average advance made by the di- 
vision in the St. Mihiel operation was six kilometers, in 
the Meuse-Argonne twenty-two kilometers. The divi- 
sion was under fire from August 20th to November nth 
with the exception of seven days occupied in changing 
sectors; seventy-five days without a relief. During 
this time it went over the top in two major offensives 



256 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

and seven minor operations, and was still advancing 
when halted by the armistice. 

The division captured 42 pieces of artillery, 36 
trench mortars, 294 machine guns, 903 rifles, and 
immense quantities of ammunition and stores. It 
took as prisoners 32 officers and 1,844 men. Casual- 
ties amounted to 37 officers and 1,042 men killed; 
62 officers and 1,257 ^^^ severely wounded; 123 
officers and 4,671 men slightly wounded; 81 officers 
and 2,094 i^^ii gassed. Of the gassed there were 
17 deaths and 1,204 men were evacuated. Exact 
figures cannot be given on the missing for search is 
being made for all in this class and the number is de- 
creasing daily. 

The twenty-second division to reach France, it 
stands tenth in amount of artillery captured, thir- 
teenth in number of machine guns captured, and 
fourteenth in both prisoners captured and total ad- 
vance. 

The division received five official commendations 
for its individual work in the St. Mihiel and Meuse- 
Argonne operations. The 90th won its place in the 
Army of Occupation by never failing to accomplish a 
mission and by never giving up a foot of ground to the 
enemy. 

To include March i, 1919, 57 individuals of the 
90th Division had been awarded the Distinguished 
Service Cross. 

The shoulder insignia of the division is a monogram 
composed of the letters T and O in red. The division 
is known as the Alamo Division. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 257 

91st Division 

In compliance with General Orders, Nos. loi and 
109, W. D., 1917, the 91st (National Army) Division 
was organized August 25, 1917, at Camp Lewis, 
Washington. The majority of the officers were from 
California, Washington, and Oregon. The enlisted 
men from California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, 
Idaho, Nevada, Montana, and Alaska. 

The division shoulder insignia is a green fir tree, 
emblematic of the Far West. The division is known 
as the "Wild West Division." 

The division began leaving Camp Lewis June 19, 
19 1 8, for overseas, the move continuing until early 
in July and was through Camp Merritt, Camp Mills, 
England, and France. The first units of the division 
sailed from the United States on July 6, 191 8, and the 
last utafts arrived in France July 26, 1918. All units 
of the division, artillery excepted, were trained in the 
eighth training area, France. The artillery was 
trained in the vicinity of Clermont-Ferrand, France. 

The division left the eighth area September 6, 
1918, and from September nth to 14th constituted a 
part of the reserves in the St. Mihiel offensive moving 
thence to the northwest of Verdun, where it took an 
active part in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, Septem- 
ber 26th, advancing from west of Avocourt to north of 
Gesnes. Continued in the offensive until October 
6th, when it moved to the Nattancourt area. One 
brigade stayed in the line with the ist Division until 
October i6th. 



258 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

On October 19th the division passed to the com- 
mand of the King of Belgium. 

From October 31st to November 4th the divis- 
ion, under the direction of the French Army, in 
Belgium, took part in the Lys-Scheldt offensive 
west of the Escaut (Scheldt) River in the vicinity of 
Audenarde. 

From November loth to November nth the divi- 
sion took part in the Lys-Scheldt offensive east of the 
Escaut (Scheldt) River in the vicinity of Audenarde. 

On November 22, 19 18, detachment of division 
participated in the ceremony in connection with the 
entrance into the city of Brussels of the King and 
Queen of Belgium. 

In December, 1918, and January, 1919, the division 
moved to the Le Mans area. 

In March and April it embarked for the United 
States. 

To include March 8, 1919, 5,838 casualties, of which 
23 were prisoners of war, had been reported from this 
division. To include March i, 1919, 19 individuals 
of the division had been awarded the Distinguished 
Service Cross. 

The commanding generals of the division from its 
organization to include the date of the armistice were 
as follows: Maj. Gen. Harry A. Greene, August 25, 
1917, to November 24, 1917; Brig. Gen. Jas. A. Irons, 
November 24, 1917, to December 23, 1917; Brig. 
Gen. Frederick S. Foltz, December 23, 1917, to 
March 2, 1918; Maj. Gen. Harry A. Greene, March 
2, 1918, to June 19, 1918; Brig. Gen. Frederick S. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 259 

Foltz, June 19, 191 8, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. 
Wm. H. Johnston, August 31, 1918, to November 11, 
1918. 

The units composing the division were as follows : 

i8ist and 182nd Infantry brigades. 

361st, 362nd, 363rd, and 364th Infantry regiments. 

347th, 348th Machine Gun battalions. 

i66th Artillery Brigade. 

346th, 347th, 348th Artillery regiments. 

316th Trench Mortar Battery. 

346th Division Machine Gun Battalion. 

316th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

316th Field Signal Battalion. 

316th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

316th Supply Train. 

316th Ammunition Train. 

316th Sanitary Train. 

361st, 362nd, 363rd, 364th Ambulance companies 
and Field hospitals. 

92nd Division 

In compliance with telegraphic instructions Ad- 
jutant General's Office, dated October 26, 1917, the 
92nd (National Army) Division was organized October 
29th at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Upton, 
Meade, and Dix, the officers and enlisted men com- 
ing from all parts of the United States. The division 
is popularly known as the **Bujff aloes," the shoulder 
insignia being a buffalo in black circle on khaki patch. 

On June 2, 19 18, the division was assembled at 
Camp Upton for embarkation. 



260 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

From June 10-27, 191 8, the division embarked at 
Hoboken, New Jersey. 

On June 19, 191 8, the division headquarters arrived 
at Brest, France. 

On August 29, 19 1 8, after a period of training, the 
division entered the Hne at St. Die in the quiet Vosges 
sector. It was relieved on September 20th. 

From September 25th to 30th the division was in 
the reserve of the I Army Corps in the Argonne- 
Meuse sector. From September 24th to 30th the 
368th Infantry was brigaded with the nth Cuiras- 
siers under command of the XXXVIII Army Corps 
(French) forming the Haison detachment between the 
French and American armies. 

October 9th it was in line in the Marbach sector, 
astride the Moselle River from October 9th to No- 
vember isth. 

The artillery brigade joined the division October 
23, 1918. 

To include May 15, 19 19, the reports showed that 
the 92nd Division suffered the following casualties: 
battle deaths, 185; wounded, 1,495; prisoners, 17. 

To include March i, 19 19, twenty-one individuals 
of this division had been awarded the Distinguished 
Service Cross. 

The division commanders were as follows: Brig. 
Gen. Chas. C. Ballou, October 30, 19 17, to November 
20, 1917; Brig. Gen. John E. McMahon, November 
23 to December 3, 1917; Maj. Gen. Chas. C. Ballou, 
December 3, 1917, to January 12, 1918; Brig. Gen. 
Jas. B. Erwin, January 12, 1918, to March 12, 1918; 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 261 

Maj. Gen. Chas. C. Ballou, March 12, 1918, to 
November 12, 191 8. 

The units composing the division were as follows: 

183rd and 184th Infantry brigades. 

365th, 366th, 367th, 368th Infantry regiments. 

350th, 351st Machine Gun battahons. 

167th Artillery Brigade. 

349th, 350th, and 351st Artillery regiments. 

317th Trench Mortar Battery. 

349th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion. 

317th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

325th Field Signal Battalion. 

317th Train Headquarters and Military Police. 

317th Supply Train. 

317th Ammunition Train. 

317th Sanitary Train. 

365th, 366th, 367th, and 368th Ambulance com- 
panies and Field hospitals. 

A Brief History of the 3rd Division 

In compliance with letter. Adjutant General's 
Office, dated November 15, 1917, the division was 
organized on November 21, 19 17, at Camp Greene, 
Charlotte, North Carolina. The first units sailed 
from the United States on April 4, 19 18, and the last 
units arrived in France May 30, 191 8. The division 
went into the Chateau Villaine training area. Part 
of the division entered the line at Chateau-Thierry 
and Hill 204 May 31st. 

The entire division entered the Chateau-Thierry 
sector in June. On July 15th they met the Germans 



262 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

who crossed the Marne. On July 21st the division 
attacked across the Marne east of Chateau-Thierry 
and advanced to the Ourcq, where it was reheved on 
July 29th. 

On September loth the 3rd Division entered the St. 
Mihiel sector and formed a part of the V Corps Re- 
serve in the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. 
Was relieved September 14th. 

The division entered the line September 30th 
in the Argonne offensive, relieving a line division, 
and fought continuously until October 27th, when 
it was relieved north of Montfaucon. 

On November 14th the division entered the line 
on the right of the American Third Army and 
marched to the Rhine via Conflans and Saaburg, 
where it occupied the Kreis of Mayon. 

The division insignia consists of three white stripes 
which stand for the three operations in which the 
3rd Division took part, the Marne, St. Mihiel, and 
the Meuse-Argonne. The blue stands for the loyalty 
of those who placed their lives on the altar of self- 
sacrifice in defence of American ideals of liberty and 
democracy. The division is known as the Marne 
division. 

The total battle casualties of the division were 
16,356 as reported up to March 8, 1918. 233 individ- 
uals of the 3rd Division had received the Distin- 
guished Service Cross up to March i, 1919. 

The commanding generals of the division from the 
time of its organization were as follows: Maj. Gen. 
Jos. T. Dickman, November 28, 1917, to February 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 263 

26, 1918; Brig. Gen. Jas. A. Irons, February 27, 1918, 
to March 18, 1918; Maj. Gen. Jos. T. Dickman, 
April 12, 1918, to August 31, 1918; Maj. Gen. 
Beaumont B. Buck, August 31, 1918, to October 17, 
1918; Brig. Gen. Preston Brown, October 17, 1918, to 
November 11, 191 8. 

Attention is invited to an article in the May, 1919, 
number of the Century Magazine entitled "The 
American Expeditionary Forces at Chateau-Thierry'* 
by Col. R. H. C. Kelton, General Staff, who was 
Chief-of-Staff of this division at that time. 

A Brief History of the 89th Division 

In compliance with War Department Instructions 
the 89th Division was organized at Camp Funston, 
Kansas, in September, 19 17. The division was com- 
posed of National Army drafts mainly from Kansas, 
Missouri, and Colorado. 

The division remained In training at Camp Funston 
until May, 191 8, when the division moved to Camp 
Mills, New York, in preparation for movement over- 
seas. On June 4th division headquarters and the 
majority of the division embarked from New York 
and the last units arrived In France on July loth. 
Upon arrival in France the division was ordered to 
the Reynel training area (Haute-Marne) except the 
divisional artillery which was ordered to Camp Souge, 
near Bordeaux, for training. The division remained 
in the Reynel area until August 5th when It was 
moved by bus to the Toul front where it occupied 
the line between northeast corner of Bols de Bau- 



264 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

chot to the middle of the Etang de Vorgevaux, and 
was supported by the 55th Field Artillery and French 
250th Regiment Field Artillery. On September 12th 
the division participated in the St. Mihiel offensive as 
the right division of the American IV Corps and ad- 
vanced to a depth of twenty-one kilometers including 
the capture of the towns of Bency, Essey, BouUion- 
ville, Pannes, and Xammes. 

On October 7th the division was relieved in the 
Pannes- Fliery-Limey sector by the 37th Division 
and was moved by bus to the Recicourt area and 
became part of the First Army Reserves. On October 
1 2th the division moved forward in rear of the 32nd 
Division as part of the American V Corps in the 
Argonne offensive, and on October 20th the division 
went into the line along the Sommerance-Romagne 
road just north of the Kriemhilde defence positions. 
The division attacked on November ist and con- 
tinued in the assault until the armistice was signed 
when it had crossed the Meuse north of Stenay. The 
division was placed under the VII Corps of the Third 
Army and on November 24th began its march into 
Germany. The division was assigned the area 
bounded by Kreise of Prum, Bitburg, Trier, and 
Saarburg with division headquarters at Kyllburg 
where it was joined by the divisional artillery which 
had been serving with the 28th Division. On May 
19, 1919, the division sailed for the United States and 
debarked at New York. It was then sent to Camp 
Funston, Kansas, where it was demobilized shortly 
afterward. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 265 

The commanding generals of this division were: 
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, August 27, 1917, to 
November 26, 191 7; Brig. Gen. Frank L. Winn, 
November 26, 1917, to April 12, 1918; Maj. Gen. 
Leonard Wood, April 12, 1918, to May 24, 1918; 
Brig. Gen. Frank L. Winn, May 24, 191 8, to Septem- 
ber, 14, 1918; Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Wright, September 
14, 191 8, to October 24, 191 8; Maj. Gen. Frank L. 
Winn, October 24, 1918, to November 11, 1918. 

The division is popularly known as the middle 
west division and its shoulder insignia is a black "W" 
in a black circle. Different colours are placed in the 
lower part of the "W" according to the various 
branches of the service. 

The division captured from the enemy the follow- 
ing: 5,061 prisoners, 127 pieces of artillery, 455 ma- 
chine guns. The division advanced thirty-six kilo- 
meters against resistance. 

During active operations the division suffered the 
following casualties as reported to the War Depart- 
ment, May 10, 1919: killed 1,419; wounded, 7,394; 
number taken prisoners, i officer and 24 men. 

The following decorations have been awarded to 
individuals of this division: 

Congressional Medal of Honour, 8; Distinguished 
Service Crosses, 119; Distinguished Service Medals, 
2; Croix de Guerie, 55; Belgian Cross L'Ordere 
Leopold, I ; Belgian Croix de Guerre, 2. 

The division was composed of the following organi- 
zations : 

177th and 178th Infantry brigades. 



266 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

164th Artillery Brigade. 

353rd, 3S4th, 3SSth, and 356th Infantry regiments. 

340th, 341st, 342nd Machine Gun battalions. 

340th, 341st, 342nd Field Artillery regiments. 

3 14th Trench Mortar battery. 

3 14th Engineer Regiment and Train. 

3 14th Field Signal battalion. 

3 14th Headquarters Train and Military Police. 

314th Ammunition Train. 

314th Supply Train. 

314th Sanitary Train consisting of Field Hospital 
and Ambulance companies Nos. 353, 354, 355, and 
356. 



FACTS AND FIGURES OF THE FIGHTING ARMY 



STRENGTH FIRST ARMY 

MAXIMUM FIGURES 

Americans 896,000 Oct. 6 

French 138,300 Oct. 10 

Total 1,034,300 



DAILY AUTOMATIC SUPPLIES ORDERED BY G-4 
FOR THE TROOPS OF THE FIRST ARMY 



SEPTEMBER 


MEN 


ANIMALS 


GASOLINE 


23 rd 


791,719 


122,590 


151,720 


24th 


790,000 


123,000 


152,000 


25th 


775,000 


127,000 


157,000 


26th 


777,800 


1 29,900 


159*300 


27th 


807,971 


128,044 


159*440 


28th 


835,026 


I29>S7I 


158*835 


29th 


851,306 


132,146 


167,617 


30th 


864,000 


134,000 


170,300 


OCTOBER 








1st 


878,694 


135*803 


170,420 


2nd 


852,400 


128,300 


169,400 


3rd 


842,800 


121,800 


167,700 


4th 


855,000 


131,900 


169,800 


5th 


872,800 


135*400 


171,200 


6th 


896,000 


143*500 


178,800 


7th 


870,600 


132,300 


176,400 


8th 


890,100 


133,100 


166,100 


9th 


617,700 


109,200 


123,400 


loth 


623,100 


108,000 


132,900 



267 



268 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



OCTOBER 


MEN 


ANIMALS 


GASOLINE 


nth 


609,100 


105,100 


126,200 


1 2th 


597^900 


96,700 


132,300 


13th 


596,800 


97,400 


133,300 


14th 


633*400 


99,000 


136,600 


15th 


605,700 


94,000 


120,600 


i6th 


646,600 


103,700 


126,100 


17th 


618,800 


113,300 


124,600 


1 8th 


593»7oo 


102,200 


122,200 


19th 


592,800 


102,100 


122,300 


20th 


594,800 


101,300 


123,700 


21 St 


592,600 


102,100 


123,600 


22nd 


593>5oo 


102,200 


123,500 


23 rd 


592,300 


98,000 


121,900 


24th 


589,400 


98,200 


124,100 


25th 


552,500 


91,400 


117,300 


26th 


612,900 


101,800 


122,700 


27th 


641,500 


103,000 


136,700 


28th 


634,600 


97,000 


132,700 


29th 


651,300 


103,300 


133,900 


30th 


651,000 


99,100 


138,600 


31st 


599,900 


86,300 


128,400 


NOVEMBER 








1st 


645,900 


102,100 


135,200 


2nd 


681,400 


103,600 


143,500 


3rd 


679,200 


102,500 


144,100 


4th 


678,400 


100,200 


143,900 


5th 


688,800 


100,200 


196,100 


6th 


668,200 


97,700 


144,300 


7th 


683,700 


102,200 


147,200 


8th 


707,600 


103,600 


148,700 


9th 


712,200 


100,400 


147,100 


loth 


683,200 


97,000 


147,100 


nth 


694,100 


99,100 


140,900 



Extract from report of Asst. Chief-of-StafF G-4, First Army, 
showing strength of First Army on various dates. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 269 

THE AMERICAN COMMANDERS 

FIRST ARMY 

Commander-in-Chief, Gen. John J. Pershing 
Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett 

I CORPS V CORPS 

Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron 

Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Dickman Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall 

III CORPS FRENCH XVII CORPS 

Maj. Gen. Robt. L. Bullard General Claudel 
Maj. Gen. John L. Hines 

DIVISION COMMANDERS 

ist. Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall 
Brig. Gen. F. E. Bamford 
Brig. Gen. Frank Parker 
2nd. Maj. Gen. John A. Le Jeune 
3rd. Maj. Gen. Beaumont B. Buck 
4th. Maj. Gen. John L. Hines 

Maj. Gen. Mark L. Hersey 
5th. Maj. Gen. John E. McMahon 
Maj. Gen. Hanson E. Ely 
26th. Maj. Gen. Clarence E. Edwards 

Brig. Gen. F. E. Bamford 
28th. Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir 
29th. Maj. Gen. Charles G. Morton 
32nd. Maj. Gen. W. G. Haan 
33rd. Maj. Gen. George Bell, Jr. 
35th. Maj. Gen. Peter E. Traub 
37th. Maj. Gen. C. S. Farnsworth 
42nd. Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher ' 
77th. Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander 
78th. Maj. Gen. James H. McRae 
79th. Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn 
80th. Maj. Gen. A. Cronkhite 



270 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

8ist. Maj. Gen. C. J. Bailey 

82nd. Maj. Gen. George B. Duncan 

Both. Maj. Gen. William M. Wright 

90th. Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen 

91st. Maj. Gen. William H. Johnston 

AMERICAN DIVISIONS ENGAGED 

The following American divisions were engaged in the Meuse- 
Argonne battle: 

Regular Army 

div. infantry artillery 

First 16,18,26,28 5>6, 7 

Second . . . . 9, 23 Inf. 5 and 6 

Marines 12, 15, 17 

Third 4,7,30,38 10,18,76 

Fourth .... 39»47>S8,S9 I3>i6,77 

Fifth 10,11,60,61 19,20,21 

National Guard 

26th, New England . 101,102,103,104 101,102,103 

28th, Pennsylvania . 109,110,111,112 107,108,109 
29th, Maryland and 

Va 113,114,115,116 110,111,112 

32nd, Wis. and Mich. 125,126,127,128 119, 120, 121, 113, 

Ii4»ii5 

33rd, Illinois . . 129,130,131,132 104,105,106 

35th, Kansas, Mo. . 137, 138, 139, 140 128, 129, 130 
37th, Ohio . . . 145, 146, 147, 148 122, 123, 124 
42nd, Rainbow . . 165,166,167,168 149, 150, 151, 146, 

148 

National Army 

77th, New York City 305*306,307,308 304,305,306 
78th, N. Y., N. J., Pa. 309,310,311,312 307,308,309 
79th, Va., Maryland. 3i3» 3I4»3IS» 3^6 325*326,327 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



271 



DIV. INFANTRY 

8oth, Pa., W. Va., Va. 317, 318, 319, 320 
81st, Tenn.jCarolinas 321, 322, 323, 324 
82nd, Georgia, Ala. . 325,326,327,328 
89th, Kansas, Mo. . 353» 354» 355> 356 
90th, Texas, Okla. . 357> 35^, 3S9» 3^0 
91st, Pacific Coast . 361,362,363,364 



ARTILLERY 

313,314,315 
128, 129, 130 
319,320,321 
340,341,342 
313,314,315 
113,114,115 



I CORPS 

Divs. 

77,28,35 

78,82, I 

77,80 

42 



First Army 
v corps iii corps 



Divs. 

91,37,79 
42-32,32,80 

3, 5 
2-89, 



Divs. 

4, 80, 33 

3,33 
5,ISF.C. 

90,5,32 



FRENCH XVII 
CORPS 

Divs. 

29, 18F, 26F 
79, 26, 26 

33 



SPECIAL ARTILLERY USED 

The special artillery employed in the Meuse-Argonne battle, 
exclusive of artillery employed as divisional artillery, was as 
follows: 

American Artillery 

134th Field Artillery 75 

135th Field Artillery 75 

136th Field Artillery 155 How. 

147th Field Artillery 155 

347th Field Artillery 4.7 

348th Field Artillery 155 G. P. F. 

44th Regt. C.A.C 8-inch How. 

43rd Regt. C.A.C 190 

51st Regt. C.A.C 240-270 

53rd Regt. C.A.C 340-400-81 M. 

55th Regt. C.A.C 155 



272 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

56th Regt. C.A.C 155 

57th Regt. C.A.C 155 

59th Regt. C.A.C 8-inch How. 

60th Regt. C.A.C. . 155 

65th Regt. C.A.C 9.2 How. 

Naval Battalion 14-inch 

52nd Regt. C.A.C. ....... 81 M. 

French Artillery 

219th Regiment 75 

238th Regiment 75 

247th Regiment 75 

117th Regiment 105 

183rd Regiment 105 

451st Regiment 105 

454th Regiment 105 

456th Regiment 105 

6th Foot Artillery 90 to 155 

5th R.A.P 95-120-155 

ist R.A.P 120155 

151st R.A.P 120-L 

86th R.A.D 145-155 

8ist R.A.L 145-155 

87thR.A.D 145-155 

113th Regt 155 Short 

142nd Regt 155 Short 

301st Regt 155 Short 

317th Regt 155 Short 

330th Regt 155 Short 

407th Regt 155 

416th Regt 155 Long 

413th Regt 155 

420th Regt 155 Long 

182nd Foot Artillery 120-155-220 

308th Regt 155-220 T. R . 

289th Regt 155-200 M. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 273 

282nd Regt 220 T. R. -270-280 

71st Regt 240 

73rd Regt 270-293 

74th Regt 190 

7Sth Regt 305 

76th Regt. 305 

77th Regt 340 

78th Regt 370-84 M. 

Naval Batteries — 6th, loth, nth, 12th, i6th, 17th, i8th — 16M. 



274 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



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OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



275 



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Strength 


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First . . 

Second . 

Third . . 

Fourth . . 

Fifth . . 

Sixth 

Seventh . . 

Twenty-sixth 

Twenty-eighth 

Twenty-ninth 

Thjrty-second 

Thirty-third 

Thirty-fifth 

Thirty-seventh 

Forty-second 

Seventy-sevent 

Seventy-eighth 

Seventy-ninth 

Eightieth 

Eighty-first 

Eighty-second 

Eighty-ninth 

Ninetieth . 

Ninety-first 

Ninety-second 



276 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

AIRPLANES— FIRST ARMY AIR SERVICE 

St. Mihiel Offensive: 





Bombardment 


Pursuit 


Observation 


I9I8 


TOTAL 


AVAIL- 


TOTAL 


AVAIL- 


TOTAL AVAIL- 






ABLE 




ABLE 


ABLE 


Sept. 1 2th 


88 


65 


372, 


297 


338 245 


13th 


85 


47 


372 


230 


324 245 


14th 


85 


62 


363 


200 


343 257 


15th 


88 


53 


372 


221 


336 264 



Average 



1918 

Sept. 1 2th 

13th 

14th 

15th 

Average 



86 



57 370 237 335 252 



FRENCH AERIAL DIVISION 



TOTAL 
513 

595 
678 
623 



Argonne-Meuse Offensive: 

Pursuit 
1918 

Sept. 26th 
27th 
28th 
29th 
30th 

1st 

2nd 

3rd 

4th 

5th 



AVAILABLE 

336 
426 
440 
400 

400 



Bombardment Observation 

total avail- total avail- total avail- 
ABLE 



602 



Oct. 



312 

322 

325 

333 
339 
334 
331 
331 
297 
296 



193 
207 
185 
200 
228 
223 
198 
198 
185 
202 



86 

83 
68 
70 
71 
79 
81 
81 
79 
78 



able 

58 

60 

48 

51 

52 

SI 

59 
59 

55 

55 



423 
434 
407 
419 
419 
421 
423 
423 
419 
400 



able 

333 
344 

322 
362 
361 
356 
343 
343 
342 
330 



Oct. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 277 

I918 TOTAL AVAIL- TOTAL AVAIL- TOTAL AVAIL- 
ABLE ABLE ABLE 



Nov. 



6th 


301 


191 


82 


56 


417 


324 


7th 


279 


198 


82 


56 


393 


320 


8th 


276 


198 


85 


(>3 


423 


332 


9th 


282 


193 


93 


71 


438 


342 


loth 


310 


154 


93 


67 


436 


320 


nth 


282 


181 


97 


71 


443 


330 


1 2th 


274 


192 


Id 


78 


426 


329 


13th 


287 


222 


100 


80 


435 


352 


14th 


296 


217 


97 


82 


431 


356 


15th 


293 


204 


99 


84 


434 


355 


1 6th 


280 


213 


98 


83 


423 


354 


17th 


282 


197 


107 


98 


332 


275 


1 8th 


278 


169 


116 


91 


324 


259 


19th 


281 


170 


103 


82 


350 


263 


20th 


282 


188 


108 


91 


352 


274 


2ISt 


283 


174 


103 


93 


354 


280 


22nd 


277 


132 


95 


81 


346 


275 


23 rd 


278 


139 


98 


73 


341 


275 


24th 


276 


172 


104 


72 


337 


270 


25th 


274 


178 


100 


76 


328 


271 


26th 


274 


176 


lOI 


80 


340 


287 


27th 


280 


166 


lOI 


75 


343 


282 


28th 


280 


154 


99 


76 


342 


274 


29th 


276 


139 


103 


73 


337 


263 


30th 


282 


141 


107 


66 


331 


254 


31st 


284 


145 


93 


61 


331 


260 


1st 


284 


173 


92 


73 


317 


244 


2nd 


289 


174 


93 


79 


338 


262 


3rd 


288 


161 


95 


71 


328 


247 


4th 


288 


163 


94 


69 


320 


240 


Sth 


295 


168 


94 


64 


318 


220 


6th 


290 


153 


93 


66 


302 


221 


7th 


28s 


171 


93 


73 


326 


251 


Sth 


287 


150 


95 


81 


332 


253 



278 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



I9I8 


TOTAL 


AVAIL- 
ABLE 


TOTAL 


AVAIL- 
ABLE 


TOTAL 


AVAIL 
ABL] 


Nov. 9th 


283 


181 


95 


85 


311 


246 


loth 


284 


164 


95 


81 


307 


246 


nth 


283 


188 

80 

242 


94 


80 


305 


242 



400 

Number of enemy planes destroyed and confirmed — ^417. 
Number of enemy balloons destroyed and confirmed — 53. 
Number of our planes lost in action — 199. 
Number of our balloons destroyed — 22. 

Balloons in St. Mihiel Offensive — 16 (i for each Company on 

the front). 
Balloons in Argonne-Meuse OjfFensive — 22. 

AMERICAN SQUADRONS IN FIRST ARMY OFFENSIVE 

St. Mihiel: 

12 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons. 
9 Corps Observation Squadrons. 

2 Army Observation Squadrons. 
I Bombardment Squadron. 

I Night Reconnaissance Squadron. 

25 Total. 

Argonne-Meuse: 

13 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons (i night). 
7 Corps Observation Squadrons. 

3 Army Observation Squadrons (i night). 

4 Bombardment Squadrons. 

I Army Artillery Observation Squadron. 

28 Total. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 



279 



The First Day Bombardment Group joined the Army Air 
Forces on this front on October i6th with an available strength 
of 85 planes. It took the place of the French Night Bombers. 

The records of the Air Service during the battle are best set 
out as given in the official operations reports. These records 
follow: 





OUR PLANES 


ENEMY 


ENEMY 


CONFIRMATION 


CRASHED OR 


PLANES 


LOSS 


OF VICTORY 


DATE 


MISSING 


DOWNED 


CONFIRMED 


REQUESTED 


Sept. 26 


13 


19 


5 




" 27 


7 


26 


3 




" 28 


7 


33 


6 




" 29 


2 


7 


— 




" 30 
Oct. I 

" 2 


8 

3 
12 


8 


3 




14 


II 




" 3 


5 


8 


— 


- 


" 4 


30 


18 


— 




" 5 


II 


7 


I 




" 6 


12 


8 


— 




" 7 


5 


I 


— 




" 8 


4 


3 


— 




" 9 


6 


9 


— 




" 10 


10 


33 


— 




" II 


2 


— 


— 





" 12 


2 


— 




I 


" 13 


— 


— 







" 14 


— 


— 







" IS 


4 


— 




— 


" 16 


3 


— 




I 


" 17 


2 









" 18 


8 






17 


" 19 


5 






2 


" 20 


I 






— 


" 21 


S 






2 


Totals 


167 


194 


29 


23 



280 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 







OUR PLANES 


ENEMY 


ENEMY ( 


CONFIRMATIOl 






CRASHED OR 


PLANES 


LOSS 


OF VICTORY 


DATE 


MISSING 


DOWNED 


CONFIRMED 


REQUESTED 


oug) 


'it Forward 


167 


194 


29 


23 


:t. 


22 




5 






14 


i( 


23 




7 






28 


a 


24 




8 









(( 


25 




I 






— 


<e 


26 




3 






I 


(C 


27 




14 






13 


<c 


28 




8 






3 


(C 


29 




14 






23 


<< 


30 




12 






23 


OV. 


31 

I 




8 
4 






7 
I 


ie 


2 




3 






— 


a 


3 




18 






7 


a 


4 




II 






30 


a 


5 




16 






19 


et 


6 




12 






7 


it 


7 




2 






— 


te 


8 




4 






3 


ee 


9 




4 






I 


a 


10 




I 






2 


it 


II 




2 






— 



Totals 



324 



194 



29 



205 



Our Bombing Groups during the period from Sept. 26th to 
Nov. nth dropped behind the enemy's lines a total of 94,448 
kilograms of explosives. 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 281 

AIR SERVICE CASUALTIES 

The casualties in the American Air Service which took part 
in the Meuse-Argonne battle are reported in the period from 
August 20th to November nth as follows: 

UNIT KILLED WOUNDED MISSING PRISONERS 

I St Pursuit Group . 

2nd Pursuit. 

3rd Pursuit .... 

1st Corps Observation. 

3rd Corps Observation. 

5th Corps Observation. 

1st Army Observation . 

1st Day Bombardment. 14 26 41 15 

Totals .... 105 104 154 16 

The number of American planes shot down in this period is 
given in the Air Service reports as 199; number of our balloons 
shot down in the same period, 22. 



28 


II 


19 


10 


I 


30 


9 


9 


24 


21 


25 


17 


9 


9 


5 


7 


II 


2 


7 


12 


16 


14 


26 


41 



Confirmation of the destruction of enemy aircraft was re- 
quested in the following cases; this report covering the period 
from August loth to November nth: 

UNIT 

1st Pursuit Group 

2nd Pursuit 

3rd Pursuit 

I St Corps Observation .... 
3rd Corps Observation .... 
5th Corps Observation .... 
I St Army Observation .... 
ist Day Bombardment. 

Totals 456 62 



ENEMY 


ENEMY 


AIRPLANES 


BALLOONS 


107 


SI 


146 


3 


87 


8 


16 




7 




12 




33 




48 





282 OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 

TANKS 

The following tank organizations were employed in the Meuse- 
Argonne offensive: 

American Tanks 

1st American Brigade (now ^04th) — Light 

344th Battalion 69 

345th Battalion 73 

Total 142 

French Tanks 

^04th Regiment — Light 

17th Group 13 

^O'^th Regiment — Light 

14th Group IS 

St. Chamond Group — Heavy 2$ 

Schneider Group — Medium 20 

Total 73 

Out of 142 fighting tanks the Americans lost 22 totally 
destroyed. The French lost about 25. The American tank 
casualties in men were as follows: 

Officers — Killed 3; wounded 18, Total 21 
Men— Killed 16; " 126, " 142 

Grand Total 163 



The American tanks were used in the advance up the Aire 
valley while the French were employed in the Bois de Mont- 
faucon, at Montfaucon, Cunel, Septsarges, Romagne, in the 
Bois de Cuisy, and in the valley of the Andon River. These 
tanks fought with the following divisions: 79th, 37th, 4th, 80th, 
32nd, and 3rd. The French tanks were in action from Septem- 
ber 26th to October 14th making their last attack on October 



OUR 110 DAYS' FIGHTING 283 

9th. The American tanks were used in several stages of the 
attack, making their last attack November 2nd. All the tanks 
had great difficulty in getting across No Man's Land and for 
the launching of the offensive September 26th and the two days 
following. The French tanks had to cross the famous Hill 304 
which was regarded as the worst terrain on the Western Front 
as it was covered with shell craters from the battle of Verdun 
in 1916. The tanks which were destroyed were direct hits. 
Officers of the Tank Corps report that the anti-tank rifle did 
very little damage. 



THE END 




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EXTRACT OF METZ- COM MERCY 




STMIHIEL OFFENSIVE 

MAP SHOWING DAILY POSITION OF FRONT LINE 

Map RoomGS.G.H.Q. 

May 24. 1919 

It IS thouqht ifie lines shown are ss near accurate as if mil ever be 
possible to obtam^ Ttie folloivinq prcccdu/v tyas used in ttieir compilation. 



uiuuiii.w fbrce, mil be considerec/ as the front line, tt is. jn genera/ the 

line which would be protected in case ofdttack, by ffie jfifisicm/srtil/ery 

barrage. A line Joining points reocfied by patrols ivill not be giyenastlie 

'-ont line. ., , ^ «j ,.» 

(b) Lines submitted bu divisions were compiled on one map ana all aoubt- 

il or disputed points noted, points such as wfiere tfie lines of adjoining 

divisions were not continuous or where two divisions claimed the same 

around at the same time. „ . , . , . , .. 

(c> An officer from GS. 6.H.Q. visited each division and took up with 

them these doubtful or disputed points 

(d) After hearing both sides of all questions. Interviewing in some cases 
individuals down to platoon commanders, a decision was Ihade on each 
^ \ point. The map shows the results of these decisions. The records of 
a I G-3 6.H. (?. contain the data upon which the decisions were based 

*^wl — ' Front line of which there is some doubt. 

line along which liaison was maintained between divisions-only 

shown in case front line was not continuous. 
I , - , ^, 1 Indicates s division in sector, the divisional front tine, the division- 
'^ a/ limits the date the line was held, and the number of the di- 
vision holdinq the line. In the illustration the 2"^ division was 
holding the ikcfor shown at 24 hours (12.00 PM.> on Sept 14. 
When a date is indicated as follows Sept. 13-14. it means that 
the line was the same at 24 hours (12 00 R 1^.) on Sept 13 and 
at 24 hours (1200 PM.) on Sept. 14. 

Abbreviatfons used' 
Fr. ' French. 

D.I.C.' French Colonial Division. 

D.CP- French Dismounted Cavalru Division. ^,,, ,„ 

® Advanced elements 1^ and 26^1' divisions met tiere about 7.15AM 



Tk NOTE: Meiz is located approximafeli^ in the center of this square 




